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This studv has attempted to understand Gibbon* s approach to
eoolesiastioal history and to evaluate it in the light of current think¬
ing on the subject. It was seen that three major sources contributed to
the historian*s preparation: the eighteenth century environment, the
impact of external oircumstances, and certain individual qualities in
the man himself. It was indicated that Gibbon had a * philosophy of
history* only in the empirical sense of possessing a fundamental view¬
point from which he approached his materials. His treatment of his pre¬
decessors was defended from the oharga of being *ore-Cooernican* on the
strength of the fact that he made an unmistakable atteaot to assess the
trustworthiness of his authorities, however inadequate by ourrent stan¬
dards*
Gibbon*s attitude towards ecclesiastical history, it was argued,
did not spring from a specific antagonism against Christianity but from
a general feeling for life which was in operation over the total range
of his experience and observation. -Prominent in this outlook were an
admiration for ancient Rome, a reflection of eighteenth century rational¬
ism and scientism; a distrust for zeal, and a sense of the importance of
individual independence. Understandably, Gibbon applied this predis¬
position of his mind to the materials of ecclesiastical history.
It was further argued that Gibbon*s treatment of Christianity
must be traced against the background of his interest in all the factors
involved in Rome's decay and fall rather than on the common and errone¬
ous supposition that he had singled out Christianity as the chief cause
of the catastrophe.
It was concluded that Gibbon's employment of the ironical device
of limiting his consideration of Christianity to an inquiry into the
♦secondary* causes of its success was an important element in the defence
of his work as a restricted and a scientific study. It was seen also
that his apparent unawareness of his assumptions was a most significant
Use other side if necessary.
weakness; for it betrayed Mm, in Ms irony ana mnuenao, inuo a axs-
missal of the Supernatural from history, a dismissal which could not
be substantiated by the evidence of critical history. It was concluded,
however, that lasting importance may be attached to Gibbon's inquiry for
its insight into the eighteenth century mentality, for its alternate
view of ecclesiastical history, for its effeot uoon subsequent approaches
to the subject, and for its attack upon a mistaken conception of the
♦historical* element in Faith itself.
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Many Christian writers have seen fit to attempt to answer
Edward Gibbon's treatment of ecclesiastical history. Some few
rationalist thinkers have been nromnted to take up the pen in his
defence. But few indeed have been the efforts to estimate the
nature and significance of his History apart from the impetus of
controversy.
This study has attempted to understand, rather than to
answer or defend, Gibbon's attitude towards ecclesiastical history.
The aim was to trace the essential background out of which his work
emerged, to inquire into the fundamental features of his handling
of Christian history, and to ascertain the factors which produced
his particular approach. At the same time, the effort has been to
evaluate Gibbon as an ecclesiastical historian in the light of
contemporary thinking on the subject.
The present would seem entirely opportune for this study.
For at least two reasons, the previous century could have scant
patience with Gibbon. First, it was a period of intense specializa¬
tion when the task of the historian became that of locating some
isolated corner of history and of seeking to disentangle its essen- .
1
tial character. Thus not one but many scholars must combine to
establish the vast structure which is history. Under these
1 Is there not a story of a German historian who, on being
invited to deliver a lecture on the sixteenth century, indignantly
replied: "My life-task is the history of Germany from 1525 to 1530"?
iv
circumstances, the attempted soope and sweep of The Decline and Fall
could only appear presumptuous. It could not be considered within
the sphere of serious, Scientific* history.
Secondly, in their supposition that it was necessary for
the historian to 'wash his mind* of all traces of bias and partisan
allegiance and to assume an attitude of neutrality, nineteenth cen¬
tury thinkers understandably regarded as quaint and naive an ec¬
clesiastical historian who obviously slanted his material and made <
no effort to conceal his decided preference for the Empire over
against the Church. Such an 'uncritical* writer scarcely warranted
the attention of repudiation; more appropriately, he could be ig¬
nored.
But the position has changed. No longer is specialization
regarded as sufficient for the purposes of history. There is in¬
creasing recognition of an intimate interwovenness in the life of
the past, that the parts must be understood in relation to the
whole; in short, that the sweep of history must be restored. And
it is now freely acknowledged that freedom from bias is not possible.
No writer approaches the materials of ecclesiastical history with a
blank mind; nor would it be desirable if he did.
Thus it can be claimed that however akin his mentality was
to his own age and to no other, Gibbon nevertheless would have been
more at home in the twentieth century than in the nineteenth. And
this is a consideration which may permit a more sympathetic recon¬
struction of his attitude than would have been conceivable a hun¬
dred or even fifty years ago.
A brief explanation is called for concerning the manner in
which this study is presented, particularly with respect to the
v
extensive use of footnotes and appendices. Frequent reference to
other writers, especially contemporaries, has been made with full
understanding that they were not to be regarded in any sense as
Authorities'. Yet some indication that many of the thoughts being
advanced were not new or novel, that they had occurred to other
minds before occurring to one's own, seemed appropriate.
Reference also has been made to numerous critics who have
written about Gibbon; not on the one hand, for the purpose of es¬
tablishing a conscensus; nor on the other, for the pleasure of
castigating one's predecessors; but simply because to attempt to
assess the merits of Gibbon on one point or another where experienced
critics have already given their verdict would be foolhardy if one
did not begin by availing oneself of their guidance or at least by
taking them into account.
References to Gibbon's writings are commonly made in the
notes to illustrate and substantiate statements made in the argument,
.and in order more clearly to indicate the real impact of the his¬
torian's attitude, it was often felt that mere page references were
not sufficient, and therefore in many instances passages have been
quoted in full. While the indulgence of the reader is entreated for
the additional length which this method has entailed, it is clear
that the argument could move faster because this material v/as not
introduced into the text. Effort has been made to make the argument
continuous and in a sense complete apart from any reference to the
notes.
The writer would acknowledge his indebtedness to the typist,
Mrs. Jean Collier, for her patience and accuracy; to his wife for
many helpful suggestions; to Herbert Butterfield, whose thinking
vi
about Christianity and its relationship to history has been of im¬
measurable assistance; and to the great work of Gibbon, which has
never failed to be stimulating and which has opened for this writer
a new window into the history of the Church.
Throughout the inquiry, except where otherwise specified,
the references to The Decline and Fall are to Bury's revised edition,
1926 (seven volumes). The -autobiography used is from the World's
Classics Series, with an introduction by J. B. Bury, 1907; except
where Memoir A., B., etc., are cited; then the reference is to the
edition of John Murray, 1897. Finally, the references to Gibbon's




THE "REPARATION OF THE HISTORIAN
It is generally agreed that the function of the biographer
is to ascertain not just the outward facts of a famous man*3 life
but the inward springs and relations of his character as well. As
Carlyle once observed, the effort must be to answer certain funda¬
mental questions: "How did the world and man's life represent them¬
selves to his mind? How did coexisting circumstances modify him from
without? How did he modify thara from within? In one word, what was
1
the effect of society on him? What was his effect on society?"
The Historian and History
nineteenth century concention,— Such an inquiry into an
historian's life is necessary, it now appears, not only to meet the
requirements of biography but for an understanding of history itself.
This was not always acknowledged. In the nineteenth century, the
individuality of the historian was considered of negligible signi¬
ficance other, that is, than from a biogranhioal standpoint. For cer¬
tain, it was assumed that the historian would be reliable. But his
purpose was to recover 'objective' history. This could be accom¬
plished by reoourse to the archives and the dispassionate study of
1 The writer is indebted for this ouotation from Carlyle to
Bertram olfe, Diego Rivera (London: Robert Hale, 1939), n.v. Carlyle
added, "He who should answer these questions In regard to any Indi¬




documents. What his personal history happened to be was of no conse¬
quence, In fact, his inquiry could be regarded as 'history* to the ex¬
tent that he succeeded in eliminating these subjective considerations.
a modern view,— By contrast, the tendency today is to
recognize the importance to history of the historian. Critics agree
that there are no objective events or facts apart from someone's
1
subjective interpretation. Out of all the multitudinous materials
of the past, the significant items must be selected, and that selec¬
tion will depend not upon the matter of history but upon the mind of
the historian. In short, the human element is a factor which no
amount of historical research can eliminate. History can never be
an exact science. Between the present and the past, as one writer
has aptly suggested, there remains a "screen"; and the historian
2
alone is the "hole" in that screen.
Thus there are several considerations about Edward Gibbon
which must be evaluated in order to appraise accurately his treat¬
ment of ecclesiastical history. Perhaps this can be done by seeking
to answer the questions which were raised at the outset: "How did
the world and man's life represent themselves to his mind? How did
coexisting circumstances modify hira from without? How did he modify
them from within?"
Eighteenth Century Background
Giobon's world was the eighteenth century, a strong-minded
age which exercised an influence uoon all its sons, but not least of
1 For a fuller statement of the impossibility of 'objectivity*
in history, see Chapter Three of this inquiry. See also Appendix 1.
2 Cf. Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History (Hew York:
Charles Soribner's Sons, 1950), p. 23,
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all upon Gibbon. Beyond question, it was a period of self-con¬
sciousness, of well established principles, and of clearly recog¬
nizable assumptions. For purposes of this inquiry, these character¬
istic features of the era may be analysed: its general disposition
towards self-confidence, tolerance and secularism; its approach to
history; its specifically religious development.
The confidence of the eighteenth century.— A faith in the
stability and regularity of the forces of nature contributed to the
1
confidence of the age. On the strength of the scientific dis¬
coveries of the previous century, it was assumed that nature had
been brought into a system of order and complete predictability.
Instead of being victimized by nature, man could now be master over
it. And these laws of nature were one with laws of reason which
were also universal and unchangeable. It was a definite universe,
and man need be under no uncertainty regarding his relationship to
it.
Coupled with this confidence in the external world was a
belief in the essential goodness of human nature which had been cor¬
rupted by evil customs and institutions. On the Continent, Diderot
and the Encyclopaedists were arguing that there was nothing in humanity
2
itself to keep the world from becoming a desirable dwelling place.
The budding radicalism of this movement wa3 rejected in England, but
3
its attitude towards human nature was widely shared. Life was
moving forward; the idea of progress was in the air; there was even
1 The meaning of the term ♦nature* in eighteenth century
usage is ambiguous. See Appendix 2.
? Cf. John Morley, Diderot and the Encyclopaedists (London:
Maoraillan & Co., 1886), I, Morley described Diderot's achieve-
ment as a "combining of the scientific idea and the social idea."
3 By Shaftesbury, e.g., and the Cambridge Platonlsts.
u
talk of the infinite perfectibility of man through education. How
could this age fail to feel confident and sufficient in itself?
The conception of tolerance,— Equally a part of the general
mentality was the idea that while men might differ on many subjects,
these differences could be regarded with tolerance and even indif¬
ference. The one sin was to introduce the note of partisan bitter¬
ness in support of a particular view. This was the reason for a
auspicious attitude towards religion. Philosophers like Holbach
claimed that religion tended to produce superstition, which in turn
led to intolerance; and intolerance was the enemy of enlightened
1
humanity.
But this attitude ought not to be interpreted as implacable
hostility to religion. The age felt that it could afford to be
generous. Superstition belonged to the childhood of the race, and
the advanoe of rationality would eliminate such ideas. Meanwhile,
the vulgar man need not be deprived of his objects of devotion pro¬
vided he did not interfere with the pursuits of the rational man.
Intolerant attitudes of all descriptions would be set aside. Not
even the recognition of the evils of superstition was regarded as
sufficient reason to upset the aspiring tolerance of the age.
Tendencies towards secularism.— A critic has argued that the
Enlightenment meant "the attempt to secularize every department of
2
human life and thought." And it may be acknowledged that this
1 Holbaoh, Systeme de la Nature, cited by Basil Willey, The
Eighteenth Century mckground (London:' 'Ghatto & Windus, 1940), p. 165.
See Chapter Four for a discussion of Gibbon*s indiotment of super¬
stition, a position which largely reflected this view, even though he
specifically disassociated himself from Holbach and the Encyclo¬
paedists. Cf. Memoir B.. p. 202. Cf. also Appendix 2.
2 K. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: The Claren¬
don Press, 1946), p. 76. ~
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effort occupied a major portion of the energy of the age. Religion
must be redirected into useful channels. It must evidence more
total involvement in the affairs of the present world, since this
was the only world about which man could be certain.
Contributing to this attitude was a clinging to the specific
and the tangible. There was a concern for definite information, and
creeds and other worldly speculations appeared profitless and point¬
less. Equally operative was a cosmopolitan perspective which enabled
men to envisage the traditions of Christianity not as universal but
as the religious expression of the particular part of the world into
which Western man had happened to be born. Simple people might
believe their own faith to do true in some exclusive sense; the
1
sophisticated and the informed knew better.
What was needed nowwas to reoast Christian doctrines and
ideas into practical concents which would be understandable to
thinking men everywhere, and so to recover their real significance.
Thus a contemporary historian has asserted that the excessive
individualism of the Enlightenment arose out of the Christian doc¬
trine of personality, its humanitarianism from the Christian doctrine
of charity, and the concept of Europe* out of the Idea of Christen-
2
dom. /Uid if the period possessed a version of a 'Kingdom of God',
this could be identified with the Enlightenment itself; its fulfill¬
ment, despite a few dark areas of exception, had already begun.
1 An English writer, visiting in Paris, reported that he had
been informed by his philosopher friends that "I was the only person
they had ever met with, of whose understanding they had any opinion,
who professed to believe Christianity." Cf. Joseph Priestley,
Memoirs to the Year 1795. Reprint from Edition of 1809 (London; H. R,
Allenson, 1904),p. 48.
? Cf. Herbert Butterfield, Christianity In European History
(London; Collins, 1951), p. 39. " ~~ ™'~ -
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--parogen to niatory.— Of particular pertinence to this
inquiry is tne attitude of oibban's world towards history. Under¬
standably, tne some spirit of confidence prevailed. There was a
sense of emerging from the darkness of the Middle nges. Under the
auspices of one universal reason, the hour had struck for history to
snow tne way, to demonstrate the triumphant progress of the human
race towards truth and happiness, to establish that there was no
limit to the development of human faculties, or to the destiny which
itum could fashion for nimaelf should he so desire.
-along v.ith tnia confidence Was a concern to recover the in¬
ternal factor in history. Tne task of the historian was not to
collect facts indiscriminately; critical minds were becoming con¬
scious of tne inadequacy of lengthy chronicle ana learned compilation.
Tne task was to select tne significant facts ana to explain the
1
reason for tneir occurrence. This was want gave separateness and
2
special opportunity to tne study of history.
It na» oeen charged that tne eighteenth century was Unti-
3
historical'. Whatever the degree of accuracy of this estimate, it
does not indicate the avowed mood of the age; for the subject had
4
become popular; tne stress on the solid and tne tangible had given
a new impetus to iustorieul inquiry; tne stage was set for the great
advances of tne nineteenth century.
1 of. nenauetto drooe, Tneor.y -Jia history of hlstorio^ramiy.
translated oy oougias ^inslie (aondon: (ieorge harrap <% do., 192TF, *
p. also, .appendix 3.
2 See Oaupter two for a reflection of this consciousness in
dieson.
3 Of. Nicolas aerdyaev, The Meaning, of history (hondon: Tne
Oentenary Press, 193b), p. 112.
4 iiut there was not complete agreement about history, nee
appendix 3.
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iior was the historiography of the period devoid of a
critical attituue. The iuoou of sceptici-ma was in tae air, and the
mood of xaodern science. rurticularly was there sensitivity to the
credulity «na ignorance of tne meuieval period, This was reflected
in txie scepticism of Voltaire, wno uouotod tne reliability of tne
1
historical jaomtm truuition itself. Uritias began to question
accounts of tne past provided by earlier Historiansj they sought to
reconstruct event3 according to their own specifications as to how
2
taese events must tuve occurred.
This sharp reaction to medieval thought has prompted the
charge that eighteenth century historiography was not genuinely
critical out polemical, a. critic has contended that the hniighten-
ment historians took over the conception of historical research
which naa been devised oy the church historians of the late seven¬
teenth century, and turned it against its authors, "using it in a
ueiibexutely anti-clerical spirit instead of a deliberately clerical
one." hut if the argument is valid that the age did not exhibit
tne bitter antagonism towards religion which has been assumed, then
it is doubtful wnether tne 'polemical* was tne prime reason for its
writing of history.
a more searcning criticism of this general approach to
history is that it was non-developmental. History was not regarded
4
as an unfolding of a single pattern of intimate interreiatedness.
h critic has observed tnat "only a slight degree of fusion was
1 Cf. Coiiingwood, op. cit., p. 78.
2 Of. drooe, op. cit.. p. 2i>0.
j dollingwood, op. cit.. p. 81.
4 h furtner iimitia0 feature of enlightenment historiography,
its conception of numon nature, has oeen examined in connection with
Gibbon's phiioaopxiy of history, Gee Uhupter Two.
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attained in the various histories of culture, of customs, and of the
1
arts." jjad it m<~ty oe granted that there was little effort to
develop trie various aspects of life 'organically *.
hut theories of holism ana developmental!sm are of more
recent origin; and even us one notes wnat are now considered de¬
ficiencies in bne eighteenth century attitude, one ought to remember
that it was not us tnough tne age had failed to utilize something
tnat had been grasped oefore, or something thut might have been unaer¬
stooa as the next inevitable step in man's thought about history.
attitude towards religion.— in this survey of the world of
Gibbon, it is necessary to examine briefly its religious development,
Deism. This movement issued out of tne same confidence in the
2
efficacy of the universal reason. ,*11 forms of Knowledge, includ¬
ing religion, must submit to the single bar of judgement. Thus
while revelation might be accepted, its validity must be measured
3
by man's reason. Tne sound approach was to believe only what could
be understood, ana to understand only wnat oonformea to the rule of
reason.
hasic also to the religious thought of tne period was the
concept of nature. The typical attitude was to accept uhristianity
only as u republication in a particular form of the more universal
relioion of nature, it was agreed that tne Gospel had brought
nothing new into tne world. Ghrist rather announced general prin¬
ciples which had always been valid and which could be ascertained
apart rrorn any special revelation.
1 Grace, op. olt.. p. 257.
2 The nature of reason was never clearly defined. Dee
appendix 4.
3 Locxe's thou0ht is illustrative of this supposition.
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jj'rom these preiuises, the logical step was to strip away all
the accoutrements of religion which now at last ooula be recognized
1
as superfluous to a mature man's faith. Immediately dismissed was
tne concept of the supernatural, in thi3 orderly world, who could
believe in the continued agency of supernatural powers*/ *.fter this
opening weage, question quickly arose regarding the authenticity of
the reports of remote supernatural activity. If it was impossible
to believe that God interfered with natural law in the present, why
2
should it oe supposed that He did so in antiquity?
With the iiupernutaral removed from an active role in the
historic process, there remained a Ureator Deity, aloof and tran¬
scendent. The existence of tnis being was amply attested by the
works of nature, out He remained apart from the world, neft alone
on earth, man was thrown back on his natural resources, his own
moral sense. Hut this was sufficient. Morality needed no super¬
natural sanctions, it could assimilate into itself all the essential
3
features of religion.
Hut the consequences of this stripping-away process were
conducive neither to the interests of religion nor morality, .-3
has been suggested, txie quest for morality does not, and in this
instance, did not, lead to morality. The results rather were
1 nor inconsistencies in the application of this tendency,
see appendix 4.
2 Hume saw one implications of this more clearly than miaale-
ton, wno insisted that his attack on tne veracity of miracles aid not
extend to tne apostolic period. Gf. Uonyers Midaieton, .a I'ree
■inquiry into the miraculous Powers (London! K. Mu.aby a. H. S. Cox,
I740i. ciume contended taut "the argument led to a complete dismissal
of one ioelty from the historic process. Uf. David Hume, assays and
Trvatises, a Hew max-ion (Ldinourgn: Heii cc nrudfute, 1793), II,
120 ff.
3 It was argued that moral virtue was the essence and life of
aix true religion, ■against tnis background, Gibbon's moralistic
tendencies can be better imdei'stooa.
10
hypocrisy and, spiritual stagnation. Gibbon wrote caustically that
he might have selected for his vocation "the fat slumbers of the
1
church"; and a later critic observed that "it is among the excuses
2
for Gibbon that he lived in such a world."
Impact of Kxternal oircuiaatances
rt contemporary has contended that the "great differences
wnien we see between men are due more often than we can remember to
tne fact that some are fortunate in their birth, their physical
structure, tneir education, their environment, fortunate in all the
3
operation of accompanying circumstances." But if this general
statement can be said to have applied to Ldward Gibbon, it requires
an expanded sense of the tena •fortunate*, since many aspects of
his early years would appear to have been otherwise, a, brief
appraisal of these external factors, and the way they affected
4
Gibbon, is tne next step in this inquiry.
I'ne preponderance of negative factors,-- rxominent among
tnese questionable considerations was tne frailty of his early
nealth. 'fhe .oitopjugrapny indicates tnat there were few known ail¬
ments from wuich he did not suffer in nis childhood. Many times his
1 iOitoDlograpny. p. 163.
2 halter "oagenot. Literary otuaies (London: Longmans, Green
ct Go., 1903)# I* 237. It may be questioned whether the author of
fne secline and fall required 'excuses1; but the point of tne com-
ment is not lost for that reason.
3 Herbert Butterfield, Ghristianity and History. p. 44.
4 In tnis section, it is not considered necessary to present
a 'life' of Gibbon. Tne standard work on the subject for many years
was J. C. Morison, Giboon "Lnglish Men of Letters" (London: Mao-
millan, 1679)• That tne topic is of current interest is indicated
by Michael Joyce, Howard Giocon (London: Longmans,Green <fc Go., 1933).
more careful study is G. M. Young, Giobon (London: Beter Davies,
1932). But the best 'life' was written by Giboon niiaself, and tne
.01 tobiograpay is generally acknowledged as one of tne immortal
aenlevementa of isnglian literature.
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aunt sett at nia ueuaide, expecting each hour to oe the last. In
tiie baptism of euoh of ilia brothers, his father prudently repeated
nis Onriatioa home; thus in tne event of nis early departure, "the
1
pati'onymio appellation might be stilx perpetuated in the family."
liven though ho surviveu, physical weakness caused many interruptions
in his education, as he was called "from the school of learning to
2
tne bed of sickness."
But Gibbon's early frailty was not without compensation, as
the mature man recogniaeu in retrospect. Many precious hours "were
employed in ay closet waicii at tne some age are wasted on horse-
3
back." The child became introspective; and the life of the intel¬
lect, to wnioh he had natural attraction, was further enhanced by
the fact tnat it was the only life open to him.
a second •unfortunate* circumstance was tne loss of his
grandfather's fortune, ana the general factor of family instability,
xhe latter could be traced to his mother's death in tne tenth year
of his life, and to nis father's inconstancy. To the former, the
4
historian made wistful reference. But this event, dating back
almost a generation before his birth, would have been of less con-
sequence had his own father been of more dependable character.
Sadly he noted that several undertakings which had been profitable
in the hands of the mex*chaat became barren or auverse in tnose of
1 ^utoblograany, p. 21. Ironically, trie historian was tne
only one of seven to survive childhood.
2 Ibid.. p. 21.
3 memoir 0.. p. 2jo.
4 "I should mention • . • the irreparable loss of above
ninety-six thousand pounds of wnich ... X nave been ultimately
de prlved" (Memoir r.. p. lp),
3 £or a furtner aelineation of Gibbon's estimate of the
character of his father, see appendix 5*
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tne gentleman. a consequence, Gibbon never felt free of
financial insecurity.
hut upon closer scrutiny, tnis apparent instability is seen
to be another instance of a fortunate misfortune. The partial
collapse of his family meant that he was placed in the care of an
able ana conscientious aunt, for whose interest and encouragement
i
Gibbon often acknowledged his indebtedness. .aid unrestricted re¬
sources might have tempted him to a life of indolence, while liiaited
2
means suggested tne wisdom of application and industry.
^mother *uafortunute' factor was tne upheaval in education
and religion which marred his early years. Jfrom the ^utobio^many,
it is clear tnut his experience at Oxford (1752-3) was very desul¬
tory, that he received no religious instruction and little enlighten-
3
ment whatever. Hy virtue of tne vacuum thus created, his deflection
4
to the woman communion becomes understandable; and it was this event
in turn which caused hi3 banishment from Oxford and England, his
* exile* to .Lausanne, and all the unforgetable unpleasantries of
Madame jfevilrlard's table.
Yet again there is indication of a guiding star, ror had
Giobon not become a Catholic, hud nis adolescence been continued in
tne Oxford environment, had ne never been exposed to the instruction
of m. ruviiriura, it woula oe difficult to envisage his future great¬
ness. he himself acknowledged waat mignt have been the consequence:
1 He referred to her as "the true mother of my mind as well
as my health." (nutoolograohy, p. 2o)
2 "Had I been ra.cn and independent, I should have prolonged
and perhaps fixed my residence in .Paris" (mutobiography, p. 30J.
3 Wor a fuller indication of the nature of this experience,
see appendix 5*
4 "The blind activity of idleness urged me to advance without
armour into the dangerous mazes of controversy" (autobiography, p. 46).
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i.e., to be immersed "in port unci prejudice among the monks of
Oxford ... if ay childish revolt against the religion of my
1
country had not stript me in time of iay academic gown." ^oid of the
final effect of doing whisked away to "a barren and uninteresting
corner v.ith the injunction to behave*, he was able one day to write:
"Whatever nave been the fruits of my education, they must be ascribed
2
to tae fortunate snipwreck Wxiioh oust axe on tne shore of hake Lemon."
i* fourth episode Wxiich would scarcely seem to point to the
3
smile of fortune was his ill-fated lcxre affair. This romance with
Suzanne curohod, a young woman of charm and intelligence, was ended
apparently by Gibbon himself; and much abuse has been heaped upon
4
him for nis famous statement of acquiescence to his father*s wishes.
Whatever the ethics of the relationship, it was not without
favourable effect upon the historian of the Koman Empire. Gibbon
5
asserted tnat it enabled him better to understand women; but this
olaim may be greeted with a smile in view of the conclusions he
6
reached. ness questionably, it gave him a taste for something
otner than books; and its prompt termination afforded hiia the op¬
portunity to pursue his study free of the encroachment and aduitional
financial burden of family life. It meant that the independence
1 -uutobiograpay, p. #5.
2 Ibid,
3 This incident uus not failed to arouse the speculation of
biographers, for conflicting versions of its essential character,
see Meredith head, historic Studies (London: Chatto & windus, 1897),
I; D. M. Low, Edward""Gjbbon 1737-1794 (London: Chatto & Windus,
1937); and J. M. Kobortson, Gibbon "Life Stories of famous Men"
(London: Watts Co., 1926). See also -appendix
4 "1 sighed as a lover; I obeyed as a son* (^utobiography.
p. 84)•
5 "This episode, curious throughout, has been of great use to
me. it has opened my eyes to the character of women" (Ibid.. p. ix).
6 Did the experience enlighten or sour him¥ See -appendix 5.
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which ne deemed indispensable to His effectiveness as an nistorian
1
could be maintained. Thus the real significance of the romantic
failure was that his historical inquiry might become the unrivalled
2
allegiance of hi3 life.
n, critic nas cited this conflux of seemingly negative cir¬
cumstances, particularly those associated with Gibbon's conversion
and forced departure from JSngland, as indicative of the historian's
3
'good luck'. one 3uspeots that there are materials here which
would submit to an interpretation of a more providential nature. nt
any rate, it is suggestive in a modest way of Gicoon's own later
4
ixisight tnat out of evil, good may come.
fosltive considerations also present.— hot all the circum¬
stances of Giocon's early years were negative, even at first glance.
Thus a factor vital to nis coming career was tne recovery of nis
health, he reported that during nis sixteentn year nature displayed
In nis favour her mysterious energies, and all his assortment of
5
ills suddenly vanished. In looking bacic over the years, he oouid
write, "few people have been more exempt from real or imaginary
6
ills." This reprieve meant that his historical effort would not
be sapped by constant physical disability.
1 for a rulier statement of this insistence in Gibbon, see
Chapter four.
2 a critic argued, "Learning was his true mistress ...
faith a passing love." Of. feter miennell, four fortraits. "Studies
of tne fignteenth Genuury" {London: Collins, 1943J p. 83 . hut so
too were all tne romantic interests of his life.
3 J. m. Kobert3on, Gaboon, p. 3*
n »ee chapter Two for an indication of tnis idea in Giboon.
3 nutobiograpay, p. 30.
b JLoia., p. 30. This was not strictly true, as an ailment
believed to be a rupture and left untended from early manhood was to
cause him considerable discomfort and eventually to shorten his life.
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a second positive faotor was tiie aiapleness of income which,
despite uis worry, oibbon enjoyed through tne years of maturity.
That income appeared providentially to be protected; for the death
of nis brothers allowed the modest inheritance not to be decimated
by division; and his father*s passing saved the family fortune from
further depletion, Thus if he had been spared from tne perils of
too much wealth, he was also saved from the fatal restriction of
1
too little,
as a consequence of this cuapieness of income, Gibbon had
the opportunity to travel. ,»*nd this was a factor wnich also was an
important itera in his preparation as an historian, /i contemporary
nu8 claimed that the nistorian who studies central or eastern Europe
is not liicely to understand much about it, unless he goes there,
in no instance was tnis assertion more clearly illustrated than in
c.uat of Gibbon.
Travel enlarged ills horizon in a general way, if it is not
true tnat his extended stay abroad (1753-1758) meant that he "ceased
to oe an Englishman," tnere is no question but tnat he ceased to be
3
insular. The extent of the French influence upon the impression¬
able yautn, tae impact of its scepticism ana cosmopolitanism, would
1 "The mediocrity of ray life ana fortune," he confessed,
"above poverty and below riches, nas powerfully contributed to tne
application and the success of the historian" (Memoir D.. p, 41a).
2 Harold Temperley, Kesearch and Modern History, "an In-
augral Lecture Delivered at Cambridge, Hov.",' 19, 1930" (London; Muc-
miilan & Co., 1930), p. 10,
3 Gibbon himself made this claim, but it applied only to a
temporary period. Cf. ^utobioarapny, p. 83• There are other in¬
stances in wnioh he prouuiy asserted nis patriotic allegiance, in
waich he "glorieu in the name of an Englishman," particularly after




be difficult; to overestimate,
But more specifically, his visit to home in 1764 supplied
Gibbon with the stimulus which was to determine the selection of
2
the subject of his great work. So appreciative was he of the impor¬
tance of this factor that he confided in nis Journul that the man
3
who does not travel early runs the risk of not travelling at all.
One is left with the feeling that no greater misfortune could befall
not only the budding historian but any aspirant to the enlightened
life,
.mother consideration which had a positive impact upon trie
future historian was his period of service (17oQ-17o2) in the English
militia. Giooon admittedly was not always impressed with the oon-
4
stractive character of this chapter in his youth, let he also
acknowledged its salutary effect both upon the average man ana upon
himself. His pride in this practical episode in his past, and nis
consciousness of its helpfulness to an historian, were reflected In
the condescension with which he referred to "mere scholars, who
6
have perhaps never seen a battalion under arias."
i conclusion,— This brief survey of the major circumstances,
1 Gibbon recounted tnat he hot only come to speak fluent
jrrenoh, but also to think in that language, so much so that his
English suffered. Of. autobiography. p, 56.
2 gee unupter four for a discussion of the determining
cnaracter of this experience. .>ee also appendix 5.
3 Gideon*a Journal to January 26th, I7o3. edited by u, M.
Low (nonuon: Ghatto & Hindus, 1937), p. xiv.
4 In one instance, he rex'exred to it as "a wandering life of
military servitude" (..utooiogra pay. p. 104).
5 "The greatest part of txxese men were rather civilized than
corrupted by the habits of military subordination" (memoir H.. p.
166). .aid in an oft-quoted sentence, ne wrote, "The captain of tne
Hampshire grenadiers (the reader may smile/ has not been useless to
the historian of the homan Empire" (nutobiography. p. 106).
6 Glbbon*s Journal, p. xevi. See also appendix 5. nut one
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Duth favourable and unfavourable, which marked iiidward Gibbon's
rise to maturity, indicates that he derived some preparation or in¬
centive or assistance for his life*s work from all of theia. The
critic was probably correct in contending that "not in the case of
Shakespeare are the pressures ana permissions of fate [or of rrovi-
1
donee] more iaprea-ive as determinants tnan in that of Gibbon!"
naoking oacx over his life, appraising .not only his achieve¬
ment but the conditions wnioh made it possible, Gibbon was prepared
2
to express his satisfaction. To go beyond that to thunksgiving
ana praise couid scarcely be expected of this * typical eiabodiement*
of the mentality of the &nli0htenmant.
The Indiviauaiity of the Historian
When full acknowledgement has been made of the influenoe
of the eighteenth century, as well as the impact of personal circum-
stances, there yet remains something unique in the figure of the
man himself whioh was of inestimable importance to the emergence of
3
a great historian. in the last analysis, tne crucial consideration
must be, not what were tne external influences, but wnat was in
Gibboav What were tne features of his individuality which prompted
him to respond us ne diaY How did ne modify tne external factors
consequence of nis military life, wnich did not contribute to his
propara&ion as an historian, was a tendenoy towards excessive drink¬
ing, a habit which was only overcome witn difficulty in later life,
une uj63 not derive tnis impression from tne ^utobiograr>ny. but it
is evident in tne journal, wnere many mornings were recorded as lost
to the student as a result of the excess of the night before.
1 Jf. m. Hocertson, Gibbon, p. 33#
2 "When X contemplate the common lot of mortality, 1 must
acknowledge that i have drawn a high prize in the lottery of life"
(uUtoblograpny, p. 217).
3 i?or current views on this subject, see .appendix o.
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from within?
His own awareness.— Gibbon was very conscious of the im-
i
portance of this consideration. in the nutopjoKrumay. he grate¬
fully oitau nis mother*s advice to the effect that "I was now going
2
into the world and must learn to think and act for myself." That
he took these word3 seriously is suggested by the particular
character of his religious pilgrimage. In his turning to Rome, he
claimed that neither a priest nor any member of that Church regis-
3
tered an influence; his conversion was the result of his own
reasoning, nnd in his return to Protestantism, he asserted that
the contribution of his tutor, Pavilliard, must be acknowledged;
4
but the decisive factor was the movement of his own mind. The
3ame might be said of his mounting scepticism. Vrfhile he recog-
3
nized the impact of the writings of Hayle and Chillingworth, the
6
form which his scepticism took was distinctively his own. This
distinctiveness stemmed in part at least from a conscious effort
after individuality.
Elements of his individuality.— It remains to examine the
main features of Gibbon*s personal, internal equipment for his
tasK, one was his early discovery of tne direction of his life*s
1 "Everyman who rises above the common level," he wrote,
"has received two educations, the one frora his teacners, and the
second, more personal and important, from himself" (autoblourathy.
p. 66)•
2 Ibid., p. 24.
3 "I never conversed with a priest, or even with a Papist,
till my resolution from books was absolutely fixed" (Ibici.. p. 48i»
4 "I am willing to allow him a handsome share in the honour
of my conversion; yet 1 must observe it was principally effected by
my private reflection" (Ibid,. p. 63).
3 Ibid., p. 31.
o H. 'Thompson, cibbon, (Historical association Pamphlet,
General oeries, 1946) p. 9. See Chapter Three for an examination of
the particular character of Giuoon*s scepticism. See also nppenuix 6.
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ambition. Unlike many historians who nave realized their historical
role relatively late in life, Gibbon quickly saw where his real
1
interest lay. jfor certain, the method, of trial ana error and. the
stimulus of a visit to home were required to determine his actual
subject. Yet there was no uncertainty about the general nature of
the effort to be made. It would be history. The advantage thus
derived in the channelling of youthful reading is obvious, -aid
this propensity for his subject, he insisted, was sustained by nis
2
own determination alone.
Of equal importance to Gibbon's preparation a3 an ecclesias¬
tical nistorian was an early interest in religion. In his cnild-
hoou, religious questions had been discussed with his aunt. Per-
naps it was her simple piety which aroused questions in the mind of
the child, whatever the reason, an attitude of scepticism was
3
early in evidence. But tills disposition did not prompt him to
4
dismiss the subject of religion as of no consequence; the intricate
5
mazes of theology remained a permanent interest of his maturity.
Thus in his approach to ecclesiastical history, he had the impetus
of a marked and early interest in both aspects of his subject.
idiother item in Gibbon's individual equipment was the
1 Prom his early youth, he claimed that he "aspired to the
onuracter of an historian" (autobiogmpay. p. 117).
2 "Without the discipline of a master or the advice of a
friend, the early bent of my mind was directed to the histories of
all ages and nations" (Gibban* a Journalt p. 6).
3 Examples of ui'oboa's early scepticism are found in appen¬
dix 6.
4 it is a mistake to interpret this youthful scepticism as
antagonism towards religion. Of. Chapter Pour.
5 The number of cooks on 'theoiogia* followed books on
•hlstoria' and 'lit. numaniores' in Gibbon's library. Bee The
library of idward Gibboa, "a Catalogue of his Books" with an intro¬
duction by Geoffrey keynes I-London: Jonathan Gape, 1940), p. 20.
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methodical quality of his mind. This is instanced by nis approach
1
to reading which, despite the laok of guidance, was not haphazard.
The same methodical tendency is suggested by his careful study of
2
the .French and juatin languages, he had the nabit of talcing
mental stock of nis intellectual acquisitions, reducing them to
3
tneir capital value. Thus it became possible to marshal and apply
nis whole available supply of knowledge to any subject. This meant
that he could handle immense amounts of material with consummate
skill and ease.
Gibbon also possessed exceptional powers of memory. a
youthful meeting with Voltaire, in which the great man allowed him
to reud one of his poems just twice, suggests this; for twice was
4
sufficient; Gibbon knew it by heart. Likewise, his method of
composition — phrasing an entire paragraph in nis mind before com-
rnitting any of it to paper — pointed to powers of retention beyond
3
tue ordinary. his ability to remember is further attested to by
the relatively few instances of repetition or contradiction in his
o
history. It is also seen in the amazing scope of particular infor¬
mation wnich uiboon not only possessed but which he kept at his
7
fingertips. while clearly traceable to tne precocious interests
1 &.g», he systematically went through the Latin classics
in four divisions; [hitobipgraohy. p. 69J and he recorded his aim to
cover tae whole field of classical literature, IGibbon'a Journal. p.5)
2 a description of Gibbon's method is given in appendix 6.
3 hutoblpgra phy. p. 94.
4 Ibid., p. 81. Gibbon added, HIn writing this trivial inci¬
dent, I wished to find whether ay memory was impaired, but I have
tne comfort of finding that every line of the poem is still engrained
in fresh and indelible characters,"
5 Gibbon's own statement of this practice is found in appen¬
dix o,
6 iiut see Chapters Two and Four for an indication of tne
significance of some of the exceptions.
7 For illustration of this contention, see appendix 6.
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of the onild, tnis passion for the particular could oe fully
utilised oxxly by an historian who naa a real capacity to reraexaber.
a final item in Gibbon*3 individual equipment for his
future task was a fundamental openness of mind. Jriis religious pil¬
grimage from Rrotestuntism to Catholicism, back to Protestantism,
and tnence to scepticism, may be cited as an instance of this
characteristic, such shifting exposed him to the charge of emo-
tionui instability and inconstancy, Eut it at least equally indi¬
cates a willingness to follow his logic whei*ever it led him, and
1
regardless of consequence. i'he same openness was reflected in
the developing insights of Tae Oeoline ana fall; and one feels
ohat it was tnis factor ratner than a failure of memory that was
2
responsible for tue instances of contradiction therein. Moreover,
his sensitivity to the pitfalls of partisan allegiance meant that
he would attempt to approach his mutei'ials apart from set theories
and preconceptions.
a problem.— against the supposition of Gibbon*s open-
mindedness, critics have argued that his consciousness of the
prejudices of otners did not keep him from prejudices of his own.
And in many re3peots, it is to become evident tnat the historian
■
did not rise materially aoove the level of eighteenth century
thought. Yet the impulse to maintain a mind free of partisan
1 it ougat to ue aoxaowledged tnat. his deflection to Home,
and ilia determination vo stand alone against family, academic insti¬
tution, ana national heritage, required more courage tnan nas oeen
attributed to him. Giboon referred to it as "an honest sacrifice of
interest to conscience" (^utobiota-a^hy. p. 50),
2 E.g., GibDon advanced not one but several chief causes
for tne fall of Rome, a circumstance wnich leads one to suspect
tnat ae uad no precoixoeived theory on txxe subject, but was open to
tne fucts as no found them. Gf. Chapter Four.
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prejudice was in accord with the true historical spirit, and was a
standard against which his own failure could he measured. But in
what sense aid he fail, ana in what sense did he succeed? Tne re¬
maining chapters of this inquiry seeic to answer these questions.
Meanwhile, it is clear that in the early awakening of his
historical interest, in tne metaodical approach to himself us well
as nis materials, in the capaciousness of his memory, and in the
aspiring openness of his rnina, there were assembled in Kdwurd Giboon
tne elements of uniqueness which alone could produce genuine history
and a truly great nistorian.
CHAPTER II
A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
An inquiry into Gibbon's 'philosophy of history' may be
deemed an important aspect of an evaluation of his attitude towards
ecclesiastical history. The present chanter is concerned with
this subject in an overall sense. Those elements in his philoso¬
phy which influenced his approach to ecclesiastical history are
discussed in a later section of this survey.
The Meaning of the Phrase
A double connotation.— What precisely is implied by a
philosophy of history? Ernst Troeltsch has suggested that the
phrase has at least two distinct meanings; the one, metaphysical,
seeking to trace the connection between the physical and spiritual
worlds, and concerned with the divine direction of the cosmos; the
other, empirical, being "the point of view from which the historian
1
passes judgements on the facts of history." Strictly speaking,
there is no 'empirical' point of view, but only the empirical
historian's assumptions and underlying attitudes. But the critic
argued that these must be acknowledged as such, and that they ought
2
also to be analysed.
1 Ernst Troeltsch, "Historiography," Encyclopaedia of
Religion and Ethics, edited by James Hastings (Edinburgh: T. & T.
Clarke, 1913), VI, 721. For further views on the meaning of the
'philosophy of history', see Appendix 7.
2 Ibid.. p. 721.
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Giooon an empiricist,— In tills second, restricted sense
only may GiODon be understood to nave nad a philosophy of history.
1
Metapiiysics did not concern aim. His interest was not in ultimate
2
questions. But He did nave definite ideas about iiistory which
were in evidence throughout The Decline and Fall. nnd despite his
determination to proceed in empirical fashion, these ideas had
emerged for the most part not as a consequence of his study, but as
preliminary to it.
Thus tnis inquiry may be served by considering three further
questions about Gibbon: What was the conception of history with
which he began? How did he propose to approach his subject? What
overall assumptions marie his treatment of history in general? The
answers to these questions can be considered togetner as comprising
GiDDon's philosophy of history.
The Purpose of History
History for history's saiee.— For Gibbon, the past had a
right to be recovered for its own sake. History need not serve any
political or ethical or theological interest. For certain, it could
3
be put to practical use.• From knowledge of the past, men might
4
learn better to meet the present. But the very fact of Gibbon's
1 But tne later argument has indicated that his inferences
were not without metaphysical implications. Thus it is doubtful
whether it can be claimed that "tne ultimate meaning ... of the
historical 'processus' in general, he leaves to the reader who will
draw his own conclusions." Bee J. B. BlacK, Tne .art of Histoxy
(London: ketnuen & Co., 19%Q, p. 159*
2 For tnis reason, tne assertion of an indissoluble relation-
snip oetween hisoory and christology would have been meaningless
to GibDon. Bee appendix 7«
3 "The experience of history exalts and enlarges the
horizon of our intellectual view" (V, 258).
4 He argued tnat the purpose of history was "to record the
transactions of the past for the instruction of future ages" (II, 87).
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own inability to turn his study to constructive account suggests
1
that tnis was not for him the prime reason for writing history.
Ranite's dictum applicable.-— That purpose might be stated
in Ranke's later dictum, "Er will bloss sagen wie es eigentlich
2
gewesen." Gibbon never phrased it so precisely. His statements
3
tended to be couched in moralistic terms. Yet one feels that the
reconstruction of events of the past as nearly as possible to the
manner in which they really did take place was the end ih view
which guided and determined his entire historical effort.
Rules of Procedure
in Gibbon*s approach to history, ohe following rules of
proceuure may be identified: ascertain the facts; cultivate a
distrust of theorizing; recount the facts with strict truthfulness;
history is more tnan compiling; the historian must interpret and
evaluate the facts; these interpretations are tentative and must be
validated continually by the materials of history; an attitude of
detachment is essential, a brief indication of the operation of
these factors is the next step in this survey.
Ascertain the faots.— There was in Gibbon's attitude a
preoccupation with the recovery of the particulars of history which
he calaed 'facts'. The assumption was that if these could be un¬
covered their meaning would be clear to an impartial inquirer.
1 See Chapter Pour for a discussion of this 'inability'.
2 Gesohicnte der romanisonen und germanisohen Volker, cited
by J. H. BlaoK, op. cit,, p. XT""
3 E. g., history was to render "to the present age, and to
posterity, a just and perfect delineation of all that may be praised,
of all that may be excused, of all that may be censured" (Miscel¬
laneous vnorxs, p. 707J. "
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1
This supposition is often reflected in the kssai. No detail in
the endless vista need be too small for the historian*s contempla-
2
tion. Nothing, not even interest in a subject itself, was to inter¬
fere with his free movement through his materials, 'i'he first con¬
cern of the historian was to ascertain the facts.
Distrust of theories.— Coupled with the emphasis on the
recovery of the facts was a distrust of theorizing. The historian
must not become so attacueu to a particular reconstruction of his-
3
tory that he refused to recognize facts wnich did not fit. "Pay
more regard," he wrote, "to the facts that spontaneously form them¬
selves into a system than those which you discover after having de-
4
vised tne system." In the study of tangible things and their
traceable connections, Gibbon believed that no elaborate theoriz¬
ing was required but rather an emptying of preconceptions and pre-
5
dispositions.
Fidelity to truth.— Once the materials were collected with
as much freedom from preconceptions as possible, the historian would
be motivated by fidelity to truth in reporting them. This fidelity
6
was what gave honour to the calling of the historian. In the
1 Kssai Sur 1*etude de la litterature (1761). See Misc.
Works, pp. 625-670. "Facts," he wrote, "are what we must interro¬
gate. Let us listen to what they have to say" (Ibid.. p. 660).
again, "Let us preserve tnem all [the facts! most carefully" (Ibid..
P. 057).
2 "We should learn," he argued, "not to be astonished at
what appears most absurd and often to distrust what seems best
established" (Ibid,, p. 654).
3 Was this precisely what Giboon did do in his treatment of
the 'spiritual* side of ecclesiastical history"? See Chapters Four
and Five for the argument in support of this supposition.
4 Ibid., p. 65$.
5 See Appendix 8 for contemporary views on the possibility
of such * self-emptying'.
6 For a collection of Gibbon's statements on this subject,
see Appendix 8.
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Autobiography, Gibbon had written, "Truth, naked unblushing truth,
is . . . the first virtue of more serious hi3cory." iuid in The
Decline and Fall, he argued that "neither the belief nor the wishes
2
of the fathers can alter the truth of history." The latter judge¬
ment applied to his own belief and wishes as well as to those of
antiquity. Fault in this respect was even more serious in the
3
historian than in the believer. Only*primary passion for *objec-
4
tive' truth entitled anyone to be called an historian.
Distinction between history and chronicle.— Gibbon reccg -
nized that the collection of facts, even when acquired with an open
mind and presented with strict adherence to truth, was not history
5
but chronicle. This collecting was the function of the compiler,
not of the historian. Towards the compiler, Gibbon expressed an
attitude of contempt. Compiling required none of the discernment
and penetration of mind so necessary to the writing of history.
Thus while the responsibility of the compiler was simple, that of
7
the historian was difficult. The inference was that the assem¬
bling of facts, indispensable as it might be to the total task, did
not constitute the prime function of the historian.
1 Memoir xx., p. 353«
2 II, 08, '
3 "The prejudice of a philosopher," he wrote, "is less
excusable than that of a Jesuit" (VI, 298, note).
4 In a fine passage, Gibbon argued that the true historian
"does not display his conjectures as truths, his inductions as facts,
or his probabilities as demonstrations" (Misc. Works, p. 643)•
5 For other views of the relationship between facts and
♦abstract truths*, and between facts and * ideas*, as expressed in
the writings of Coleridge and Macauley, see Appendix 8.
6 He argued, "The office of the historian is as honourable
as tnat of a mere compiler is contemptible" (Misc. works, p. 6$7).
7'It is easily seen," he observed, "how difficult a task it
is to choose the facts that are to be the basis of our reasonings"
(Ioid., p. 637).
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The need for interpretation.— The historian must evaluate
1
his materials and determine the 'dominant' facts. His task was
not to convey the available, detailed information on his subject,
but to single out the significant occurrences, to show their inter-
relatedness, and to indicate the extent of their impact upon the
historic process. In doing this, the historian must reduce the
mass of documentary material by the use of criteria for determining
2
importance and significance. Gibbon assumed that these criteria
were obvious, or at least that in his interpretation, he was expre-
sing the thought of every rational mind. Yet the subjective element
3
was undeniably involved, and Gibbon recognized it. To this extent
4
at least, the historian must be a philosopher.
The necessity of immediate validation.-- If it was true
that history implied the imposition of evaluation upon the materials
must not the materials in some sense have determined the evaluation?
Gibbon had no difficulty with this question. He insisted that if
his construction were an hypothesis, it was immediately borne out
by the facts. Never could the materials of history be required to
6
fit into an overall pattern. Always there must be a willingness
1 Misc. Works, p. 655*
2 "Among a great number of facts," he wrote, "there are some
and these are the greatest number, which prove nothing beyond their
own existence" (Ibid.. p. 655).
3 "An enlightened age," he wrote, "requires from the his¬
torian some tincture of philosophy and criticism" (VII, 26, note).
4 "If philosophers are not always historians, it were to be
wished that historians were always Philosophers" (Misc. Works, p.
657). And he frequently referred to himself as a philosopher. See
IV, 207; V, 269; VII, 86, 258.
5 This has posed a problem for later students of history,
e.g., Ernst Troeltsch. See Appendix 8.
6 The Catholic critic conceded the truth of this: "... he
[Gibbon] did not try to force the facts into a unitary scheme of
development . . . ." (Christopher Dawson, Edward Gibbon. Annual Lec¬
ture on a Master Mind (London: Humphrey Milford, Amen House, 1934),
p. 19).
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"to sacrifice the most brilliant theory" if it was no longer fruit-
1
ful in explaining the facts. Thus while the historian must be a
2
philosopher, philosophy must not lead him to lose touch with history.
The importance of detachment.— A philosopher-historian
would be detached not only from the materials of history but from all
partisan approaches to its interpretation as well. Eusebius had as¬
serted that history was to be used to advance the interests of reli-
3
gion; this was a violation of "one of the fundamental laws of his-
4
tory;" Eusebius' History must not be trusted in those instances
which could be seen to support his bias. A philosopher would be free
Q
of prejudice; his mentality rather was analytical, factual, cooly
5 A
dispassionate.
A critic has suggested that this 'coolness1 sprang from
feelings of aversion and antipathy:
Und kalt, ja eisig wird die Luft, wo eine innerste Abneigung
ihra die Feder ftlhrt, wo der Zusammen3toss von Heidentura und
Christentum und das Eindringen des Christentums in den^schon
morsch gewordenen KCrper des Reiches dargestellt wird.
Against this, there is indication that the detachment applied also
to attitudes of antipathy and aversion. As one defender has observed,
it is a mistake to say that Gibbon 'hated* this or 'despised' that.
"These are not the right words for the temper in which he shrugged
7
his shoulders over the imbecilities of men."
1 Misc. Works, p. 651.
2 FoF^ontemporary views on this subject, see Appendix 8.
3 Eusebius, The Ecclesiastical History, cited by Gibbon,
II, 144.
4 Ibid.. p. 144.
5 "Sow calm," he observed, "is the voice of history compared
with polemics" (VI, 386).
6 Friedrich Meineoke, Die Entstehung; des Hlstorismus (Berlin:
R. Oldenbourg, 1936), I, 251. *""* -
7 1. M. Robertson, Gibbon on Christianity (London: Watts &
Co., 1930), p. xxii.
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At tne root or Gibbon* s attitude was something wiiicli may
1
be termed * temperament** Others mi&ht vicariously experience the
2 3
anguish of mun*s life in history. Gibbon did not. Freedom from
the misery and frustration of Dast existence was an essential ele-
4
ment in his wellbeing. And it was indispensable to the role of a
philosophic historian. While the partisan of a particular cause
might descend to a level where he oould be affected by the hurts of
humanity, the "calm historian of the present hour" must hold his
place in the heights.
Further Assumptions About History
If tne foregoing i3 an accurate account of Gicoonfs
general approach to his subject, it remains to indicate three over¬
all assumptions wnich influenced his historical writing: his doc¬
trine of human nature; his position on the unity of history; his
attitude towards Providence.
Human nature.— Critics have argued that an historians
theory of human nature determines his entire attitude towards his-
5
tory. According to one modern view, the historian*s sole concern
1 For an exposition of the effect of temperament upon philo-
sopnic argument, see F. M. Cornford, The Unwritten Philosophy, and
Other hssays (Cambridge: The University Press, 1950), p. 33, ff.
2 Heroditus contended, "Of all the sorrows wnich inflict
manxind, the bitterest is tnis, that we should have consciousness
over much, but control over little." Tne writer is indebted for
tnis reference to keinnold Niebuhr, Faitn and History (London: His-
bet & Co., 1949), p. 176. But tnis consciousness failed to *infiict*
Giboon.
3 "Our sympathy," he observed, "is cold to the relation of
distant misery" (V, 284).
4 Gibbon wrote of "tne salutary indifference of a states¬
man and a philosopher" (IV, 207).
3 Of. Haymond nron, Article on "The Philosophy of History", in
the Chambers Encyclopaedia, a Hew Bdition (London: George Hewnes,
1950), VII, 149.
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is with peoole, "with individual personalities, possessing self-
1
consciousness, intellect and freedom."
This assumption may be distinguished from that of the
eignteenth century. Then the aim was to ascertain, by means of
history, the general nature of man, the universal principles of
2
human nature; whereas today, many historians seek to recapture
the unique mental atmosphere of each individual under consideration.
They contend tnat in history as distinct from nature, universal
3
principles do not apply.
Gibbon was a son of nis ovvn age. He was not investigating
4
uniqueness. He believed that human personality could be analysed
in terms of the operation of basic impulses which characterized
the behaviour of people in all times and at all places. Thus the
impact of a person upon hisuory must be studied not in its par¬
ticularity cut as illustratrve of a mechanistic or moralistic
type. According to current thinking other than positivist, thi3
5
was a capital defect of Gibbon as an historian.
In more particular respects, Giboon's analysis did not
deviate materially from tne typically eighteentn century attitude.
Man was a rational being. It was his reason wnich distinguished
1 Herbert flutterfield, Christianity and History, p. 26.
2 J?'or statements of the eighteenth century view, ef. Basil
Willey, op. oit., p. 183 IT. Cf. also Appendix 9.
3 The name of H. G. Collingwood is associated with this
emphasis. Cf. The Idea of History, p. 203 tt.
4 karly in life, Gibbon had written, "I read Leo's Qbser-
vations. . . . They are not ill wrote, but I think a capital fault
or tnem is attributing more consequence to the particular character
of man than to the general manners, character, and situation of
nations" (Giocon's Journal, p. 183).
5 But' Giboon would insist that tne method of understanding
human naoure must be based upon experience and observation rather
tnun upon 'a priori' assumptions about man's nature.
32
1
jaim from an animal rather than anything indefinable like Spirit*.
But tills rationality was properly exercised only vtfien man's mind
became free of all fetters, Reason and freedom were the two in-
2
dispensable elements in making man truly man.
3
Man had a moral core; and the historian could write con¬
fidently of "those principles of justice and humanity which nature
4
has implanted in every bosom." The goal of human striving was not
justice but pleasure. Personal happiness was the final purpose of
5
life. Thus self-love must be regarded as a characteristic of
essential humanity, since it was natural that each individual
6
would be concerned with tne quest for his own happiness.
This indication of Gipoon's positive position concerning
human nature may provoke the question: did he 3ubsoribe to "the
myth of human goodness wnich for liberal thought replaces the be-
7
lief in divine grace?" There is indication to the contrary, as
he advanced with his inquiry, the historian found reason to sus¬
pect his earlier impression that man was a rational being; for the
1 In a fine passage, he wrote of "the acquisition of know¬
ledge, the exercise of our reason, and the cheerful flow of con¬
versation," as "among the marks of a liberal mind," by which he
meant anyone genuinely human (II, 37).
2 Giboon commonly used the two terms in the same phrase
along with 'humanity*. Cf. e.g., VII, 310.
3 "a prophet in his moral precepts," he observed, "can only
repeat tne lessons of our own hearts" (V, 371).
4 VI, 148. See also .appendix 9.
5 For a further indication of Gibbon's understanding of
human motivation, see .appendix 9.
6 In tne Essai, ne argued that self-loir e might be manipu-
lated to social ends; if people were inforxaed of the advantages
they may derive from otners, "their self love will perform the
office of sound reasonixig and human nature is benefitted." ^xnd
then would come the milienium: "Before, men were rivals, now they
are brothers" (Mi3c. ttorxs, p. 649).
7 This question was posed by T. S. Eliot, Launcelot ^tadrews.
p. 62. (Cited by Basil Willey, pp. oit». p. 98) "* ~
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1
human mind oould be guided by superstition as well as reason.
element of irrationality in man gave to superstition perennial
2
appeal. Furthermore, mankind had been far more afflicted by sins
of the spirit than of the flesh; ambition had often led to indi-
3
vidual and collective madness. Reflection upon these melancholy
considerations was perhaps what prompted Gibbon to assert that nis-
tory was "little more tnan the register of tne crimes, follies,
4
and misfortunes of mankind."
Despite tnis factor of human rascality, man was subject to
moral law, collectively, this was instanced in the recognition of
trie folly of empire; the path of conquest led with inexorable logic
to destruction. No matter how powerful the empire, the evil hour
could not be averted. Individuals also were summoned to an ulti¬
mate reckoning for their evil deeds; and even while the world still
aclaimed them, they might be haunted by the shadow of conscience
and remorse. So constant was the operation of conscience that
Gibbon observed, "I snail not be accused of superstition, but in
this world, the natural order of events will afford a strong ap-
5
pear&nce of moral retribution."
Coupled with this consciousness of a moral reckoning was a
sense of the transiency of human life. Particularly were the
1 Of. Ill, 225. So common was tnis condition that Gibbon
in one instance claimed that the function of the historian was "to
trace the progress of the human mind from one error to another"
(Misc. 'worxs, p. 654).
2 Of tne Armenians, he wrote, "They floated eighty-four
years till their vacant faith was finally occupied by the mission¬
aries of Julian" (V, 168),
3 See Vol. V, 242, for a full statement of his appraisal cf
ambition.
4 I, 84.
5 VI, 500, For illustrations of Gibbon*s view on the folly
of empire and ambition, and the fact of conscience, see appendix 9«
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follies of ambition underlined by the fact of mortality, .all of
human striving was under tne same sentence; "the grave is ever
1
beside tne throne." But so also was it beside the xaeek and the
humble.
Tnus wnile tnis reading of history supported tne supposi-
2
tion that "Whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it,"
while it recognized that the will to power was self-frustrating
and self-defeating, it did not suggest that the meek "shall in-
H 3
herit the earth." One is led to see a pathetic quality in all
of humanity as it moved across the stage of history, nnd the
4
only ultimate epitaph was, "Vanity of vanities; all is vanity."
The unity of history.— The subject which Gibbon embarked
upon as his 'magnum opus* was evidence that he had a grasp of the
essential unity of history. The entire success of his undertaking
in portraying the fortunes of the Empire over a period of nearly
fourteen hundred years depended upon that Empire's existence as a
continuous historical entity. Gibbon's problem was to trace the
factors involved in the fall of home; but this search would be
meaningless were not the first century and the fifteenth century
in some sense intimately related.
Conscious of the importance of this consideration, Gibbon
carefully noted that "in the lowest period of decay, the name of
Roman adhered to the last fragments of the empire of Constantinople
1 V, 258. See also VI, 253, and VII, 16o, for further in¬
stances of this emphasis on the transiency of human life.
2 St. Luke 17:33.
3 St. Matthew 5:$. In another connection, Gibbon had
written, "Persuasion is the resource of tne feeble, and the feeble




and tnrough tne later chapters, he made comments which, while in¬
dicating the contrast between Home in its antonine splendour and
its subsequent degeneracy, served to tie the entire phenomenon to-
1
gether as a single historical piece.
But the disposition to posit unity in history, while in
accord with the notion of the historian's responsibility to see
connections where others saw isolated occurrences, was not without
limits. One must not read modern 'developmentalst* insights into
The Decline and jfall. Gibbon did not assume inevitable and abso¬
lute relatedness in history. Jtie proceeded on the less metaphysical
supposition that the historian was to point out causal relation¬
ships when and if he found them.
Critics have charged that although Gibbon grasped the over¬
all unity of the Bmplre, he did not understand the intimate con¬
nectedness of its constituent parts. Thus his treatment of eccle-
M ■
siastjcal history in separate sections has been regarded as evi¬
dence that he aid not discern how closely interwoven such history
2
was with political and social history.
But other considerations suggest that he conceived of his¬
tory in a more unified sense than has been supposed. What was
termed his 'guiding idea' that "the historical development of
human societies since tne second century after Christ was a retro-
3
gression," may be cited in support of this contention. Critics
have agreed that he found history's ideal in the past; his gaze
went backward to the golden age of the antonines rather than forward
1 Of. e.g. Vll, 237, 309, 338. The verdict of critics on
this effort is given in Appendix 10.




to the glories of modern civilization; he was haunted "by the
2
lingering ghost of the Roman senate and people." This seeking
for the measure of historical development in the distant past in¬
dicates that Gibbon had implicitly recognized the fact of history's
3
unity and continuity.
But to what extent did he subscribe to the idea of retro¬
gression? Granted that he regarded the Empire as a constantly de¬
clining organism whose sickness could not be arrested or overcome
4
by any apparent remedies; did he apply this insight to history as
a whole?
The statement in his epigram that he had "described the
3
triumph of barbarism" suggested as much. The same impression
might be derived from his glowing description of the .antonine era
as the period in wnich the human race was "most happy and most
6
prosperous." all modern civilization would then be what Toynbee
termed "an almost meaningless repetition of something the Greeks
7
and Romans did before us and did supremely well." Likewise, the
contrast he portrayed between the enlightened leniency of ancient
Rome and the later bigotry of superstition, did not suggest pro-
8
gress. and his awareness that the arduous achievements of humanity
9
might so swiftly be destroyed, did not indicate complacency.
1 Christopher Dawson, pp. oit.. p. 8.
2 a. H. Thompson, op. oit.. p. 16.
3 This position leads to difficulties in classifying GiDbon
as a typical historian of the eighteenth century. See appendix 10,
4 Of. I, xxxix.
5 VII, 321.
6 I, 8o.
7 The writer is indebted for this reference to H. J. Black-
ham, The Human Tradition (London: Routledge tc ifegan Raul, 1933) p. 31
8 Gf. II, 113.
9 Gf. VII, 8b.
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These considerations have led to the supposition that
Gibbon joined with Swift in seeing history not as progressive ame¬
lioration, but as "a struggle, often marked by disastrous failures,
1
to maintain the values fixed forever by antiquity."
against this conclusion are the passages which indicate
2
tnat Gibbon had his own confidence in progress. In fact, there
were ziiaeQ when the historian of retrogression became extremely
mellow about the general movement of the historic process. There
had been setbacks; humanity had known no uninterrupted march for¬
ward. Yet the human race seemed to survive in spite of all.
Gibcon often registered this assurance, especially in the later
3
chapters. so prevalent was the pattern that he was persuaded
4
that here was a basis for predicting the future as well.
The question may be raised: did Gibbon attempt to recon-
5
ciie this view with his guiding idea of retrogression? Critics
nave argued that the dual view could be explained by positing in
Giooon's ohought two great peaks of cultural achievement, the
.antonine era and the eighteenth century, with nothing of conse-
6
quence in between. Thus when seen from the former perspective,
1 This analysis of Swift was made by Basil Willey, op. clt..
p. 103.
2 His editor, J". B. Bury, acknowledged the fact of these
passages, but claimed that Gibbon treated the idea of progress as
a speculation. See J". B. Bury, The Idea of A'oaress (Jbondon: Mac-
millan, 1920), p. 223»
3 See appendix 10 for a selection of these statements of
assurance.
4 for statements of Gibbon's optimism, see Appendix 10.
3 a critic has argued that other figures in history were
marxed by a similar dichotomy. Gf. John Baillie, The Belief in
rrograss (-London: Oxford University fress, 1930), p. 21. Uf. also
Appendix 10.
6 Christopher Uawson, op. cit.. p. 8; and G. M. Young,
Giooon, p. 93* But this interpretation has failed to do justice to
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the movement of history wa3 retrogressive; hut when the eighteenth
century was compared with what had preceded it, the movement was
one of progress. Whatever the explanation, Gibbon was not conscious
of a contradiction and did not attempt to defend the inclusion of
1
both ideas.
a conception of Providence.— In Gibbon's general approach
to history, was there any place for Providence? He did admit the
2
fact of God. Occasionally there was indication of a sense of tie
3
mystery and wonder of life. .and his treatment of ecclesiastical
4
history was marked by references to the 'Great Author', the 'Su-
5 6
preme being', and the 'first Gause'.
But while Gibbon affirmed that God existed, this was of
7
no consequence; the Divine was indifferent to the affairs of men.
History could be understood apart from any reference to Deity,
since there was no evidence that God had acted in the historic pro-
8
cess. Rather was there something inexorable about the processes
of time, something "which spares neither man nor the proudest of
9
his works."
Gibbon's little noticed appreciation of the Middle Ages. See
Chapter Four.
1 was this a common tendency among eighteenth century
English novelists as well? Cf. Hois Whitney, Primitivism and the
Idea of Progress {Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1934), p. 8. Cf,
also Appendix 10.
2 Gibbon often made non-ironical references to the Deity.
Bee Appendix 11.
3 Cf. Ill, 264.
4 II, 8. 5 Ibid., p. 81. 6 Ibid.
7 Use of the term 'Providence' was always ironical and had
no positive significance. Cf. e.g., II, 23.
8 Gibbon often noted drily that the Divine was deaf, or
neutral, or powerless to reply to human appeals. For specific
instances, see .appendix 11,
9 VII, 313-
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Yet Giboon also saw evidence of a control beyond man. The
happenings of history were shaped into a pattern for wnich no one
person or group of persons were responsible; nor, in Gibbon's view,
was tne Deity itself, he recognized that not infrequently good
1
had emerged out of evil, that in some sense, "history's apparent
2
agonies are the travail of a new birth." He perceived also that
resources of utmost importance to the ultimate interests of humanity
3
had been 'miraculously' saved from destruction.
Gibbon did not move beyond these observations, nor did
4
this view pervade The Decline and fall. Yet there were tnese
instances in which a perception of destiny was unmistakably present.
In them, by a strange and unconscious quirk, the historian had
come full cycle; the Providence, which was rejected in its reli¬
gious version, reappeared in a secular guise; and the complacency
of tne enlightenment could be complete.
1 Gibbon quoted George adam Smith's contention: "The most
salutax*y effects have flowed from selfisn causes." See VII, 309.
See also .appendix 11.
2 Benadetto Croce, op. cit., p. 93.
3 for statements of Gibbon to this effect, see .appendix 11.
4 a critic nas claimed that tnis consciousness 'fluttered'
around in Giboon's book without ever taking firm hold. See P.
Meinecke, op. cit., p. 251*
CHAPTER III
GIBBON AND HIB PHBDEGEddOKB IN EGGlESIiiBTIGAL HI3T0RY
A basic test of the skill of ail historian is the manner in
which he utilizes the labours of his predecessors. It is an axiom
of historiography that the inquirer must be acquainted with the con-
1
tributions of those who have covered his field before him. Such
utilization does not necessitate slavish dependence upon other
people's findings. Tne competent historian constantly is exercis¬
ing his own critical faculties to evaluate tne extent to wnich his
2
predecessors can be trusted. Yet the results of previous investi¬
gation into an event or era must inevitably affect subsequent re¬
searches into the same subject.
General Features
Indebtedness.— This constant U3e of predecessors is
clearly instanced in Edward Gibbon's approach to ecclesiastical
history. From tne outset, it is evident that his ecclesiastical
structure was established with the assistance of orthodox historians
who had gone over the ground before him and whose references he
1 Noteworthy is the fact that at least one recent history
of tne Roman Empire contains no reference to Trie Decline and Fall,
nor any direct acknowledgement tnat tne writer had made himself
acquainted with tnis monumental inquiry into nis suoject. See M.
Gary, a his lory of Rome Gown to the Reign of ConstantIne (London:
MaoMilian & Go., l93i> J.
2 For contemporary views on the relationship oetween tne
historian and his predecessors, see Appendix 12.
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faithfully followed and checked. Thus a critic has contended that
wnen for a given period Gibbon had the research of a learned pre¬
decessor to draw upon and to direct his own inquiry, his treatment
was noticeably stronger; whereas when he was deserted by his 'au¬
thority*, the historical, if not the literary, quality of his
1
narrative distinctly declined.
admittedly, the conclusion that "he felt his special genius
lay in . • . working up into literary form what the researcners in
2
tne mine brought to the surface," was an overstatement; whatever
function ne actually performed, Gibbon never 'felt* himself to be
3
a compiler or polisner of the findings of others. Yet the immense
extent of his indebtedness to his forerunners was beyond question.
a. proper procedure.— Far from questioning it, Gibbon often
acknowledged his dependence upon the "labours of those who hu.ve dug
4
in the mine of antiquity." In his view, this was entirely proper
proceuure. On the one hand, he recognized that the subject he had
embarxed upon was beyond anyone's ability to embrace apart from the
5
most liberal use of modern as well as ancient guides; that even
with the aid of 'modern glasses', it was still hardly possible, for
6
many periods, to cover all the available data.
1 J. B. Bury, I, x. another critic supported his contention
that Gibbon v»as only as good as his predecessor s by citing his
scanty treatment of the Byzantine Empire and by suggesting tnat Gib¬
bon was without a Tillemont in this area of his inquiry. Cf. a. H.
Thompson, Giouon, p. 6.
2 J. B. Black, Tne art of History, p. 161.
3 Of. Chapter Two of this inquiry,
^ tiisc. Works, p. 748. See appendix 13 for further state¬
ments of ac knowledgement.
3 He reasoned that many ecclesiastical writers, e.g. Jerome,
augustine, Chrysostom, had been so voluminous and yet their his¬
torical comments so occasional, that in order to detect these, the
historian could not be expected to examine all their writings. Cf.
Misc. worxs, p. 748.
o "In the consideration of any extensive subject," he
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On the other hand, in soiae instances the materials were so
meagre, or the reliability of the source so questionable, as to make
it almost impossible to reconstruct an event or to fashion an ac-
1
ceptabie nairative. Under these circumstances, tiny sensible in¬
quirer into universal history would want to take advantage of the
concentrated work in a particular period which had been done by a
previous writer.
■accuracy,— Such borrowing must be accomplished, however,
with the most scrupulous exactness, not only in noting the fact of
it, but also in transcribing faitnfully the sense or substance of
2
the passage in question. Tnis guiding principle was evidenced in
Gibbon's handling of Tillemont and Mosheim, to cite two of the
3
modern ecclesiastical historians whose writings he employed. Fur¬
ther support for his overall accuracy has been provided by the
4
acknowledgements of critics of the most diverse schools.
Preference for the primary source.-- Despite this careful
use of tne moderns, Gib Don was concerned always to consult the
primary source. His aim, as he put it, was to draw "from the
5
fountain-head." And it was she critic's charge of improper
contended, "none will pretend to have read all that has been written,
or to recollect all that they have read1" (Misc. Works, p. 747).
1 For statements to this effect in. the History, see appen¬
dix 13.
2 Exception: Gibbon did not always deem it necessary to
acknowledge the fact that a predecessor had referred him to a pri¬
mary source when he himself had seen that source. Such free use of
common historical materials, he contended, was constantly made by
his predecessors, and could be readily illustrated in tneir writings
(Misc. Works, p. 750).
3 For an exposition of Gibbon's treatment of Tiliemont aid
Mosheim, see appendix i4.
4 a selection of these acknowledgements is provided in
Appendix 15#
5 Preface to the Fourth Volume. I, xlvi. He added, "My
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borrowing and or failure -co consult tlie primary sources wnich alone
1
aroused, his ire. In tne History, the Historian sought to meet
tnese slurs as he pointed to "the numerous passages which I Have
2
seen with my own eyes." This was more tnan a matter of personal
pride. To Gibbon, tnere could be no History apart from authority,
3
the best authority available.
Occasional use of secondary sources.— Gibbon did acKnow¬
ledge instances in which he had not perused the original writings,
and therefore could not be as authoritative as he would like to be.
1
, 4
Sometimes, tnis oould be attributed to 'inaccessibility*; or he
had been unable to trace the primary source; or in exceptional
5
cases ne nala tnat secondary sources were preferable. Hut always,
6
Gibbon claimed that ne had noted tnis fact; always, ne had sougnt
to be exact in indicating tne extent of his reading and the source
of his information. There are even instances when it appears tnat
tne histoi'ian enjoyed tnese acknowledgements and the integrity in
7
himself whion they reflected.
curiosity, as v*eii as my sense of duty, has always impelled me to
study the originals." For a critic's interpretation of Gideon's
motivation in consulting the primary sources, see .appendix 16.
1 This charge drew the one reply to his critics. See a. Vin¬
dication of Some Passages in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Chapters
TFTTTT- CfJ Misc. bforxs, p. 713 ff.
2 V, 103, note.
3 Gibbon was critical of tne failure of other historians to
cite the authority for their statements; yet he defended the occa¬
sional occurrence of tne same practice in his own writings. See
appendix lb.
4 a cx'itic cn^rged that his claim to have examined all tne
original materials "referred only to those accessible in print." See
J. H. Slacx, op. cit., p. 162.
3 For examples, see appendix 17.
b "Wnen tney hc.ve sometimes eluded my search," he wrote, "I
have carefully marxed tne secondary evidence, on whose faith a
passage or a fact were reduced to depend" (I, xlvi).
7 Tnese admissions were common throughout his survey of
ecclesiastical hisbory. See appendix 17.
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General references.—* In explanation of those rare instances
in which he had made a general reference, Giboon contended that
either he had recollected the sense of a passage which he had for-
1
merly read without being able to find the place, or the idea he
wanted to convey was the total result of a treatise he nad quoted,
thus making it impossible to confine "within the limits of a particu¬
lar reference the sense or spirit which vms mingled with the whole
2
mass."
But throughout Lhe History, tne aim remained exactness, and
$ .
one consideration over-riding all others was accuracy. On this
rested Gi 00011*3 hope of winning and maintaining the res sect and
3
confidence of the critical reader.
a Critical .attitude
The foregoing section has indicated the manner in which
Gibcon intended to approach his materials and has suggested the
overall accuracy and honesty which marxed his work. But his per¬
formance must be evaluated not only by his intention and his in¬
tegrity but also against tne later development of historiography.
as has been asserted, being accurate uoes not necessarily involve
4
Being rignt. To what extent, by present day standards, did GiDbon
exniDic, a critical attitude?
Disposition towards scepticism.— at first glance, the
1 Cf. e.g., II, lo, note 38.
2 Misc. Works, p. 718. Gibbon also complained that upon
occasion ne had ceen required to adopt quotations "wnich were ex¬
pressed with less accuracy than I could have wished" (Ibid., p. 747).
3 He expressed the desire that his readers mi^ht "consider
me not as a contemptible thief out as an honest manufacturer, who
has fairly procured the raw materials, and worked them up with a
laudable degree of skill and success" (Ibid., p. 747) •
4 J. B. Bury made tnis observation (l, x).
45
critical effort of Tne Deo line and ifall might appear to be only a
1
reflection of a general scepticism. Particularly in Gibbon's
approacn to ecclesiastical history, an attitude of suspicion and
mistrust was betrayed, at times it appeared that fraud and false¬
hood were the common ratner than the exceptional occurrence. The
historian's duty was to instil in the reader a mood of caution and
tne need to reserve judgement. This caution occasionally assumed
the form of outright questioning, but tne historian more often
2
book refuge in tentative agnosticism.
at the basis of this attitude was the historian's conscious¬
ness of the presence of bias in his predecessors, he was convinced
that one orthodox writers had often permitted Christian allegiance
to uisbort tne dispassionate recording of the materials of eccle¬
siastical history. Tne tendency was to allow wishes to control
beliefs, and beliefs to influence and control the writing of
nistory. Constantly he was watchful for the operation of this
3
factor in tne worxs of nis predecessors, and insisted that it was
wrong to reiy upon a writer in findings which supported the
writer's prejudice. So cneracteristic had these tendencies be¬
come in the reporting of ecclesiastical history that Gibbon con¬
cluded: "If tne eyes of spectators nave sometimes been deceived by
fraud, tne understanding of the readers has much more frequently
4
been insulted by fiction."
1 "Criticism," he defined in tne Kssai. as "the art of
judging autnors and their worxs, wnat they have said and whether
tney have spoken trutn" (misc. Worxs. p. 042}.
2 Statements illustrating the various snades of Gibbon's
scepticism, togetner with comments by contemporary critics, are
found in Appendix 18.
3 For examples of this 'watchfulness, see appendix 18.
4 II, 322.
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Limits to scepticism*— Tnis attitude of suspicion and
mistrust might well appear to be anything but truly critical. Yet
a certain amount of scepticism is an essential ingredient in any
1
sound criticism. and Gibbon's scepticism was not unrestricted.
It never prompted him to question the supposition that the past
could be reconstructed historically. It did not issue in a dis¬
trust of the historical inquiry itself. In this respect, The
Decline and Fall does not contain the seeds of a modern 'sociology
of knowledge'.
Giobon was aware chat scepticism ecu Id oe as uncritical
ragr
¥
as credulity. He was scornful of a viewpoint vh ich undermined tne
2
validity of any inquiry into ancient hiscory. He saw that if
carried to ins logical conclusion, scepticism would threaten the
possibility of all knowledge. That would be absurd for the same
conclusion must tnen apply to the insight of scepticism as well.
The most scepticial criticism," he wrote, Is obliged to respect the
3
integrity of this passage of Tacitus."
further support for the contention that Gibbon's scepti¬
cism was not all-consumxng is found in the faith which, after noting
and discounting tneir 'bias', he placed in his predecessors, for
the most part, he was prepared to follow their guidance with
respect and confidence. Critics have contended that upon occasion
his willingness to follow tne lead of a predecessor was complete!, y
1 Lord acton wrote, "The critic is one who when he lights
upon an interesting statement, begixxs by suspecting it." Of. Lecpure3
on Modern History (London: Macmillan & Co., 1900), p. 15-
2 for instances of Gibbon's scorn of Voltaire's scepticism,
see V, lbO, note 121; and II, 268, note 26.
3 II, 92. Cf. also II, 128, note I46.
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1
uncritical, and involved him in errors.
Mistaken impression of vacillation.— This combination of
caution and confidence, of disparagement and reliance, has created
an impression of confusion and vacillation. Even a friendly critic
was led to observe: "His scepticism follows no rule, and leaves us
2
asking for canons."
Yet Giobon's attituae towards his predecessors actually
reflected more rationality than might at first be apparent. His
assumption was that while the bias of a writer must be recognized
and his conclusions discounted in those instances in which bias
led him astray, still there were ways of establishing or challenging
the authenticity of the accounts of a previous writer. By means
of them, Giobon believed it possible to avoid the Charybdis of com¬
plete credioility on the one hand, and the Scylla of a sterile
3
scepticism on the other.
Methods of Evaluation
The following criteria were employed by Gibbon to determine
&he trustworthiness of nis materials: conscensus; comparison;
I
inference; tne appeal to reluctant authority; the use of ancient
manuscripts; his own historical sense. While it is necessary to
consider the operation of these several factors separately, Gibbon
1 Examples of Gibbon's 'faith* in his predecessors are
given in .appendix 19.
2 Bury charged that Gibbon had uncritically adopted "the
animosity which the chronicler [Constantine Porphyrogennetos3, from
ecclesiastical prejudice, exhibits towards Martina" (V, 185, note),
and Robertson cited furtner instances of Gibbon's 'gullibility'.
Gf. J. M. Robertson, Gi_bbon, p. 90.
3 That there were times when his critical apparatus failed
him does not of itself argue against the existence of the apparatus.
Gf. appendix 20.
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never specifically classified them as such. Rather were they
assumed, as essential ingredients of any adequate approach to the
stuay of history.
Consceasus.— Giobon frequently sought to marshal more than
one authority in support of his account of an event or period.
Expressions such as, "See Eusebius and JLactantius," or "Bee Mosheim
and Tillemont," are often to be observed in his notes. In estab¬
lishing a conscensus of ancient authorities, he was pleased to note
I 2
that a modern predecessor had tackled the task before him.
But he was also aware that the repetition of the same state¬
ment by many writers did not of itself add anything to its authen-
3
ticity. He knew that accounts could be improved upon in retelling,
and took particular satisfaction in tracing stories back to tneir
4
point of origin.
Comparison.— Gideon thus understandably discovered that
/
more reliable than consensus was comparison. Nothing brought him
more satisfaction than "the singular felicity of comparing the
3
narratives." Especially when opposing ♦biases* were betrayed by
ecclesiastical writers, the stage was set for the * impartial* his-
6
torian to supply the necessary insight into what actually occurred.
These differences between several historians' recording of
1 Cf. e.g., II, 91, note 32.
2 Examples of these acknowledgements are given in Appendix
21.
3 Cf. e.g., II, 322, note 46.
4 For instances of this practice in Giboon, and the apparent
failure of a friendly editor to take account of them, see appendix
21.
5 VI, 425.
o E.g., "With the mutual aid and opposite tendency [of Pro¬
testant ana Catholic scholars], it is easy for us to pose the balance
with philosophic indifference" (V, 269, note).
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tne same event also impressed him with the need for cautious and
1
careful weighing of tneir conflicting narratives. and character¬
istically, he was prepared to acknowledge when a modern predecessor
2
had performed this task for him. But it might be expected that
tnis would have happened since a part of the function of every
historian was to compare and contrast previous accounts of an
event.
Inference.— The modern historian is not content merely to
compile and contrast previous accounts. He uses one document to
3
see new folds of interpretation in the other. as a contemporary
has ciaimed, the historian's task is that of interpolating between
the statements borrowed from his authorities, other statements
4
implied oy them. Thus it becomes possible to proceed by infer¬
ence beyond information supplied by authorities to a reconstruction
of the past which is more complete than the facts available without
contradicting any of them and without involving anything "that is
5
not necessitated by the evidence." Like a natural scientist in
this respect, the historian advances an hypothesis which seeks to
explain and understand even when actual or complete confirmation is
not possible.
This procedure was frequently illustrated in Gibbon's hand¬
ling of his predecessors. He strove to deduce from what they had
1 Variations between his autnorities wex*e noted conscient¬
iously. bee Appendix 21.
2 "by comparing their unsatisfactory accounts," he noted,
"Mosheim has drawn out a very distinct representation of the cir¬
cumstances and motives of this revolution" (II, 11, note).
3 Of. butterfiela, History and Human Helations (London:
Goiia.no, 1931) i p. 13 ff., for a discussion of the method of his¬
torical inference.
4 Collingwood, The Idea of History, n. 240 ff.
3 Ibid., p. 2U1~.
6 Gibbon argued that the historian was to extract "knowledge
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or had not reported, conclusions which were valid even though not
based upon evidence whioh was immediately given. Sometimes, he
employed what had been reported for the purpose of discounting
x
itselfi or he suggested that the fsilence* of a writer spoke most
2
significantly of all; or he showed how a predecessor's oersonal
3
situation made it impossible for him to be a trustworthy reporter;
or he argued that the situation itself made it entirely likely that
4
the account was authentic. So triumphantly upon occasion did
Giboon relate his inferences that one feels that he regarded infor¬
mation thus derived as more reliable than that supported directly
5
"by the suspicious evidence of ecclesiastical history."
Reluctant authority.— Closely allied with this method of
inference was tne appeal to reluctant authority. When Gibbon
found a writer supplying testimony which seemed to go against his
own bias, he was inclined at once to regard the account in a more
favourable light. Thus he used Tex-tullian* s testimony in support
from credulity, moderation from zeal, and impartial trutn from the
most disingenuous controvex'sy" (Misc. Worms, p. 747).
1 E.g., "Yet tiie most rapid march from .Edinburgh. ... to
Milan must have required a longer space of time than Claudian seems
willing to allow for the duration of the Gothic war" (III, 265,
note).
2 he reasoned that from the ignorance of Pliny of any per¬
secution, "we raay properly conclude that in his tirae there were no
general laws in force against the Christians" (II, 99). again he
suggested that the silence of JSusebius regarding the sign of the
gross in the sky "is deeply felt by those advocates for the
miracle who are not absolutely callous" (II, 323, note).
3 E.g., "Lactantius was, at the time, an inhabitant of
hicomedia ... it seems difficult to conceive how he could acquire
so accurate a knowledge of what passed in the imperial cabinet"
(II, 129, note).
4 Thus Gibbon argued for tne validity of the circumstances
reported for the elevation of mthanasius, by citing the encyclical
of a.D. 339, and by observing, "tney would not huve guaranteed a




of the fairness of Pliny. He annealed to the authority of the
Book of Acts to prove that the oivil magistrates protected the
2
first Christians. And he sought to substantiate his contention
3
that the early Christians were intolerant, that they were fre-
4
quently guilty of corruption and immorality, and that some of their
5
most cardinal doctrines were extremely "doubtful, by citing authori¬
ties from whom one scarcely would exnect to receive that information
unless it were undeniably true. Gibbon felt that this testimony was
far more ant to be reliable than that designed to support the en¬
thusiasm or the prejudice of an ecclesiastical writer.
Ancient manuscripts.— Gibbon also attempted to evaluate
the contributions of his predecessors in the light of the ancient
manuscripts then available for study. It is true that noteworthy
advances have been made in the analysis of manuscripts since Gibbon
6
wrote. Yet he was possessed of the modern temper to the extent of
7
being impressed by their crucial importance, and of attempting
1 II, 87, note.
2 II, 89. He also asserted that "Tertullian, in his epistle
to the governor of Africa, mentions several remarkable instances of
lenity and forbearance which had happened within his knowledge" (II,
103, note). But similarly he observed that "Julian seems mortified
that the Christian charity maintains not only their own, but like¬
wise the heathen poor" (II, 54, note).
3 Gibbon quoted Justin Martyr1s admission: "There were many
among the orthodox Christians, who not only excluded their Judaizing
brethren from the hope of salvation, but who declined any inter¬
course with them in the common offices of . . . life" (II, 12).
4 He cited Cyprian*s statements about the corruptions of the
early Christians, (II, 53); Jerome*s admission that the lav/ pro¬
hibiting the clergy from visiting widows was lamentable but necessary,
(IY, 365); and the thirty-fifth canon of the council of Illiberis,
which "provides against the scandals which too often poluted the
vigils of the church" (II, 86, note).
5 GibPon contended that Athanasius and Chrysostom "are
obliged to confess that the divinity of Christ is rarely mentioned
by himself or the apostles" (V, 103, note).
6 For a discussion of this development, see I, xii.
7 K.g., Gibbon argued that the testimony of Tacitus (con-
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1
to make certain of their genuineness. But it cannot be claimed
2
that his approach was genuinely critical. For while he readily
3
noted tnat a predecessor was lacking in such evidential support,
he himself relied upon interpretations of the ancient texts which
4
were actually only speculations. it is true that in at least one
instance, Gibbons reliance upon an ancient writing was annihilated
5
by a critic only to be reinstated by a still later scholar. hut
this is of limited significance. Giboon's own sense of inadequacy
in this area is reflected by his cautious refusal in so many in¬
stances to be committed to a definite conclusion. A similar ten-
tativeness was involved in his notations of alterations introduced
6
by translators. Thus it must be acknowledged that Gibbon was more
concerned to buttress his contentions "by the consent of ancient
manuscripts" than he was to make an extensive, critical study of
7
their authenticity.
Historical sense.— Also utilized was Gibbon's own historical
sense. In many instances, the real basis for accepting an account
cerning the persecution of the Christians under Nero) was proved "by
the consent of the most ancient manuscripts" (XI, 92). See also,
II, 140, note 172.
1 For examples of Gibbon's use of manuscripts, and the
opinions of later scholars, see appendix 21.
2 Gibbon was aware that his effort was superficial, that he
had studied "the theory without attaining the practice of the art."
See AUtobiography, p. 138, 9»"
3 He noted that "Moshelm seems to refine too much on the
domestic religion of Alexander," without realizing that for some of
the letter's activities, "there is no foundation than an improbable
report" (II, 119, note). Cf. also II, 342, note 110.
4 His interpretation of the term 'Galilean' in the text of
Tacitus is an instance of sucn groundless speculation. See II, 94.
5 Cf. II, Appendix 395.
6 See Appendix 21 for examples.
7 He was thus content when the reproduction of original
materials was available in print. See e.g., II, 135, note.
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was simply that the historian himself accepted it; it satisfied his
•sense* of authenticity; and behind him stood whatever dependability
and trustworthiness he had been able to achieve as an historian.
Constantly through Gibbon*s notes run comments such as, "a just
1
account"; or he reported of a writer that the latter related "with
2
great freedom and acciiracy"; or a predecessor was "rational, cor-
3
rect and moderate"; tne clear implication was that this had been
the impression made upon Gibbon.
This'historical sense' was not arbitrary. Gibbon had his
own methods of confirming it. .at times, he applied the test of
4
consistency; or he sought to establish the reliability of a pre¬
decessor by citing the extent of the latter's inquiry into the sub-
5
ject; or he ascribed to the authenticity of an account because of
6
the character of the authority who attested it. Yet one feels
that his own sense of history was operative, and that the arguments
advanced to justify it really represented reasoning after tne fact.
1 II, 131, note.
2 Ibid., p. 127, note. 3 Ibid.. p. 98, note.
4 "Neftner of these writers," he observed, "seems to recol¬
lect how it [the Edict of Toleration] directly contradicts whatever
they have just affirmed of the remorse and repentance of Galerius"
(II, 141, note).
5 Gibbon thus supported his appeal to EeClerc for a conten¬
tion about the Old Testament, by suggesting, "His authority seems to
carry the greater weight, as he has written a learned and judicious
commentary on tne works of the Old Testament" (II, 23, note). But
the fact that Gibbon gave his confidence to a predecessor at one
point did not prevent him from withdrawing it at another: e.g., of
a writer whom he held in high esteem, he observed, "Mosheim, in a
particular dissertation, attacks the common opinion with very incon¬
clusive arguments" (II, 50, note).
6 In citing the testimony of Tacitus concerning the persecu¬
tion of the christians under Hero, Gibbon asserted, "The character
of the philosophic historian, to whom we are principally indebted
for our knowledge of this singular transaction, would alone be suf¬
ficient to recommend it to our most attentive consideration" (II,
89, note). *
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Now tnis approach to history might appear to be extremely
uncritical. 5fet modern critics nave come to recognize that it is
the historian's own standards that are finally normative; no matter
what 'authorities* he has been able to cite in support of a parti¬
cular statement or interpretation, his reconstruction of the past
can possess no more reliability than he himself has been able to
1
attain. Gibbon never articulated tnis more modern conception of
the nature of historiography; but he assumed an 'historical sense*
to be an essential element in the approach to his predecessors.
Criticism
Established errors.— In some areas, significant short¬
comings become apparent in Gaboon's treatment of his predecessors,
where, fox* example, he professed uncertainty and agnosticism,
2
modern research has in many instances reached definite conclusions.
Where he relied heavily upon ancient writers some of these writers
3
have since been thoi'oughly discredited. Boiae problems which h«ve
4
troubled later scholarship did not concern him at all. .and he
1 Current views on this subject are given in Appendix 21.2 E.g., Gibbon contended, "Vne cannot receive with entire
confidence either the Epistles or the nets of Ignatius . . ." (II,104, note). Bury, following nigntfoot, asserted, "The .acts are
certainly spurious; the Epistles are doubtless genuine . . ."(Ibid., p. 104, note;.
3 Bury wrote, "In the interest of literature [tne inferenceis, not in tne interest of history] we may ... be glad ... heused wxtn conx'idenee the now discredited nl Waicidi" (I, xi). J. B.Biacx reproacned Gibson for relying on Procopius' Beeret historyfor tne grea&er part of his material for tne reign of Justinian,contending tnat Procopius "has been successfully impugned as asatirist, calumniator, and party witxiess" (Tne art of History.
p. ib2j. But this contention is now open to question; "The Beerethistory, wnich uiooon accepted, and wnicn was later discredited byKan ice, has now been rehabilitated . • •" (Michael Joyce, EdwardGiobon, p. 129).
4 Bury obsei'ved, "The difficult questions connectea withthe authorsnip and compilation of tne Historla Augusta have
1
could be cnarged occasionally with utterly mistaken inferences.
There are also ins Dances in which lie combined testimony from dif¬
ferent centuries in order to fill out his desci'iption of a purticu-
2
lar period, a practice wnich is not permissible by any present-
day theory of historiography. Eurbxiermore, Gibbon did not use all
3
fcae sources available in nis own time. and, as has been indicated,
it can be contended that his treatment of ancient manuscripts was
lacking -n scientific cnaracter; while he recognized the importance
of a critical attitude in this area, his work actually did little
to forward the arrival of such an attitude.
The verdict of critics.— These considerations have led to
a general disparagement of Gibbon by later students of the method-
4
ology of history. Croce, Collingwood, and even Bury himself, have
echoed "Lord Acton's well known judgement that the difference be¬
tween historiography at the time of Giobon and in modern times was
produced a chestful of German pamphlets, but they did not trouble
Gibbon" (I, xi).
1 Lightfoot e.g., uncovered "a nest of errors" in Gibbon's
account of the history of the remains of Babylas. This fact was
citea by Bury, II, 493, note, again Gibbon relied upon the cele¬
brated 'Edict of Milan*, which, according to some modern scholars,
never existed. See II, 310, note. iOid see III, 50, note 126, for
an instance of Giboon's 'misreading' of Orosius. Noteworthy also
was the mistake wnich Gibbon made about the origin of the Scots. He
argued against the idea of their emigration from another country,
whereas "it is now generally admitted that the Scots of Scotland
were immigrants from Ireland" (III, 45, note).
2 J. B. Black made this charge, and cited as an example
Gibbon's account of the manners and customs of the Germans, contend¬
ing that "in order to impart an artistic unity to the narrative, he
skilfully weaves together the facts supplied by both Gaesar and
Tacitus, ignoring the changes that took place during the hundred
years that separated the two accounts" (The art of History, p. 163).
3t/Thus Bury charged tnat Gibbon failed "to refer to Tatian's
xlfos 7*/»os which contains the best account of the Ghristian
doctrine of demons" (II, jl, note).
4 The views of these critics on the 'unscientific' character
of Gibbon's work are given in appendix 22.
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the same as the difference between astronomy before and after
1 I
Copernicus." The consjcensus has been that GibDon was not simply
'dated*, but tnat nis datie was unmistakably before the dawn of
scientific his&ory. If it could be substantiated, tnis contention
would cancel any contemporary significance for Edward GibDon as
an ecclesiastical historian. But can it be substantiated?
jo. 'scientific' inquiry.— It would appear that the problem
is at aeast partially verbal, and centres around the proper meaning
of the term 'scientific*. If by 'scientific* there is implied the
great development of the nineteenth century wnich, as one critic
has observed, "intensified the technical discipline and extended
its application, carrying the sceptical or critical attitude into
further realms of what had hitherto been too easily accepted as
2
established facts"; then obviously and inevitably, Gibbon was
unscientific.
Likewise, if it is insisted (as the nineteenth century, in
the person of such historians as Kanke and acton, did insist J that
it is possible to write a completely objective account of any
historical occurrence, however remote, and that in such 'objectivity'
lies the only conceivable claim to the status of a scientific
inquiry, then again, with his historical 'sense' and his highly
1 Cited by B. Croce, History as the Story of Liberty (Lon¬
don: George .alien & Unwin, 1941), p. 68. Gollingwood described
tnis idea of a Copernican revolution In the theory of history, as
"the discovery tnat, so far from relying on an authority other than
himself, to whose statements his thought must conform, the his¬
torian is his own authority and his thought autonomous, self-au-
tnorizing, possessed of a criterion to wnich his so-called authori¬
ties must conform, and by reference to wnich they are criticized"
(Tne luea of History, p. 236). But the present inquiry has indica¬
ted that this was precisely wnat Giobon sought to do.
2 Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History, p. 12.
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individualistic approach to the labours of nis predecessors,
Gibbon must appear naive, uncritical, unscientific, ana rightfully
to warrant all the bitter censure that has been heaped upon him.
fne impossibility of 'objectivity*.— But the movement of
historical thougnt in the first half of the present century has
cast a shadow over these supposedly indisputable * scientific'
1
assumptions. Increasingly, critics have acknowledged tnat in
historiography the idea of Objectivity' is an illusion; even the
xaost scientific history is written under conditions which ties it
to the individual's time and place; in our day as in any day, it
2
is impossible to eliminate the human element. The past, in other
words, must always be limited by the Kind of subject which seens to
3
understand it. There can be no 'scientific* history in the sense
4
in which the nineteenth century conceivea of it.
a justifiable connotation of 'scientific'.— Far more de¬
fensible is it to regard as scientific any inquiry that is con¬
ducted with a passion to conform to the highest standards of in-
5
teiiectuaiity wnich that age has been able to obtain. .From this
standpoint, it becomes possible to appraise previous historical
6
efforts not only with greater humility but with far more fairness.
1 Gf. Fritz Medicus, "On the Objectivity of Historical -Know¬
ledge" in Philosophy and History to ismst Cassirer (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 137 ff«
2 For current statements of this insight and its implication
for ail of science, see Appendix 23.
3 Of. J. Huizinga, ".a Definition of the Concept of History"
in Philosophy and History, p. 7*
4 "Kanke himself was to learn later," observed a contempor¬
ary historian, "that a considerable degree of human frailty is
liable to insert itself into any species of mere reporting that is
done by an eye witness ... or even in official documents" (H.
Butterfield, Christianity and History, p. 13).
5 Cf. Philosophy and History, p. 7.
6 contemporary has written of "the usual depreciation by
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One begins to see that while Gibbon lacked modern methods of •de¬
termining* evidence, he was not lacking in a critical approach to
1
what was established by his own age as evidence. and while the
fact that he failed to employ what was not known until a later
age needs to be noted and advances in his subject properly acclaimed,
this consideration ought not to impair his status either as a thinker
2
or as a critical historian.
What indeed can now be recognized is that due to the con¬
stantly changing situation with respect to evidence, history always
3
has to be rewritten by eacn succeeding generati on. Such varia¬
tions and advances do nob jeopardize the scientific quality of
previous historical inquiries. They only attest to the fact that
every historian "renders his account in accordance witn the stan-
4
dards which his education and Weltanschauung lead him to adopt."
Thus the claim that "Gibbon was not backward for his day"
was in this sense a superfluous statement, since tnat is the only
5
possible basis for judging any writer in any day. And the dis¬
position of one age to castigate another as unscientific not only
attests to its own arrogance, but also exposes tnat age to a
every historical period of the one tnat has preceded it, with the
view of showing its inferiority to the present" (Groce, History of
Hiatoriography, p. 261). Of. also Philosophy and History, p. 22£.
1 a critic has argued tnat "the enlargement of historical
knowledge comes about xaainly through finding how to use as evidence
this or that kind of perceived fact wnich historians have nitherto
thougnt useless to tnem" (Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 247).
2 The same argument can be advanced in defence of all tne
great minds of history. See Appendix 24.
3 See Appendix 24, for contemporary expressions of tnis
awareness.
4 Huizinga, "a Definition of the Concept of History," op.
cit.» p. 6.
5 This assertion was xaade by the friendly rationalist
critic, J. M. Robertson, Gibbon, p. 91.
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similar charge from a subsequent generation.
fiie implications of the 1 subjective*.— On the strength of
this understanding of the subjective element and its crucial impor¬
tance in the writing of history, it beoomes possible to appreciate
1
the validity of variations and divergencies among historians. One
begins to realize that "every present allows of a multitude of re-
2
constructions of the past."
Thus Gibbon's predecessors in ecclesiastical history fol¬
lowed a basically orthodox line of interpretation, but that fact
in itself in no wise discounted the possible validity of their his¬
tories. Gibbon approached tne same materials from a fundamentally
different standpoint, and it may be argued that his findings were
3
not automatically to be disqualified for that fact.
This acknowledgement need not lead to a position of his¬
torical relativism. It is not a sign of scepticism, hut it does
suggest tnat any final designation of the meaning or significance
of the historic process, or any portion thereof, exceeds the scope
4
of the critical historian. The historian is not thereby barred
from advancing an interpretation based on his own premises even
5
though tnese premises are not scientifically supportable. This
1 The validity of these variations is now commonly acknow¬
ledged. See Appendix 25.
2 JTitz Medicus, "On the Objectivity of Historical .Knowledge,"
op. cit., p. 147.
^ Recognition of the propriety of this may serve to underline
the partisanship of the catholic critic's comment: "The infidel Gib¬
bon . • • despised all tnat Tillemont revered and used the materials
which Tiliemont had so laboriously collected in order to explain
away Christianity, and to rationalize the history of the church"
(Cnristopher Dawson, Edward Gibbon, p. 11).
4 Did Gibbon himself exceed the scope of his inquiry pre¬
cisely at tnis pointy See Chapters tfour and Jfive for the argument
supporting mils supposition. Cf. also Appendix 25.
5 I.e. j while there can be no claim of a givenness of meaning
6o
practice is not only permissible, tut it is inevitable if history
is to be more than cnronicle.
jaut the fact remains that how the historian reconstructs
his materials depends upon himself, upon the particular historical
'posture* wnich he decides to assume; and that 'objective* recording,
as nineteenth century historians conceived of it, is a goal beyond
1
the attainment of the 'human' inquirer.
a conclusion.— It is proper to conclude that GiDoon and his
predecessors could offer variant and even conflicting accounts of
ecclesiastical history without contradicting or refuting one another.
iOid while tnese several interpretations might be appraised on the
2
basis of their ability to explain all the facts, one suspects that
the adjudication could never be final owing to the absence of any
real agreement as to what were the facts. Moreover, one wonders
whether much may not be gained from reflecting upon more than one
approach to ecclesiastical history.
This study has suggested tnat in the handling of his pre¬
decessors, Gibbon could be defended on three main counts: his
accuracy, with negligible exceptions, was beyond reproach; he could
not be accused justly of being *pre-Gopernican* in his historical
method, since he made an unmistakable attempt to assess the trust¬
worthiness of his authorities, no matter how inadequate by current
standards;and the slant which he imposed upon their work was not to
in history, the fact remains tnat only by advancing an interpreta¬
tion based on his own premises, can the historian approach history
at all,
1 Thus it can be claimed tnat the only truly 'objective'
observer is God.
2 for other applications of this insight, and another view
of the proper basis for evaluating interpretations, see Appendix 26.
be discounted either because it deviated from ortnodoxy or on the
supposition that it was incompatible with the function of a critical
historian.
What it would appear that Gibbon failed to recognize was
that his interpretation stemmed from his own individuality and from
the age in which he lived, that it was not elioited by the findings
of critical history itself. Thus a closer analysis of Gibbon*s own
attitude towards ecclesiastical history and of the factors which
formed it constitutes the next major section of this inquiry.
CHAPTER IV
THE ATTITUDE OP EDWARD GIBBON
TOWARDS ECCUSSIaSTICaL HISTORY
The Problem
One of the marks of a reputable and reliable Historian is
tnat while he may use his theme to develop a congenial thesis, he
1
do63 not permit an animus to inspire and motivate his work.'
Edward Gibbon staked significant claims to reliability as an his¬
torian. Yet in his consideration of the rise of the Christian
Church, it has been the very general view that antagonism and anti¬
pathy influenced him and endangered his conclusions.
ha indication of the indictment.— Can this supposition of
the critics be sustained? Did Gibbon betray a deep and settled
grudge against every form of Christian belief? Has one encountered
here "that great misrepresentation which pervades his History, his
I
false estimate of the nature and influence of Christianity"? Would
Chapters .Fifteen and Sixteen fall into the category of what Crooe
called "pseudo-history," whose "true purpose was not to discover the
truth about the past but to express the author1s feelings towards
3
it"? Must his sole significance consist in "leaving us the materials
1 Bury cited as excoaples the indictment of the Empire by
Tacibus, the defence of Caesarianism by Mommsen, Grote* s vindication
of democracy, and Droysen's advocacy of monarchy. Cf. I, ix.
2 Freface to Henry Milraun's Edition of the Decline and Fall
(London; Ward Locke & Co., 1888), I, viii.




of forming a fairer judgement"?
The admission of an enduring value.— If tnese contentions
require credence, how xaay the supposition that Gibbon exhibited
2
astonishing accuracy be defended? How could the claim that he
had produced a work of enduring value be maintained?
On the other hand, if the allegations were not correct,
what was Gibbon's attitude towards ecclesiastical history, and what
were the factors wnich formed it?
The Historian's Intention
There can be no beoter way to begin tuan to examine Gibbon's
own estimate of nis attitude. How did he claim to conduct his sur-
3
vey? Was he conscious of "taking sides"? Hid he assume that his
ecclesiastical history required an approach fundamentally different
from the other portions of his Hisuory? Once Gibbon's view has
been appraised, it may be possible to evaluate his actual perfor¬
mance and the extent to which he approximated to his own standards.
Antagonism incompatible with his conception of history.—
From the outset it is clear that Gibbon did not consider himself af¬
flicted by any such antagonism or prejudice as was at once attribu¬
ted to him. His aim was to write a serious, scientific history,
.any uncritical yielding to predispositions would have been regarded
by him as oeneath the dignity of an historian and a betrayal of the
most fundamental principles of his office. In the controversial
1 Milman, op. cit., p. ix.
2 Cf, I, xil.
3 a. critic has claimed tnat historians at the turn of the
century "found fault witn Gibbon not for taking sides against
Christianity, but for taking sides at all" (Collingwood, op. oit..
p. 146).
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Chapter fifteen, he declared that "the duty of an historian does
not call upon him to interpose his private judgement" in religious
1
controversies. mid in reviewing the composition of The Decline
and gall, he claimed that he had treated Christianity "without
interposing his own sentiments," that he had "delivered a simple
2
narrative of authentic facts."
That none of these statements was strictly accurate is sug¬
gested even by some of the historian's own admissions. Yet it does
point to a recognition of impartiality as a highly desirable aim
in any scientific history. Regardless of the verdict of critics,
Gibbon characterized the Fifteenth Chapter as an "impartial, though
3
imperfect, survey of the progress of Christianity."
Detachment a deterrent to hostility.— Operative also was
the desire for detachment which influenced all of Gibbon's his*
torical writing and which was clearly in evidence in his discussion
4
of ecclesiastical history. Always it was his intention to stand
apart from the process he was describing so that his reporting
might be dispassionate and objective. Always he wanted to be above
the melee of conflicting loyalties and enthusiasms so tnat he
could be free of the suspicion of bias, Naturally this Olympian
view might lead to otaer conclusions than those reached by the
5
partisans of a particular cause. Their censure would not disturb
him. Throughout his History, Giboon seemed to say: 'Whatever the
opinions of partisanship, i have no personal stake in the outcome;
1 II, 32.
2 Miscellaneous Worsts, p. ^10.
3 II, 69.
4 Cf. Chapter Two of this inquiry.
3 Examples of this ulympian attitude are given in Appendix
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nor has scientific history.'
Such a disposition was scarcely indicative of a writer
radically incensed against religion or evaa against ecclesiasticism.
Katner does it suggest someone indifferent and aloof. Granted
that the rationalist's contention that "witn the exception of iiayie,
ne was the first student of ecclesiastical origins who combines
thorough Knowledge with perfect detachment of spirit" exceeds the
1
truth; 'perfect detachment' is never possible, and it cannot be
claimed for Gibbon; yet it can rightly be asserted that it was not
in Gibbon's nature greatly to become agitated over any subject,
and tnat whatever hostility he did evince against Christianity
failed to conform not only to his conception of history but to
"ohat modification of ideas and sentiments which led him to per¬
ceive always in things, whether in detail or mass, tiieii* advantages
2
as well as their disadvantages."
.antagonism not present in early attitude.-- Still other con¬
siderations indicate that Gibbon's original attitude towards
Christianity was not one of antipathy. This possibility has been
commonly overlooked or even rejected because of Gibbon's frequent
use of irony, as a consequence, sarcasm has been suspected in
every positive statement he ever made on the subject of religion.
When, for example, at the occasion of his reconversion to
Protestantism, he wrote, "It was here that 1 suspended my religious
inquiries, acquiescing with implicit belief in the tenets and mys¬
teries wnich are adopted by the general consent of Catholics and
1 Robertson, Gibbon, p. 76.
2 if. a. Guizot's Edition of Tne Decline ana fall, (London:
J. £>. Virtue & Co., 1838), I, xii. Jfor furtner views of critics
on Gibbon's detaonment, see Appendix 27.
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1
Protestants,M the usual practice nas been to dismiss it as "the
solemn jest," or "a statement in his most significant manner of
2
innuendo."
Vi/hen in his Essai, he wrote, "The enemies of a religion
are never well acquainted with it because they detest it, and often
3
detest it because they are not acquainted with it," this has been
regarded as youthful exuberance, the only significance of which was
that it might be appropriately applied against the subsequent
4
writings of Gibbon himself.
His frequent attexxaanoe at cnurch during the early years at
Lausanne, his participation in Holy Communion, his recorded pleasure
in following tne New Testameixt lessons in the Creek language - all
5
tnis has been deeraed of little or no consequence. "It is pretty
certain," wrote tne critic, "that even in regards to his frame of
mind in 1754," any expression of piety was merely "the official
6
falsehood it was naturally taken to be."
Yet in the autobiography, Gibbon'pointedly referred to this
period in these terras:
Since my escape from Popery I had humbly acquiesced in the
common creed of tne Protestant Churches; but in the latter
end of the year 1759 the famous treatise of Grotius (de veri-
tate Religionis Christianas) first engaged me in a regular
tryal of tne evidence of Christianity.7
1 a.utooiograpny, p. 63.
2 Robertson, op. cit., p. 12.
3 Misc. worxs, p. 659.
4 James Cnelsum, Remarks on the Two Last Chapters of Mr.
GiDbon's History (Oxford: fxie Clarendon Press, 1778), p. xiii.
5 -a critic referred to Morison*s "naive citation of a letter
of 17o5 on txxe 'edifying spectacle' of Sunday communion," as "quaint
ground for reckoning its writer orthodox" (Robertson, op. oit..
p. 14). But it would appear equally 'quaint ground' for reckoning
nim implacably antagonistic.
6 Ibid., p. 12.
7 Memoir u., p^ 249. The underlining is the present writer's.
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Must not some consideration of such specific utterances be included
in a final estimate of Gibbon's attitude?
Absence of an emotional involvement.— Of significance also
was the fact that Gibbon's own religious Pilgrimage was accomplished
1
without permanent emotional soars. In a letter to his aunt, he
referred to "the different movements of my mind, entirely Catholic
when I came to Lausanne, wavering a long time between the two sys-
2
terns, and at last fixed for the ProtestantThere is thus little
foundation for the supposition of the German scholar, Meinecke:
Aber ein starkes Erlebnis war es, und es zitterte nach in
dera Interesse, das der Geschichtschreiber nunmehr den Dogmen
der Kirche widmete. Eine solche Vertiefung in sie, bemerkt
Bernays treffend, mutet sich nur die nach Erhitzung abgektlhlte,
nicht die von Haus kalte Indifferenz zu.3
Against this, the Autobiography had indicated that the con¬
version and reconversion as well as the mounting scepticism were
4
essentially intellectual occurrences. It does not suggest-that
religion was a subject which had greatly 'heated' his emotions;
nor does one gain this impression from his other writings.
A mistaken inference.— The suspicion grows that there has
been an inclination on the part of critics to view Gibbon's early
attitudes and youthful experiences in the light of his later reputa¬
tion as an attacker of Christianity, to read back into them inter¬
pretations which might account for the subsequent development of
his thought, and to dismiss all utterances to the contrary as
1 With reference to his conversion to the Roman communion,
the historian recorded "a momentary glow of enthusiasm" (Autobio-
graohy. p. 48). He added: "I was seduced like Chillingworth and
Bayle, and, like them, my growing reason soon broke through the
toils of sophistry and superstition" (Memoir E.. p. 297).
2 autobiography. p. 66.
3 Meinecke, op. pit., p. 253.
4 Cf. Autobiograohy. p. 50 ff.
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indicative of his ironical temperament. This is questionable pro¬
cedure. why may it not rather be assumed that when Gibbon assured
Lord Sheffield that "he hadn't at first any idea of attacking
1
Christianity" in the famous chapters, he meant precisely that?
Searching for a subject.— But if it be conceded that what
Gibbon uctually meant by some of his early utterances was not al¬
ways clear, one is assuredly on better ground in arguing tnat the
vast variety of ideas wnicn tne historian entertained for his main
literary effort proved tnat at this period ne had no great antagon¬
ism pressing within him.
Tne expedition of Cnarles VIII, the crusade of Richard I,
tne barons' wars against John and Henry III, the history of Edward
the Black Prince, the lives and comparisons of Henry V and the
Emperor Titus, the life of Sir Philip Sidney, and the story of Sir
Walter Raleigh — all were at one time or another seriously contem-
2
plated and rejected.
Suon searching for a subject would scarcely confirm the
notion tnat Christianity was weighing in on him as a phenomenon,
the recora of wnich ne would relish the chance to set straight. On
tne contrary, it indicates that he had no special purpose to serve,
no preconceived tneory to support, no particular prejudice to over¬
throw .
Appreciation of Christianity
This initial freedom from antipathy carried over into the
1 Lord Sheffield reported this stutemait in a letter to
Wilberforce. Of. The Correspondence of William Wilberforce, XI, 323.
The writer is indebted for this reference to ohelby McCloy, Gipbon's
antagonism to unristianity (London: Williams <x Norgate, 1933), p. 47.
2 autobiography, p. 118.
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History itself. That is established by numerous passages which
suggest that Gibbon was not insensitive to what he evaluated as
1
the positive aspects of Christianity.
Kecognition of the merits of individual Christians,— Of the
divine ".author" of this religion, he entertainsd not a suspicion
as to whether He had lived. The historian referred to Christ as
2
One who "lived and' died for the service of mankind," and Ifuhose
life was marled by "mild constancy in the midst of cruel and volun¬
tary sufferings," by "universal benevolence," and by "sublime
simplicity."
Of ntnanasius, he wrote in terms of the highest respect and
4
admiration; a fact which prompted J. H. Newman, a far from sympa¬
thetic critic, to observe that "nthanaaius stands out far more
grandly in Gibbon than in the cages of orthodox ecclesiastical
historians."
about another saint of the Church, Gibbon observed, "The
youth of augustine had been stained by the vices and errors which
he so ingenuously confesses; but from the moxaen t of his conversion
1 In a letter, he wrobe of "the purity of its original
principles" (Misc. Worxs, p. 217).
2 v, TW.
3 II» 63. Tnis must be set over against his comparison of
Christ witn Hocr&tes, whose "life and death had likewise been devoted
to the cause of religion and justice" (V, 10$). "Not a word of im¬
patience . . . escaped from tne mouth of the dying philosopher" (V,
111, note). But the latter reference may be interpreted more as a
defence of Socrates, whom Gibbon felt the Christians had uncharitab¬
ly consigned to tne outer darkness tnan as a deliberate disparage¬
ment of Christ.
4 II, 383 ff. Klsewhere Gibbon observed, "May I presume to
add that the portrait of iVthanasius is one of the passages of my
history with wnich i am the least dissatisfied?" (VI, 212, note)
$ Cited by Leslie Stephen, Studies of a Biographer (London:
Duckworth fit Co., 1898), I, 18$. ~ "
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to that of his death the manners of the bishop of Hippo were pure
1
and austere." These words must be read in the context of a
sharply critical appraisal; yet they do surest that Gibbon was
not oblivious to the positive qualities of this great figure of
2
tne Church.
The constructive role of the Church,— Mot only did Gibbon
recognize the qualities of individual Christians; there is also
indication that he appreciated the constructive and conserving
role which tne Church played in the ancient world and even into
modern times. It is true that he observed that by the eighth cen-
3
tury, "the long night of superstition" had begun. Yet he pro¬
ceeded in many instances to qualify that judgement.
He saw, for example, that the successful establishment of
Christianity preserved "a permanent respect for the name and insti¬
t¬
utions of home." He perceived that by its demands for uniformity
in doctrine and organization, the Church had been able to keep
5alive the feeling of a united Roman people throughout the world.
He discerned tnat after the fall of the Hmpire, Christianity acted
6
as a preservative of European civilization and culture. He con¬
tended tnat society was indebted to the monks for their attention
to agriculture and to useful trades; and he argued that the ecclesi¬
astical use of .Latin involved the preservation of the "monuments of
1 III, 430. tfor furtner instances of Gibbon's appreciation
of Christians individually and collectively, see Appendix 29.




3 Of. Ibid., p. 173.
0 Cf. VI, 172.
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1
ancient learning." He cited notable contrioutions made by the
2
Church to learning in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; and
he declared:
Tne authority of the priests operated in the darker ages as
a salutary antidote: they prevented the total extinction of
letters, mitigated the fierceness of the times, sheltered the
poor and defenceless, and preserved or revived the peace and
order of civil society.3
Thus one does not find in Gibbon the unqualified rationalist
contention that the Church was the cause of the cultural backward¬
ness of the Dark /iges, and that the Renaissance rediscovered clas-
4
sical antiquity despite the Church. With truer historical per¬
spective, Gibbon maintained that Christianity was responsible for
the retention of tne tradition of ancient culture, and that it
rendered invaluable assistance to Western Civilization by delivering
5
Europe froxa tne depredations of the barbarians.
Exposition of Christian doctrines.— Still further support
for Gibbon's readiness to interpret Christianity apart from an
6
active antagonism is contained in Chapters Eifteen and Sixteen.
1 IV, 86. See Misc. Worxs, p. 835, for Gibbon's recognition
of the contribution made by the "monkish historians"; but against
this must be set the whole of Chapter Thirty-seven with its devas¬
tating attack upon monasticism.
2 711, 122.
3 VI, 465. for additional instances, see Appendix 30. In
tne face of tne nuiaDer of passages which can be cited, it is hard to
account for tne critic's contention: "GiDbon's religious prejudices
rendered it impossible for nim to understand the positive achieve¬
ments of medieval religion and culture." Cf. Christopher Dawson,
Edward Gibboxx, p. 15.
4 Rationalistic contentions to this effect and an evaluation
by contemporary critics are indicated in .appendix 30.
5 VI, 172. One feels tnat Gibcon was motivated here by the
historian's instinct to recover the past, rather than to confirm
wnat on tne basis of his own view ne expected to find. JJ'or a further
instance, see appendix 30.
o His biographer contended that the two chapters contained
a bias which was not present in tne remainder of the work (J. C.
Morison, Gibbon, p. 121). But tnere is ample evidence that the
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Admittedly, he was not viewing the rise of the Church from anything
approaching a believers standpoint, and the exposition was not
1
coucned in terms which implied that the ideas expounded were true;
still this did not preclude an effort to treat the subject strnight-
2
forw^rdly and objectively. Such treatment WdS instanced in his
3
presentation of the nature of faith; it was reflected also in his
discussion of the importance of witnessing in the early Christian
4
community; it was seen in his consideration of the question of
5
wnat was the primitive model for the organization of the Church.
Clearly the irony and cool detachment in no way stripped his state¬
ments of possible validity.
Admissions of critics.— These considerations have prompted
noteworthy admissions on the part of critics. J. C. Morison sug¬
gested that "Gibbon became more just and open to the merits of the
approach was the same throughout.
1 a critic's supposition that there was sufficient evidence
to conclude that Gibbon was really a believer scarcely appears
plausible ir. the face of the overall impact of the work. Of. J. M.
Macdonald, "Irony in History", Bibliotneca Sacra, (.London: Trubner
& Co., 18o8), XXV, 550.
2 For an amazing literary effort based upon the recognition
of this fact, see appendix 30.
3 He described it as a "deep impression of supernatural
truths ... a state of mind . * . recommended as the first or per¬
haps the only merit of a Christian . . . the moral virtues . . .
are destitute of any value or efficacy in the work of our justifi¬
cation" (II, 34).
4 "It became the most sacred duty of a new convert to dif¬
fuse among his friends and relatives the inestimable blessing which
he had received, and to warn them against a refusal that would be
. . . punished as a criminal disobedience to the will of a benevo¬
lent but all-powerful deity" (II, 8). From a Christian standpoint,
is this not an adequate statement of the urgent summons to win others
for Christ?
5 "The few who have pursued the inquiry with more candour
ana impartiality are of the opinion that the apostles declined the
office of legislation, and rather chose to endure some partial scan¬
dals and divisions than to exclude the Christians of a future age




Christian community." Gibbon*s most recent biographer has referred
"to an odd sense of fairness which keeps cropping up . . . through-
2
out his work." .and in a work significantly entitled "Gibbon*s
antagonism to Christianity" and which was based on the premise of
the historian*s "implacable hostility" and his "bitter and subver¬
sive attack," Shelby McCloy declared that "he was imbued with an
3
Englishman*s love of fairplay,"
a necessary distinction.— It is not being argued that the
historian*s own claims or the instances cited from the History or
the reluctant admissions of critics are sufficient to establish
that Gibbon was an impartial and unprejudiced appraiser of ecclesi¬
astical history, -anyone well acquainted with Tne Decline and Fall
is aware of a wealth of indication to the contrary. Hut it is con¬
tended that tnere is no basis for the supposition of a complete
and all-consuming animosity to all things Christian as has been
4
attributed to Gibbon,
The Impression of Hostility
Tne manner of presentation.— It remains to account for the
almost universal verdict that the History constituted a major attack
upon Christianity. The origin of this impression must be traced not
to the materials which Gibbon assembled, but to the manner of irony
and "thinly veiled contempt" in which, it was charged, these
materials were presented. One has the feeling that had Gibbon
1 Morison, op. cit,, p. 127.
2 Micnael Joyce, Edward Gibbon, p. 149.
3 McOloy, op. oit.. p. 45* The critic also suggested, "It
is by no means impossible tnat Gibbon let an objective attitude
toward lis subject influence and direct his personal opinions"
(Ibid., p. 47).
4 Eor further views of critics to this effect, see Appendix 31.
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approached the subject in a simple, direct style, nothing like the
1
uproar would have resulted.
This contention is supported by the fact that almost a cen¬
tury earlier (1684), the theologian Dodwell had attracted little or
no notice when he questioned the historical basi3 for the belief in
2
a vast number of early martyrs. Yet when Gibbon took up the same
subject and with remarkable thoroughness, followed the learned
theologian's lead, the publication of his book provoked a heated
3
controversy.
Irony not applied only against Christians.— The general
aim of irony, it is commonly held, is to show the incompatibility
between traditional moral standards and aotual ways of living. Its
method is the use of language conveying a meaning contrary to its
literal import. This style of writing, which Gibbon claimed he
acquired from the study of Pascal, met the demands of his materials
4
and of his temperament extremely well. Par from being limited to
his approach to ecclesiastical history, the historian employed irony
as a general weapon and wielded it against Jews and Moslems as well
5
as Christians.
1 But Gibbon's irony was not obscure; he never sought to
hide his real meaning, or to make the reader suppose he was sincerely
defending the proposition he asserted, and there was a cultivated,
refined quality about this irony which separated it from the savage
onslaughts of polemical writers.
2 See II, 95» note, for Gibbon'3 reference to Jbodwell's
De Paucitate Martyrum.
3 Gribbon's carefully argued conclusion to Chapter Sixteen
is a classic, and his findings have been sustained by later scholars.
See appendix 32. This suggests that it was not so much the argument
as tne irony with which it was advanced which constituted, in the
Christian view, its reprehensible character.
4 autobiography, p. 75.
5 .For examples of his ironical treatment of non-Christian
faiths, see appendix 33.
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But it was Christianity, a faith still subscribed to un¬
critically by the greatest portion of the Western World, which
seemed to afford the weapon its real opportunity. Unhesitatingly,
therefore, the historian brought the full weight of his powers to
bear upon this much venerated institution, the Christian Church.
application of irony to Christianity.— Most commonly, the
attack was conducted in cool and dispassionate fashion, and there
was a classical, almost epic quality about the cadence and rhythm
1
of the sentences. Occasionally, the inference was less thinly
veiled and came closer to open derision and contempt. But the
indirect approach was by far the more characteristic and congenial
to Gibbon. This was evidenced by the frequent use of innuendo by
which detraction was neatly oonveyed by the quick thrust of ♦inno¬
cent' suggestion, or the same effect was achieved by disavowing
piously what he actually implied. But never was there any doubt as
to the real meaning wnich the historian intended to convey.
.Now this treading lightly, Ironically, sometimes even con¬
temptuously, in the sacred precinet3 of religion could not fail to
arouse resentment regardless of the validity of the main argument
being advanced. Many who might otherwise have concurred with the
historian's findings were alienated by this manner of treatment,
.and if Gibcon seriously supposed tnat Christians would receive,
"without surprise or scandal," an inquiry conducted in this fashion,
he soon had reason to revise his estimate of the allegiance of
2
Christians to their faith. The question naturally arises, why did
1 Examples of Gibbon's use of irony and innuendo are pro¬
vided in appendix 34.
2 He finally did revise his judgement: "Had I believed that
the majority of English readers were so fondly attached to the name
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he resort bo tne use of irony?
Reason for tne employment of irony.— Defenders of Gibbon
Rave argued tnat this method was forced upon him by the bigotry
and intolerance of his time, that it was simply a way of protecting
himself and his work against the possibility of persecution. J. B.
Bury, for example, cited the law which made it a oriminal offence
1
to attack the established faith. The inference was that had he
felt free to state his findings directly, Gibbon would have done so.
Another defender argued that it was a fine example of "religious
unrectitude that an historian who would have been execrated had he
openly declared himself a deist is still denounced for wearing the
2
light armour of irony iiapailed on him by his critics."
But the validity of this argument is open to question. The
faot was that despite the formal law, the England of the eighteenth
3
century practised tolerance. It wa3 an age of deviation from ortho¬
doxy; yet there were only isolated instances of the actual persecu-
4
tion of intellectuals. One suspects that something other than
the impulse of self-protection motivated Gibbon.
More plausible is the supposition that his irony sprang
and snadow of Christianity; had I forseen that the pious, the timid,
and the prudent, would feel, or affect to feel, with such exquisite
sensibility, I might, perhaps, have softened the two invidious
chapters, which would create many enemies, and conciliate few friends"
(Autobiography, p. 185). It may not be without interest that a dif¬
ferent reaction was registered in Scotland, See Appendix 34.
1 aiitobiograpay, p. xv. Uf. also .appendix 35.
2 J. M. Robertson, Gibbon on Christianity, p. xxi,
3 a study might be made of the number of laws still included
on tne statutes of a realm which are never enforced. Persecution
occurs only when there is tyrannical government or else dear en¬
dorsement of such a policy by the majority of the population, neither
of which conditions prevailed in Gibbon's time.
4 JJ'or an indication or Gibbon's gratitude for tnis fact, see
appendix 35.
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from his detachment, from Ms feeling of aloof superiority to the
1
interests and enthusiasms of average men. iUid particularly did he
feel aloof from the enthusiasms of ecclesiasticism. At any rate,
apart from the threat of persecution, irony suited his underlying
mood extremely well.
The presence of hias,— 'While therefore Gibbon was not in¬
spired by a specific animus against Christianity, he was not without
his particular bias; that is, his irony slanted his materials in a
2
way tnat was not required by the materials themselves. But if it
is true that ecclesiastical history cannot be approached apart from
a px-eaisposition regarding it, if what the historian finds in Ms-
tory is determined by what he brings to history, then this bias
3
ought not to be held against Gibbon nor to detract from his work.
.as a contempoi'ary has put it:
The historian may be cynical with Gibbon or sentimental with
Garlyle. He may have religious ardour or he may be a humour¬
ist. There is no reason why he may not meet history in any
or all of the moods a man may have in meeting life itself.
It is not a sin in an historian to introduce a personal bias
that can be recognized and discounted.h
What was important, insisted this critic, was that the bias be not
3
confused with the voice of history.
May it not be contended then that the bias betrayed by
1 Cf. G. M. Young, GibDon, p. 89; and Black, op. cit.. p. 176.
2 This assertion may be set over against the critic*s con¬
tention tnat Gibbon*a irony was merely "the running comment of a
lively ana gifted intelligence, elicited by the impact of facts on
the mind" (Ibid., p. 159). But "the impact of facts" in itself eli¬
cits no one particular type of response from the historian; on the
contrary, in any approach to 'facts*, assumptions are necessarily
involved. Cf. Chapter Three.
3 Cf. Chapter Two of this inquiry.
4 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History
{London: G. Bell & Sons, 1931), p. 105.
5 Ibid.
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Gibbon's frequent use of irony ought not in itself to disqualify
him as a reliable ecclesiastical historian, especially since the
obviousness of that slant should distinguish it, in the thinking of
1
an attentive reader, from 'the voice of history*.
Admiration for Rome
with the main external features of Gibbon*s approach to
ecclesiastical history thus indicated, it remains to trace the fac¬
tors which combined to cause him to approach the subject in this
way. One critic has dismissed the problem summarily, claiming
that "Gibbon entnahm den Werken des franzdsischen .aufklarers nur
2
die antikirchliche und antichristliche Tendenz." But this is
hardly an adequate explanation.
a lasting enthusiasm.— For one thing, Gibbon's attitude
towards ecclesiastical history cannot be appraised apart from an
understanding of his feeling for the ancient Empix-e, the one signi-
3
ficant and lasting enthusiasm of his life. This appreciation was
4
evidenced at an early age. Subsequent reading and writing ran
5
true to this initial interest. The attachment grew with an early
visit (1764) "to the country of Scipio ana the city with its
1 But that obviousness was no greater in Gibcon than in
later Christian historians. Bee -appendix 36.
2 Eduurd Fueter, Geschichte der Heueren Historiographie
(Bei'lin: R. Oldenbourg, 1911), p. 369.
3 A critic correctly observed, ".although he owed so much to
the thought and culture of the Enlightenment, his history stands
apart from tne typical products of the eighteenth century philoso¬
phical movement. He was not the disciple of Voltaire; he was the
last of tne Humanists" (Dawson, op. cit.. p. ?)•
4 Cf. -mtobiograpay. p. ff. The earliness of the impres¬
sion together with the pervasiveness of the influence challenges
the critics' surmise that tne enthusiasm was merely the reflection
of Enlightenment values. Cf. -appendix 37.




palaces, temples and triumphal arches."
The fruition of this admiration came in the First Volume
of The Decline and Fall. There, with unforgetable eloquence, the
historian of the Roman Empire revealed the depth of the impression
2
that Empire had made upon the man. Nor did GibDon regard Rome's
fate to be restricted to antiquarian interest. He proudly referred
to a "revolution wnich will ever be remembered, and is still felt
3 4 5
by the nations of the earth." Rome's tolerance, its orderliness,
6 7
its cosmopolitanism, its universal peace — all these impressed
Gibbon as marks of a system of government which could ill afford
to vanish from the face of tne earth.
Resultant errors.-- Such open admiration might be expected
8
to result in clear instances of partiality, wnich it did. One
feels that it was a preference for all things Roman which prompted
Gibbon to attempt to explain Nero's persecution of the Christians
in 64 A.D., the result being one of his few clear mistakes of con-
9
jecture. xkgain, it can be contended that Gibbon did not adequately
appraise all aspects of the Antonine era, especially those which
1 II, 27.
2 For instances of Gibbon's admiration of the Empire, see
.appendix 37«
3 I, I.
4 "according to the maxims of universal toleration, the Ro¬
mans protected a superstition which they despised" (II, 4). Cf.
also I, 31.
5 Of. I, 5° ff. It has been contended tnat this appreciation
of the orderliness of tne Antonine period with its despotism was in¬
consistent with his recognition of the evils of imperialism. Gf.
appendix 37. Gf. also the later argument of the present Ghapter.
6 Cf. I, 59 ff.
7 Of- Ibid., p. 47 ff.
8 Gibbon often was very aware of his partiality. See .appen¬
dix 38.
9 He argued that confusion may have resulted from two pos¬




would not fit into his pic oure of a golden age.
Confirmation of critics.— But in the main, his designation
of the period as that in wnich the human rme was "most happy and
most prosperous," a judgement which at first might appear so uncriti¬
cal and unhistoricul, has found surprising confirmation among
scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, hord Bryce and
Arnold Toynbae, for example, have reached amazingly similar conclu-
2
sions. whatever the degree of accuracy of these estimates, there
can be little question but that Gibbon found sufficient therein to
arouse nis deep admiration, and that this admiration influenced the
entire outlook of his maturity.
Obliviousness to his own era.— Gibbon*s preoccupation with
Home was further instanced by the difficulty, on any other supposi¬
tion, of accounting for his attitude towards his contemporary world.
Must it not be assumed that it was his involvement in ancient times
which made him so insensitive to his own?
at any rate, apart from this consideration, his oblivious¬
ness to the pressing political problems of his age would be hard to
reconcile with the keenness of his analysis of the historic process.
His attitude towards Parliament, the American Uolonial question,
and the French Hevolution can only be adequately approached on the
assumption tnat his most pressing interest was not in the eighteenth
3
century.
1 It has been suggested that the fioman world of the second
century did not present the impression of universal toleration and
of freedom from "internal strains" that Gibbon had led the reader
to assume. Gee appendix 38*
2 Descriptions of the period by Bryce, Toynbee and Butter-
field are quoted in appendix 39. For a dissenting estimate of the
era, cf. Stephen Neill, The Christian Society (London: Nlsbet & Co..
1952), Pi 33 ff.3 For an exposition of Gibbon*s lack of adequacy and of
bl
Basis i'or a claim to fume.— One other consideration may be
cited in tnis survey of the extent of Giooon's attachment to Roman
antiquity. Gibbon recognized tnat it was upon the greatness of
Rome that his own claim to fame rested. At tne very outset of his
1
career as an historian, tnis confidence was reflected. and at tne
end, the fact tnat he made no further effort to launch upon another
serious work, even though he finished The Decline and Fall while
still in the prime of life, suggests that he regarded the history
as his suprexae effort. Herein also was tne reason for writing the
Autobiography. In it, there was no pointing to Gibbon as an inde¬
pendent personality. The purpose was to explain how Tne Decline
and Fall had come to oe written, to open up to posterity the mind
2
of tne historian of the Roman Empire.
Thus it is scarcely surprising that in nis will of 1788,
the historian wrote, "Shall I be accused of vanity if I add tnat
3
a monument is superfluous?" This identification of self with sub¬
ject nas prompted critics to sneer tnat Gibbon came to believe that
4
he was the Roman Empire.
insight in these tnree areas, and an indication of tne censure of
critics, See Appendix 40.
1 "The subject is curious," he wrote, "and never yet treated
as it deserves; and . • . during some years it has been in my
thoughts, and even under my pen. Should the attempt fail, it must
be by the fault of the execution" (Misc. Yiiorks, p. 2?0). .i^gain, in
describing tne period of waiting for tne release of the first volutae,
he registered his confidence: "I had chosen an illustrious subject
. . . familiar to tne schoolboy and the statesman" (AUtobiography.
p. 180).
2 lie confided that this mind might one day be familiar "to
tne grandchildren of tnose who are yet unborn" (Ibid., p. 2ly).
Gibson also implied that as Fielding justified his ancestors, the
Habsburgs, Dy nis great literary work, so Giboon's own ancestors
would be remembered for tneir connection with the historian of the
Roman Empire (Ibid., p. 4). (Giobon was mistaken about the connection
between Fielding and "the Habsburgs.")
3 Autobiography (Murray's Edition), p. 421.
4 a critic reported: "a wit said ... that he aid not know
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The Church cuxu the .Empire
Tnis was tne allegiance of the mind which approached the
subject of ecclesiastical history. i'rom tne start, it had become
clear to Gibbon that the decline of home had been accompanied step
by step by the ri3e of Christianity. That conviction was
visualized in tne circumstances of the setting in wnicn his great
1
'inspiration' had coxae.
Ever after, Gibbon saw Christianity as an institution
wnich, with its chant of vespers and its barefooted monies, had
been substituted for the magnificent ceremonies of the old worship
of Jupiter and the legendary heroes of antiquity.
On the scune spot [where occurred the Eeronian martyrdoms]
a temple . . . has been erected by the Christian Pontiffs,
who . . . hrve succeeded to the throne of the Caesars . • .
and extended tneir spiritual jurisdiction from . . . the
Baltic to . . , the Pacific Ocean.2
The Empire's outlook.-- Thus it is necessary always to re¬
call that Gibbon approached Christianity from the standpoint of
the ancient Empire as well as from tne assumptions of eighteenth
century Enlightenment. It was the Empire's view that he was attemp¬
ting to articulate when ne wrote: "Tne religious concord of the
the difference between himself and the Roman Empire" (Walter Buge-
hot, Literary Studies. I, 188).
1 "It was at Rome," he wrote in a frequently quoted passage,
"on tne 15th of October, 17o4, as I sat musing amidst the ruins of
tne Capitol, wnile the barefooted friars were singing vespers in the
Temple of Jupiter, that the idea of writing the decline and fall of
the city first started to my mind" (autobiography. p. 160}.
2 II, 92. Between these two contending forces, Giboon left
little question as to his personal preference: "Our early studies
allow us to sympathize in the feelings of a Roman" (VII, 313, note).
In a letter to Sheffield, he added, "The primitive church, which
I have treated with some freedom, was itself at that time an inno¬
vation, and I was attaexxed to txxe ola pagan establishment" (Mi3c.
Worics, p. 134).
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world was principally supported by . . . reverence for
traditions and ceremonies. It might be expected that
they would unite with indignation against any sect of
people which should separate itself from the communion
of mankind, and, claiming the exclusive oossession of
divine knowledge, should disdain every form of worship,
except its own as impious and idolatrous.
iuad he expressed what must have been the attitude of the average
Roman citizen when he demanded: "What must be the fate of the
Empire attacked on every side by the barbarians, if all mankind
2
should adopt the pusillanimous sentiments of the new sect?"
Charge of undue interest.— But this disposition in Gibbon
to be the spokesman of the Empire over against Christianity need
not suggest that he was preoccupied with the rise of Christianity
in a way that was alien to the real purpose of his undertaking:
i.e., the description of the decline and fall of Rome. This charge
has often been advanced by ecclesiastical critics. The claim is
that the ecclesiastical aspect of his History held for Gibbon a
fascination out of proportion to its place in the totality of the
3
work.
Justification for the inquiry.— Gibbon's purpose was to
analyse all that imperilled Rome. This was the thread which uni¬
fied his work. That unity hinged not alone unon the unity of the
Empire as a continuous historical entity but also upon the inclu¬
sion of only those elements which contributed to Rome's decline
4
and fall.
1 II, 77. A theologian ouoted this statement as expressing
the attitude of classical antiauity towards Christianity. Cf. H.
Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (London: Faber & Faber, 1952),
P. 23.
2 XI, 41.
3 See e.g., Thompson, op. clt.. p. 5.
4 One might argue that it was within the scope of Gibbon's
inquiry to analyse the new situation which emerged as Rome declined.
84
Giobon applied this insight to ecclesiasticism when he
stated his purpose to review "the objects of ecclesiastical history,
by wuich the decline and fall of the Roman empire were materially
1
affected." and as though he were sensitive to the possible sug¬
gestion that he wus excessively interested in the subject of ecclesi-
2
asticism, he often repeated the justification for his inquiry.
.a. subordinate subject.— In point of fact, ecclesiastical
exposition was kept subordinate to the main purpose of tracing the
3
decline and fall of a political empire. This is suggested by the
limit8a space allotted to Christianity in the context of the entire
History. Of possible significance also was the fact that the his¬
torian indicated relief that it was not necessary, for some periods,
4
to become involved in the intricacies of ecclesiasticism.
.an inseparable connexion.-- But Gibbon could not escape
the recognition that the rise of the Church and the fall of the
Empire were intimately if not inseparably associated. When in his
epigram he contended, "I have described the triumph of barbarism and
3
religion," tne inference was that this was the reverse side of
One decay and fall of Rome, and in the oft quoted words of the
nutobiography, this idea was made more than an inference: "as I
believed and as I still believe, that the propagation of the Gos¬
pel, and One triumph of the Church, are inseparably connected with
the decline of the Roman monarchy, I weighed the causes and effects
See appendix 41.
1 V, 261.
2 i?or statements to this effect, as e Appendix 41.
3 About his treatment of the church and the Empire, he wrote,
"I have considered the former as subservient only and relative to
the latter" (V, 261).




of tiie revolution . . ." This statement oan be considered a fur¬
ther effort to justify the extent of his inquiry into the history
of the Church.
Tne surmise of critics.— But whether Gibbon understood this
close and inseparable connexion between tne two phenomena as a
causal connexion remains to be ascertained. This has been the com-
2
mon surmise of critics. With few exceptions, they have argued
that Gibbon's recognition of the bitter hostility between the
Church and the Empire coupled with the statement about "the triumph
3
of barbarism and religion" could point to no other conclusion.
This conclusion would identify Gibbon with an historic
judgement which has been thoroughly discredited by subsequent
scholarship. Every present day student of tne question concurs in
tne recognition tnat Christianity was not the cause of the fall of
4
Rome. and since Gibbon's tuistalce' must be regarded as a crucial
onaracteristic of tne wnole History, his entire woric would be dis¬
credited as a consequence. But did Gicbon subscribe to this sup¬
position?
There are two major considerations which indicate that this
was not his view: He nowhere explicitly connected the two phenome¬
na causally; his History contained clear attempts to analyse the
actual causes of the Empire's decline and fall.
1 a.utobiography. p. 1?2.
2 Tne conclusions of J". M. Robertson, a, H. Thompson, Shel¬
by McCloy, .Arnold Toynbee, Algernon Gecil, F. a. Ridley, and J. B.
Bury are quoted in appendix 42.
3 J". B. Black and F. Meinecxe nave dissented from the common
view. See Appendix 42.
4 The verdict nas not been unanimous; Bury dissented. Cf.
J. B. Bury, a History of tne Later Roman Empire (London: Macmilian
& Co., IBSy),p. 1.But for a later reversal in Burv's thought
see Appendix 42.
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No unqualified causal connexion asserted.— There is ample
evidence in the History that Gibbon stopped short of asserting a
clear, causal relationship between the rise of the Church and the
fall of the Empire. Often he hinted at this possibility; yet in¬
variably ne introduced doubt as to the propriety of it. Thus he
observed, "as the happiness of a future life is the great object
of religion we raay hear without surprise or scandal that the intro¬
duction, or at least the abuse, of Christianity had some influence
1
on the decline and fall of the Roman Empire."
Of equally equivocal nature was the reflection, "half philo-
sopnical and half superstitious, that the province wnich had been
ruined by the oigotry of Justinian was the one through vhich the
2
Moslems had entered the eastern empire." and even his famous
statement, "I nave aescribeu the triumph of barbarism and religion"
was also qualified: "I can only resume . . • their real or irnagin-
3
ary connexion with tne ruin of ancient Rome."
When more directly he did assert a causal relationship,
Giobon provided in tne next phrase or sentence, a counter suggestion
which impugned the full impact of the original assertion. Thus he
declared that "if the decline of the Roman empire was hastened by
the conversion of Constantine, his victorious religion broke the
violence of the fall, and mollified the ferocious temper of the con-
4
querors." again, he observed that ecclesiastical schism by "aliena-
5
ting her most useful allies . . . precipitated the decline and fall;"







but then he argued that the real causes of the schism were not re-
1
ligious or ecclesiastical but "political and temperamental."
Finally, in citing the causes of the fall of the city of
Rome, Giboon listed the ignorance of the times, the hostile attacks
of barbarians and Christians, the use and abuse of materials, and
2
the domestic quarrels of the Romans; but in considering these
causes separately he discounted the hostile attacks of barbarians
and Christians, claiming that they did not count for much in the
3
fall of the city after all. •
These careful allowances suggest reasonable doubt not only
as to whetuer Gibbon believed that Christianity was the chief cause
of the decline of the Empire, but also as to whetner he ever linked
them causally at all. At any rate, this inquiry would indicate
that he never did so unqualifiedly. But how then must the state¬
ment, "I have described the triumph of barbarism and religion," be
interpreted?
A critic has advanced a reasonable explanation, arguing
that this was Giboon's way of intimating that "he has traced the
4
history of Gothic conquests and the rise of the Church." This
process paralleled the decline and fall of the Empire. That Gibbon
regarded the two developments intimately to be interwoven, and that
wnere tnere had been a political empire, now tnere was a spiritual-
temporal empire, a replacement which aroused the historian's strong
resentment — of all this tnere can be no question.
But there is no confirmation in his history for the
1 VI, 386.
2 VII, 317.
3 Ibid., p. 322.
k Black, op. oit., p. 170.
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supposition that he regarded the one as the cause of the other. Hor
may it be without significance that in hts early Essai, Gibbon had
asserted: "It requires an extraordinary judgement to discern
whether two things, which always exist together, and appear inti-
1
mately connected, do not . . . owe their origin to each other."
Inquiry into actual causes.— The otner consideration which
challenges the traditional view is that Gibbon inquired into the
2
actual causes of the fall of Rome. He did so in such fashion as
to render scant need to posit tne Church as a fundamental factor
in the process.
Gibbon actually advanced not one but many causes of the
3
Empire's decline. In Chapter Two, he attributed it to the long
peace and the uniform government which reduced men's minds to the
same level, extinguished the fire of genius, dissipated the military
4
spirit. In Chapter Twenty-Seven, he suggested that the real cause
5
was the luxux*y which resulted from the long peace. But this was
not satisfactory, since he saw that luxury and effeminacy were not
so much a cause as an effect of the political breakdown. In Chapter
Thirty-Five, he hinted at an economic explanation, citing the un¬
equal distribution of taxation ana arguing that the evasions of the
wealthy placed an intolerable burden upon the remainder of the popu-
6
lation.
1 Misc. Works, p. 669.
2 For instances of the failure of critics to take account of
tnis fact, see Appendix 43.
3 This 'zeal' to uncover causes produced one of the few
instances of contradiction in the History. Bee .appendix 43.
4 I, 62. On this insight, a German scholar commented: "Es
scnwingt in diesem oewegenden Urteil 3chon etwus mit, was iiber das
raoralistiscne und mechanistiscxie Denken der iiufidLarung hinausgeht"
(Meinecjie, op. oit., p. 250).
5 III, 19*>* 6 IDid., p. 507.
But as he proceeded with, his survey, Gibbon discerned that
far more important than any of these particular causes was a factor
underlying them all. This factor he saw to be inherent in the rise
1
and success of the Empire itself. "The decline of Rome," he
wrote, "was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate great-
2
ness. .Prosperity ripened the principle of decay." In other words,
not the collapse of a military system but the decline of ordinary
citizenship lay at the bottom of the difficulty. The historian
sadly concluded that nothing could arrest the downward trend; "if
all tne Barbarian conquerors had been annihilated in the same hour,
their total destruction would not have restored the empire of the
3
West."
Inadequacy of the inquiry.— Gibbon's analysis of causes
nas been criticized on two main counts: It was superficial; it
was not systematic. First, it has been claimed that he did not
carry his inquiry far enough; he neglected sufficiently to analyse
many factors wnich he did nint at such as depopulation, the decay
1 Gf. Misc. Wortcs, p. 669» But a critic has complained
that Gibbon did not recognize that the Empire itself was "a monu-
xaental symptom" of the "far-advanced disintegration" of Hellenic
Giviiization. Gf. Arnold Toynbee, Tne Study of History, abr. by
Somervell (London: Oxford University Press, 1947)P* 261. This
panoramic insight may not be without value, but since tne Empire
was not established formally until the time of Augustus, Gibbon
may be pardoned for not discerning the beginning of its * breaisdown*
wnere Toynbee placed it, at the outbreaic of the Peloponnesian War
in 431 B.C. Gf. Ibid.. p. 262.
2 IV, 173. The tneory of biological development, in which
una state is born, matures, and finally dies, was thus hinted at
by Gibbon, but he did not state it directly.
3 III, 507. Bid he realize that the path of empire, ex¬
panding by conquest, led inevitably to resistance, mounting hatred
and eventual overthrow? Cf. John Macmurray's well-argued tnesis
in Conditions of Freedom (London: Faber & Faber, 1950), p. 64 ff.
Gf. also Appendix 44.
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of agriculture, fiscal oppression, and the general psychological
decline produced by despotism; he did not place these factors "be-
1
neath the deeper sky of social evolution."
Secondly, it has been asserted that while Giboon saw all
the major elements involved, he only 'colligated* and never ' syn-
2
tnesized* either the evidence or his own reflections. His great
fault, according to a biographer, was that he left his conclusions
at "loose end3"; he never brought his causal considerations "to a
3
luminous point."
Hud tnese criticisms may be sustained without affecting the
basic contention; that Gibbon's concern to trace the actual causes
of the decline and fall of Home, no matter how unacceptable by
present-day standards, made it questionable that he could have con¬
sidered uhristianity the prime factor in that process.
The balance of help and hindrance.— What role did Gibbon
assign to Christianity in the drama of Rome's decay and fall? as
has been inuicntea, he asserted that in some respects, Christianity
exercised a conserving influence. Hut this was balanced in Gibbon's
view by t-he recognition that it was a disturbing factor as well.
"In Dhe fever of the times," he wrote, "the sense or rax-ner the
sound of a syllable was sufficient to disturb the peace of an em-
4
pire."
One is led to believe that the effect was not so much oxxe
of active undermining as it was that of steady, slow attrition. In
1 This was Leslie Stephen's phrase, cited by Black:, op,
oit., p. 166.
2 J. M. Robertson, Gibbon, p. 10.
3 Morison, Gibbon, p.' 133.
4 V, 139.
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Charlemagne's reign, for example, the historian cited "the canals
of communication, wnich could have revivified an empire," — and
observed that "more cost was wastea on the structure of a cathe-
1
dral." JLixewise the holy wars appeared to Gibbon to have checked,
2
ratner than forwarded, the maturity of Europe. and from Rome's
standpoint, the real significance of monasticism was that it
siphoned off manpower, and multitudes of monks were lost to the
3
defence of the Empire.
On the strength of such passages, critics have contended
that Giboon inferred that Christianity was not a preservative but
4
a dissolvent of all ancient civilization. Yet in his "General
Observations on the Fail of the Roman Empire in the West," the his¬
torian insisted on citing the balance of help and hindrance con¬
tributed by Christianity. He argued that while the active virtues
of sooiety were discouraged, ana the last remains of the military
spirit were buried in the cloister, and a large portion of public
and private wealth was consecrated to the specious demands of
charity and devotion, still, "party spirit ... is a principle of
union as well as dissension. The bishops, from eighteen hundred
pulpits, inculcated the duty of passive obedience to a lawful and
5
orthodox sovereign." Always, Gibbon's effort was to preserve the
6
balance.
1 V, 309. The underlining is the present writer's. The
choice of a word affords a striking example of Gibbon's bias; can
it be supposed that Gibbon himself expected that this would be
accepted as the verdict of history?
2 VI, 465.
3 IV, 07.
4 E.g., J. M. Robertson, Gibbon on Christianity, p. xv.
5 IV, 175.
6 This balance also preserved him from the view later ad¬
vanced by ecclesiastical historians that Christianity was not the
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.a parallel development.— It must be reiterated that far
from assigning to Christianity tne main blame for the fall of the
Empire, Gibbon discerned the rise of tne one and the fall of the
other as' a parallel development; their history intertwined but did
not intertwine oausally. In the words of James Bryce:
As the Empire had decayed, the Church had grown stronger,
and now while the one, trembling at the approach of the
destroyer, saw province after province torn away, the other,
rising in stately youth, prepared to fill her place and to
govern in her name, and in doing so, to adopt,and sanctify
the notion of a universal and unending state.
Gibbon's recognition of this fact together with his decided pre¬
ference for the old establishment of Roman antiquity may be cited
as a partial explanation for tne impression of hostility which per¬
vaded the History.
Eighteenth Century Influence
Rationalism.-- .another fundamental consideration in account¬
ing for Gibbon's attitude towards ecclesiastical history is re¬
flected in the confidence in reason wnich he shared with his
2
eighteenth century contemporaries. Reason, thus relied upon as
the absolute standard, was never defined. True to the assumption
of his tixae, Gibbon regarded it as that which needed no definition:
the common sense understanding available to every person of educa¬
tion and enlightenment.
enemy but the friend of the Empire. Cf. George Einlay, Greece Under
tne Romans (Edinburgh: W. BlacEwood & Sons, 1857) > p. 10.0; ana
M. Ramsay, Church in the Roman Empire (London: Hodder & Stoughton,
1893), p. lW.
1 James Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire (London: Macmillan &
Co., 1864), p. 12. ~~ ~ ~
2 Gibcon recognized that reason could be corrupted, but
clung to it as the only possible basis of procedure. Cf. "Hints"
Ho. IX, among tne Gibbon Papers in the Manuscript Room of the
British Museum, IX, 197-
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Nor was the case for this confidence ever argued. Gibbon
was convinced that rationality must be regarded by every sensible
person as the basic measurement of all things; and this supposition
seemed so proper and necessary that any statement of justification
was superfluous.
Tnus it became tne historian*s duty "to reconcile the in-
1
terest of religion with that of reason." nil religious convic¬
tions which would not stand scrutiny at the bar of reason belonged
2
to the childhood of the race; they were not tenable when men be¬
came mature. "The words and shadows that might amuse the child no
3
longer satisfied his manly reason."
Sensationalism.— Together with this confidence in reason
was a sensationalist theory of knowledge. The 'real' world was
tne physical world, anyone who claimed insight into a supra-
4
sensual order was the viotim of illusion. Knowledge must be of
reality; and reality, by common consent, was confined to what could
3
be ascertained by the senses.
This assumption was constantly operative in Gibbon's
writings. In the autopiography. he reported that in his youth he
nad come upon a * solid' argument against transubstantiation, the
1 II, 32. Of the Jacobites, Gibbon wrote: "Their doctors
(as far as I can measure the degrees of nonsense) are more remote
from the precinots of reason" (V, 165).
2 The observation, "augustine is a memorable instance of
this gradual progress from reason to faith" (II, 16, note), must
be interpreted ironically.
3 VI, 134.
4 Thus Gibbon wrote contemptuously of Seanderberg, "nor is
it easy to conceive what new illumination at the age of forty could
be poured into his soul" (VII, 158).
5 For an exposition of the absurdity of a strict sensa¬
tionalist epistemology, see F, H. Bradley, The Presuppositions of
Critical History (Oxford: James Parxer & Co., 1874), p. 7ff»
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effect of which was to settle the mutter by simple majority vote.
"The text of scripture," he wrote, "is attested only by a 3ingle
sense — our sight; while the real presence itself is disproved
1
by three of our senses — the sight, the touch, the taste."
History, the same attitude was in evidence. Thus
immortality was a doctrine "removed beyond the senses and experience
2
of mankind." as a crushing argument against it, the historian ob¬
served: "Those who most firmly believe her (the soul's] immaterial
nature are at a loss to understand how she can think or act without
3
the agency of the organs of sense." Similarly, in his estimate
of the Reformers, Gibbon complained that instead of consulting
the evidences of "their sight, their feeling, and their taste,"
k
they were "awed by the words of Jesus." Yet it would appear that
just this disposition to cling to Christ despite the fluctuating
sense impressions of passing generations has constituted the con¬
tinuing strength and vitality of the church through the centuries.
But this consideration did not ixapress Giboon, since the Christians
5
had refused to consult "the evidence of their senses."
a recent analyst has asserted that men are generally right
6
in what taey affirm and wrong in wnat they deny. In his denial
of the Supra-rational and the Supra-sensual, Gibbon exposed hi3
writings to the charge of rationalistic dogmatism. He made
1 autobiography, p. 63. Today, all but the positivist
would probably agree that belief in transubstantiation can be
neither proved nor disproved by an appeal to the testimony of the
senses.
2 ix 21.
3 V, 372. Cf. also Appendix 49.
4 VI, 131.
5 Ibid., p. 131.
6 Cf. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 237.
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inferences wnich could, not be supported by scientific evidence.
He opened himself to the accusation that as far as the real
essentials of the religious consciousness were concerned, he knew
1
notning about them.
Attack on superstition.— The supposition that Gibbon was
reflecting eighteenth century ideas is further confirmed by the
fact tnat he tended to label every aspect and manifestation of
religion which would not stand before the bar of reason and the
senses as superstition. Nor was that consignment confined to
2
Christianity, Of Mohammedanism, he wrote that it produced "a
3
seasonable vision for such are the manufacture of every religion."
Upon the Jews, he poured his scorn for their veneration of the
heroes of the Old Testament who stood convicted, Gibbon believed,
by their own records, of every kind of crime against nature and
4
humanity.
But Christianity proved not a whit more immune to the pro¬
gress of superstition tnan other religions. (The historian often
employed the two terms, Christianity and Superstition interchange¬
ably.) Under the leadership of the Popes, those "great masters
1 a careful ecclesiastical histoi'ian has asserted that
there was in Giobon "an absolute want of comprehension of the
nature of religion, whetner Christian or other, and of the forces
by wnich religions make conquests." Cf. Williston Walker, A His¬
tory of tne Christian Church (Hew York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1918), p. 493.
2 Nor did he neglect to denounce superstition and impos¬
ture outside the sphere of religion altogether. Thus the senti-
mentalism that clung about the almost divine quality of kings,
the follies of militarism, and the mystifications of the law —
all were included in his indictment.
3 VI, 4. See also Y, 367, and V, 420, for further instances
of superstition in Mohammedanism. But Gibbon admired the Moslems




of human credulity," the tendency had beoome "to believe because
it is absurd, to revere all that is contemptible, to despise what-
2
ever might deserve the esteem of a rational being." Likewise
tne monks impressed Gibbon as embodiments of the worst elements
of superstition, and some of his most devastating sarcasm was re-
3
served for "these unhappy exiles from social life."
Gibbon was prepared to support his charges with what he
regarded as a wealth of specific instances. Thus the doctrine of
4
the assumption was affirmed by the Catholic Ghurch. "Yet Chris¬
tians of the first four centuries were ignorant of the death and
5
burial of Mary." Similarly, belief in the Immaculate Conception
of one Virgin Mother has come to be regarded as an indispensable
item of Catholic dogma. Yet Giboon argued that there was sufficient
reason to suppose that the whole idea was borrowed directly from
6
the koran. Likewise, belief in miracles in general was subscribed
to by Christians as an essential element in the edifice of faith.
1 VII, 293. "Innocent," he observed, "may boast of the
two most signal triumphs over sense and humanity, the establishment
of transubstantiation and the origin of the inquisition" (VI, 369).
2 VII, 310. Giboon claimed these inclinations were in¬
stilled in every prospective pope as an essential part of his train¬
ing. Elsewhere he had written derisively of the irrational ten¬
dencies of religion: "as this opinion has the strongest recommenda¬
tion of absurdity, I am surprised that it was not more explicitly
decided on in the affirmative" (V, 298).
3 IV, 67.
4 Giooon cited tne parallelism between the 'Mother of God'
and tne old genialogy of Olympus. Cf. V, 120; and in a note he re¬
called the laughter of the Pagans "at tne new Cybele of the Chris¬
tians" (Ibid.. p. 120, note).
5 V, 122. Likewise Gibbon discerned the 'development' of
superstition in Lhe transfer of tne 'brothers' of Christ to the sta¬
tus of ■cousins' (II, 96, note). He observed, "The Latins im¬
proved on unat hint {the idea of a second wife for Joseph] and as¬
serted. one perpetual celebacy of Joseph" (Ibid.).
6 V, 364.
97
Yet "does there exist a single instance of a saint asserting that
1
he hiraself possessed the gift of miracles?" Still again, worship
of the deities and demons of Paganism was a crime against the "su-
2
preme majesty of God"; yet did not the Christians proceed to wor¬
ship tne saints and martyrs in place of the pagan gods and heroes?
Partner indictment,— Gibbon considered superstition, thus
identified, to be indefensible on many counts. First and foremost
was tne stifling effect upon the mind. "Curiosity and scepticism
3
were benumbed by the habits of obedience and faith." He further
charged that superstition defeated the real ends of religion itself:
"j% superstitious conscience," he wrote, "is less forcibly bound by
the spiritual energy than by the outward and visible symbols of an
4
oath." He also argued that superstition had transformed beyond
recognition the original religion of Jesus and the apostles, and
observed:
if • . • £>t. Peter or St. Paul could return to the Vatican,
they might possibly inquire tne name of the Deity who is wor-
shipped with such mysterious rites in tnat magnificent temple:
at Oxford or Geneva, they would experience less surprise; but
it might still be incumbent on them bo peruse the catechism of
the cnurch, and to study the orthodox commentators on their
own writings and the words of their Master.^
The aavance of anti-rational tendencies, it was claimed,
represented a risx to the clergy itself. "Under the reign of super¬
stition, he wrote, "they had much to fear from the violence of
1 II, 32, note.
2 III, 198.
3 V, 270. Elsewhere, he had written, "The imagination,
which had been raised by a painful effort to the contemplation of
the Universal Cause, embraced such inferior objects of adoration





mankind." And there was tne supposition that once started upon
the path of superstition, religion might become incapable of draw¬
ing back or ever extricating itself. Thus he wrote of "the shackles
2
of prejudice wnich enchain the cleric," and of "the impossibility
3
of a philosophical theologian." Even when rational elements did
appear on the religious scene, Giboon questioned the likelihood of
their lasting: "It only remains to observe whether such sublime
simplicity (as the altered Lutheran worship was intended to intro¬
duce]] be consistent with popular devotion."
Limitation of outlook.-- It is evident from these instances
that GiDOon was making no effort to inquire into the religious con¬
sciousness, to explain why a rational being like man had persisted
since time began in irrational involvements like religion. Nor
was there any attempt to appraise religious at»,ituues against the
background of tneir various historical epochs even though these
differed radically from Gibbon*s own. In his view, superstition
was fundamentally the same phenomenon whenever and wherever it
reared its ugly head. The task of the philosopher was to identify
and expose it as the enemy of enlightened humanity.
A Scientific Study
It can scarcely be considered surprising that with this
overall view of religion, Gibbon should feel the necessity of ad-
1 VII, 224.
2 Misc. Worxs, 54l.
3 II, 408.
4 VI, 132. Again: "The influence of superstition is
fluctuating and precarious; and the slave, whose reason is subdued,
will often be delivered by his avarice or pride" (VII, 224).
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1
vancing a naturalistic explanation of the rise of Christianity.R
"A natural scientist," wrote a contemporary historian, "would be
committing an act of sabotage if he brought God into his scienti-
2
fic argument." This was precisely the principle with which Gibbon
proposed to approach the study of ecclesiastical history. Like a
natural scientist, he committed himself "to learn by the scientific
3
study of just the observable interconnections of events." He
claimed to confine his innuiry to considerations which did not re¬
quire any reference to the Deity.
Restriction of the inquiry.— The implication of this ap¬
proach, it was immediately understood, had the effect of elimina¬
ting God from the entire historic process. Yet Gibbon, for what¬
ever reason and against his sensationalist epistemology, took pains
4
to insist that this was not his intention at all. From the out¬
set he announced that it was to be an inauiry, "with becoming sub¬
mission," into the * secondary' causes of the rise of Christianity
5
and thereby implicitly affirmed the existence of a First Cause.
"It is my intention," he wrote, "to remark only such human causes
6
as were permitted to second the influence of revelation."
1 A critic claimed, "The question which Giboon asked when
he proposed five causes for the spread of Christianity, introduced
a new problem, an entirely new method of treatment." Cf. A. C.
Headlam, "Methods of Early Church History," The English Historical
Review, XIV (January, 1899), 13. But Gibbon never supposed that he
was breaking new ground. For an earlier analysis of the "Causae
humanae propagatae religionis Christianae," cf. J. L. Mosheim, De
Rebus Christianorum Ante Constantium Magnum Comentarii (Helmstadii:
Friedericum Weygand, 1753), p. 223 ff. K
2 Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p. 102.
3 Ibid.
4 Bury argued that it was a device to insure protection
against persecution and had no other significance. Cf. Autobio¬
graphy. p. xv.
5 For the fuller stateraent, see II, 2.
6 II, 34.
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This announced intention was further supported by the fact
tnat Gibbon made no attempt to enter into the question of the divine
1
origin of the Christian Religion. Re began his analysis at a poixit
in which the Church was already an organized and operating institu¬
tion, conceding, it would appear, tnat its history before that point
was adequately expounded in the Book of nets and in the Gospels.
By this concession, Giboon extricated himself from the controversial
subject which was to occupy so much of nineteenth century scholar-
2
ship. It enabled him to proceed at once to a more congenial task:
the description of the rise of Christianity as a natural process.
The approach contested.— This neat manoeuvring did not
escape the scrutiny of critics. Milman and Guizot contended that
3
Gibbon had not properly consulted the testimony of -nets. "If he
had only taken the pains to present Christianity in its primary
development," tne critic lamented, "he would nave encountered an
argument for tne divine authority" which would have been "explic-
4
able on no other hypothesis than a heavenly origin." The apolo¬
gist also argued that tne further Christianity advanced, the more
5
causes purely human were enlisted in its favour.
1 "By tne wise dispensatioxx of Providence," he wrote, "a
mysterious veil was oast over the infancy of the Church" (II, 68).
2 It has also been a vital question for theologically mirxded
thinkers of the twentieth century. See, D. M. Baillie, faith in
God (Eaixxburgh: T. & T. Clartc, 1927), p. 227 ff.
3 -a critic contended, "The main question of the divine
origin of the religion was entirely eluded or speciously coxiceded"
(Milman, op. cit., p. ix). See Guizot's Edition of The Decline and
fall, I,~~208, xiote; also, Appendix 45.
4 Milman, op. oit., p. viii. Even more questionable was
the following concession of Milman: "When it (Christianity] had re¬
ceived its impetus from above, it might be left to make its way by
its natural force (Ibid., p. viii).
5 Ibia., p. vii'i".
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Gibcon iaius on far more certain historical ground in refus¬
ing even to try to appraise the extent of the divine influence or
tne particular periods in which it was or was not operative. It
was rather the function of the historian to "discover the inevi¬
table mixture of error and corruption which she [religion] con¬
tracted in a long residence upon earth, among a weak and degenerate
1
race of beings."
evaluation.— How must Giboon's claim of presenting a
naturalistic approach to ecclesiastical history be evaluated?
Clearly tnere is little reason to suppose that he attached any
actual signiii cance to tne operation of the First Cause in the his¬
toric process or that his concession of a divine origin of Chris¬
tianity was anything more than an ironic one. Not a single passage
cut ratner tne whole impact of The Decline and Fall points to this
conclusion. Tne ecclesiastical writer was therefore hardly correct
in his contention: "Gibbon was too keen-sighted not to see the
limitation of his own theory. Whatever may have been his own be¬
liefs, he was probably quite sincere in speaking only of secondary
2
causes." Of that supposition, anyone who has detected the pre¬
vailing tone of this "candid and rational inquiry" would scarcely
be convinced.
Yet it remains true that the use of the device of confin¬
ing tne survey to a consideration of secondary causes was of ex¬
treme importance in support of Gibson*s claim to be writing a
1 II, 2.
2 Headlam, "Methods of Early Church History," op. cit..
p. 13. Two other critics assumed Gibbon genuinely to have been
disposed to acknowledge a First Cause. See appendix 46; but such
a misreading of his meaning is difficult to account for in the
fc.ee of the clear intent of Gibbon's irony.
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scientific history. For this meant that unlike the writings of
most rationalist historians, his History was expressly kept from
a dogmatic dismissal of tne possible presence of the supernatural
factor in history. This latter question was one upon which, strict¬
ly speaking, his historical inquiry could afford him no occasion
to comment.
The ifive Causes
Together with this indication of the character of the
general approach, a brief exposition of the actual development of
nis famous five causes of tne success of Christianity is an essen-
2
uial part of this inquiry. Gibbon listed them as: the zeal of
the early Christians; tneir conviction of immortality; the belief
in miracles; tne good works of the Christians; and their internal
organization.
It was tne first of these, Gibson argued, that provided
tne Christians with tneir "valour." The next three equipped the
valour with weapons. The final factor provided the means of con¬
solidating tneir gains; it "united their courage, directed their
3
arias." These causes must be appraised always in the light of Gib-
boa's attempt to provide a 'human*, naturalistic account for tneir
occurrence.
1 That Gibbon regarded this 'device' as an important part
of his defence as an historian is suggested by a passage in which
ne claimed that he had allowed the "full and irresistable weight
of the Jirst Great Cause" (Misc. Viiorks, p. 752).
2 For an account of the causes and conditions of the propa¬
gation of Christianity which contains the conclusions of more recent
scholarship, Bury cited the important work of Harnack, Die Mission
und .iusbreitung des uhristenturas in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten.
1902. Bee II, 2, note.
3 II, 57* ftere these 'effects* or 'causes'? See .appendix
47.
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Tne zeal of tne Christians.— Gibbon contended that this
factor could be traced for its origin to the Jews and the sullen
obstinacy with which they maintained tneir peculiar rites and un¬
social manners in the midst of other peoples, and \*hich "seemed to
mark thera out as a distinct species of men who boldly professed
1
. . . tneir implacable hatred to the rest of huraan kind," But the
Jewish faith with this exclusiveness was hardly fitted for the con-
2
quest of the Roman world.
Under these circumstances Christianity presented itself,
"armed with the strength of the Mosaic law and delivered from the
3
weight of its fetters." The gates of salvation were thrown open
to all, and "a pure and spiritual worship" was initiated which was
4
"adapted to all climates, as well as all conditions of mankind,"
Next arose the need for the new sect to extricate itself
from tne shadow of Judaism, a process vhich ended in the outright
rejection of tne Mosaic law as being no longer binding for Ghris-
3
tians. ji. zealous animosity was directed as well at the Gnostic
heretics who deviated in the opposite direction and who concluded
that the Jewish religion "never was instituted by the wisdom of
6
the Deity."
Ji'inally, it was the same zeal, influenced by a superstitious
fear of demons, which inspired the Christians to a contempt of the
1 II, 3.
2 »Vas tne positing of a Jewish origin an adequate explana¬
tion for the emergence of Christian zeal? for the views of later
critics, see appendix 4B.
3 il» 7. 4 Ibid., p. 7.
3 In this development, Gibbon discerned that tne same zeal
Which ,nad oeen inherited from the Jews was at length turned against
those who insisted upon maintaining the traditional observances,
(loid., P. 9) 6 Ibid.. p. 12.
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national deities who were believed to incorporate these demons.
The Christians thus must take no part in national holidays or any
public or private rite sponsored by the Pagans, since it was the
1
Christian's first duty to guard against "the stain of idolatry."
Gibbon argued that by these frequent protestations, "their attach¬
ment to the faith was continually fortified" and "in proportion to
the increase of zeal, they combated with the more ardour" for the
2
victory of tneir faith.
The belief in immortality.— Gibbon asserted that tne iaea
of immortality was known in ancient philosophy and classical mytho¬
logy. It had a natural appeal to men's imagination, prompted by
vanity, since tney "were unwilling ... to suppose that a being,
for whose dignity they entertained tne most sincere admiration,
could be limited to a spot of earth, and to a few years of dura-
3
tion." Yet Gibbon discovered that the doctrine had difficulty
4
taking hold, was rejected oy all lews except the Pharisees, and
was not taken seriously by "the eminent persons who flourisned in
3
the age of Cicero." The difficulty was tnat tne doctrine, "dic¬
tated by nature, approved by reason, and received by superstition"
needed to "obtain tne sanction of Divine truth from tne authority
6
and example of Christ."
But once tnis authority wan secured, and joined by a belief
in the imminent end of one world, and tne commencement of Christ's
1 II, 18. 2 Ibid., p. 20.
3 II, 21.
4 By the "mysterious dispensations of Providence," it was
"omitted from the law of Moses" (Ibid., p. 23).
5 Ibid., p. 21.
6 Ibid., p. 24. Por views of critics on Giobon's handling
of the subject of immortality, see appendix 49.
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reign upon earth, the conviction became a potent weapon in appeal¬
ing to the hopes and fears of mankind: to their natural hopes to
have a share in the happiness of a temporal reign, but alike to
their fears, since one most dreadful calamities were denounced
against tne unbelieving world, Was it not understandable that these
claims might not be without effect upon the Polytheist? "If he
eouia once persuade himself to suspect that tne Onristian religion
might possibly oe true, it became an easy task to convince him that
1
it was one safest and moat prudent party he could possibly embrace."
The miracles,— Gibbon commenced the argument on one belief
in miracles by contending that "the most curious, or the most credu¬
lous, among the Pagans were often persuaded to enter into a society
2
whi.cn asserted an actual claim of miraculous powers," But that
the historian regarded these 1 claims' with deep distrust is evident
3
from the whole of his exposition. He cited, for example, the
failure of any of the Pagan writers to mention the praeternatural
4
darkness of three hours at tne time of the Crucifixion. Nor could
1 II, 29.
2 Ibid,, p. 33. Yet there was little elaboration of how this
actually occurred. Tne capacity to perform miracles was a common
claim of most religions of the time. How did this particular repu¬
tation contribute to tne winning of converts to the new faith? In
what specific way did such mere claims became factors in the final
triumph of Christianity? To tnese questions there was in Gibbon's
analysis no adequate answer.
3 The real impact of the argument was to deny tne possibili¬
ty of miracles rather than to offer the expected naturalistic inter¬
pretation of their occurrence. Occasionally ne did advance such an
interpretation; see appendix 50.
4 Gibcon lamented that "this miraculous event, which ought
to have excited the wonder, the curiosity, and the devotion of man¬
kind, passed without notice in an age of science and history" (II,
74). Only one critic has refused to see irony in this passage. See
Maodonald, "Irony in History," op. cit.. p. 559. Christian scholars
have more commonly sought to account for tne silence of Pagan
writers by attempting to naturalize and localize the darkness. See
e.g., Guizot's Edition of Tne Decline and Pall, I, 207, note.
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he find adequate Historical basis for accepting any of the miracles.
There was not only the problem of evidence, but also the
obvious need of a cessation point. Wnen did miracles cease? Why
"deny to the venerable Bede, or to the holy Bernard, the same de¬
gree of confidence wnich, in the second century, we had • . . granted
1
to Justin or to Irenaeus"? Yet every Christian was convinced that
there must have been a point at which miracles stopped. If so,
wnat was one to think of those who "still supported their preten-
2
sions after they had lost their power"? The clear inference was
that every effort to defend miracles landed one in insuperable dif-
3
ficulties. Thus Gibbon, going beyond Middleton, and following
Hume, excluded miracles from all of history including the apostolic
4
pei'iod.
One parenthetic comment may be permitted, in his treatment
of miracles, Gibbon stepped out of his role as a scientific his¬
torian and indulged in a favourite activity of eighteenth century
iconociasm. But what he inadvertently accomplished in conjunction
with the opening and more original attacxs of Middleton and Hume,
was to destroy forever the temptation of theology to try to
establish a case for faith on the questionable ground of * proven'
1 II, 32. 2 Ibid., p. 33.
3 Of Middleton, he wrote in his Journal on 25 February, 1764,
"Get homrne avoit bien de la netoete et de la penetration. II voyoit
bien jusqu'ou 1'on pouvoit pousser les consequences de ses principes
mais ilsne lui convenoit^pas de les tirer." Gf. Le Journal de
Gibbon a .Lausanne, 17 nout 1763 - 19 ^vril 1764. edited by Georges
Bonnard (Lausanne: i'. Kouge, 1945), p. 22n.
4 He attached apparent significance to the case of the
nobleman wno declared that if he were gratified by the sight of a
single person raised from the dead, he would have become a Christian,
anu the fact tnat it was thought proper to decline this "fair and
reasonable" challenge (II, 51). iPor similar instances, and a cri¬





Likewise, trie supposition that miracles could be established
by a dispassionate weighing of * evidence' was shelved for good. It
was seen that it was necessary to have a sustaining faith in the
activity of the eternal God in history in order to carry with it an
2
acceptance of the occurrence of miracles. Moreover, it was subse¬
quently understood tnat what was involved was not merely an event;
but an event together with an interpretation made through the eyes
3
of faith were required to make any happening in history a 'miracle'.
Good worxs.— Gibbon was more within the scope of his inquiry
wnen in attempting to account for the virtues of the first Christians,
he citea two understandably 'human* motives "which might naturally
render the lives of the primitive Christians much purer and more
4
austere than . . . their Pagan contemporaries.*1 These he suggested
were repentance for past sins and concern for the reputation of their
society.
Repentance became an effective factor in appealing to the
degenerate elements, because the new faith held out the hope of com¬
plete cleansing from the guilt of past sins. It was understandable
tnat the derelicts and castaways would embrace a life of penitence
and virtue, and hunger after perfection, since "while reason embraces
1 But the position regarding miracles did not change at once.
This is indicated by Paley*s great work, first published in 1794. He
observed, "we do not assume the attributes of the l)eity, or the exis¬
tence of the future state, in order to prove the reality of miracles.
That reality must be proved by evidence." Cf, William Paley, A View
of txie Evidences of Christianity in Three Parts, (6d ed.; London: R.
jftouder, 179?), I. 4.
2 See e.g., Walker, op. oit., p. 491.
3 Por an exposition of the view of miracles as maintained by
representative modern theology, see Emil Brunner, The Christian Doc¬
trine of Creation and Redemption, Dogmatics, trans. Olive Wyon (Lon¬
don: Lu&terworth Press, 195*), p. 18o ff.
4 II, 34.
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a cold xaediocrity, our passions hurry us, with rapid violence,
1
over the space which lies between the most opposite extremes."
Thus since Christianity*s appeal was geared to a broad base, its
success was enhanced.
Concern for tne reputation of their society was also a
powerful factor, Oiboon contended, in producing good works among
the Christians. Since they were continually under the scrutiny of
hostile critics, it might be anticipated that the Christians would
seek, "by the strictest integrity and the fairest dealing, to remove
the suspicions which the profane are too apt to conceive against
2
the appearance of sanctity." While this strict morality might
appear to go against the natural impulses of humanity, and carried
with it a condemnation of luxury and easy living, Gibbon believed
he could still trace a 'human* motivation: "But it is always easy,
as well as agreeable, for tne inferior ranks of mankind to claim a
merit from the contempt of tnat pomp and oleasure which fortune has
3
placed beyond their reach."
Even with those who chose a life of celibacy in preference
to the pleasures of the flesh, spiritual pride could be considered
4
sufficient compensation for the loss of sensual satisfaction. But
tne fact remained that all this rigour in morality, however humanly
explicable, could not help but impress the multitude of Pagans who
"were inclined to estimate tne merit of the sacrifice by its apparent
1 II, 35.
2 Ibid., p. 36. Eor further instances, see Appendix 51. But
is it necessary to suspect irony in his recognition of the good works
of the unristians? Cf. Edward Clodd, Gibbon and Christianity (London:
Watts & Co,, 1916), p. 52.
3 II, 38.
4 Gibbon wrote of "that secret pride which, under the semblance




The organization of tne Church.— This topic provided the
historian with a congenial task: to trace the growth of ecclesia¬
stical government as an understandably human phenomenon. He con¬
tended that its psychological impetus stemmed from the love of
action which became even more demanding, since the other great
human drive, the love of pleasure, had been suppressed. The im¬
pulse towards action, Gibbon argued, foind an acceptable outlet in
the government of the Church.
The argument was advanced with care. The historian wanted
to show how from a group of equal persons presided over by Pres-
byters, the Church, through the varying ambitions and abilities of
various men, became ruled by Bisnops whose final autnority was in
time usurpeu by Primates; and the final step was tne ascendancy of
2
the Roman Primate over the rest. the fact that this whole
development was not accomplished without resistance and opposition
was citeu in further support of the contention that human factors
were in operation, including "such passions as seem much more adapted
3
to the senate or to the camp."
Further factors.— Once Gibbon had accounted for the emer¬
gence of trie organization, he proceeded to analyse how the Hierarchy
employed such disparate weapons as the disposition of tithes, the
1 II, 40. But tnis was more a factor in the internal con¬
solidation of trie Christians tuan in their outward expansion. How
mhis stern morality could actually win 'the multitude of Pagans',
the historian did not adequately indicate.
2 The same understandable human process could be traced in
the rise of Synods and in the ascendancy of Rome. See appendix 52.
3 II, 49. For other views of tne fundamental motivation
behind the development of ecclesiastical organization, see Appendix
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administration of penance, the threat of excommunication, and tne
management of wealth to consolidate the advances of the Church and
to entrench itself in a position of constituted authority. These
considerations, Gihbon oonoludea, all contributed to the 'human'
strength of the Church.
To complete his survey, he cited other factors also favour¬
able to the final outcome. There was the weakness of Polytheism,
the scepticism which failed to satisfy tne spiritual hunger of the
1
masses, and the peace and stability insured by the Roman Empire.
all these factors taken together comprised the natural and human
explanation for the triumph of the Gospel.
Criticism.— None but the most bigoted would deny that such
an analysis could and did contribute to an understanding of this
2
important subject. But it is one thing to contend that the fore¬
going factors were involved in Christianity's final victory over
the other religions of the Empire. This Gibbon did argue, for the
3
most part, convincingly enough. It is another thing to infer that
these human causes were the only factors in the process, thereby
inferentially ruling out the possibility of an impact from the side
of the Supernatural. This Giboon also unmistakably did and thus
prooeeued by inference beyond the bounds of a strictly scientific
1 Giobon claimed that so congenial was the general climate
of tne times tnat the wonder was not that Christianity was success¬
ful, but that its success was not "still more rapid and still more
universal" (II, 60).
2 Tne ecclesiastical historian who so summarily dismissed
Gibbon, admitted that "with his five causes, most historians of the
present would not take exception" (Walker, op, oit.,p. 493).
3 J. 3. Bury contended that Giobon's account was mo3t ex¬
posed to criticism for its omissions. Cf. Bury, "Gibbon," Encyclo¬
paedia Britannioa, lid ed., Vol. XI. /mother critic's complaint was
that Gibbon failed to account for the coincidence of the five causes.




But it is still another thing to state categorically that
txie natural, human factors were the sole ones to be considered. This
in a sense most important for his status as a critical historian,
Giboon emphatically did not do. "I have attempted," he concluded,
"to display the secondary causes which so efficaciously assisted the
2
truth of the Christian Religion." That statement, stripped of
all ironic overtones, constituted the real defence of Edward Gibbon
as an ecclesiastical historian.
Motives of the Christians
Closely connected with the disposition to uncover a natural¬
istic explanation for the success of Christianity, there was in Gib¬
bon the impulse to ascertain the real motives of human conduct. In
this, ne was influenced by an age which believed that it had de¬
tected the frequent gulf which existed between professed motives of
action and actual ones. Gibbon believed that it was the historian's
duty to expose the latter. But he did not regard this as a difficult
assignment, since all conduct could be reduced to certain analysable
human impulses.
Greed.— High on the list of these, the historian placed
greed. Human beings were impelled by the desire to amass for them¬
selves material possessions, and Christians in this respect were no
different from non-Christians.
London: Burns & Oates, 1881), p. 457. But this was a difficult if
not impossible tash to assign to a critical historian.
1 Gibbon commented upon Bishop William Warburton that he was




If tne ecclesiastics were checked in the pursuit of personal
emolument, they would exert a more laudable industry to in¬
crease the wealth of the church, and dignify their covetous-
ness with the specious names of piety and patriotism.
Other than in scattered passages, however, he did not expound the
2
economic aspect of the advance of the Church. And even in his
treatment of individuals, there was no suggestion of the all-con¬
suming cnaracter of this factor which was to arise in the thought of
3
the next century.
Ambition.— Operative along with greed, Gibbon believed, was
ambition, which in every age and climate had prevailed "with the
same commanding energy." Just why this was so Gibbon was at a loss
to know, since through the centuries ambition had invariably produced
4
not personal happiness but misery, frustration, and final ruin.
Nevertheless, it was precisely this impulse which was at the basis
5
of much of the history of the Church. "Religion was the pretence,"
he wrote, "but • . » ambition was the genuine motive of episcopal
6
warfare."
Pride,— Gibbon held that pride had constantly to be regarded
?
as an underlying human motive. It was pride which prompted people
1 III, 31. For further instances, see Appendix 53.
2 For exceptions to this general statement, see Appendix 53;
and for a discussion of the economic aspect of ecclesias-oieism, see
also II, 52 ff., 339; III, 29; V, 39, 290; VII, 223.
3 He did assert that "avarice is perhaps the only permanent
ruling passion" (Gibbon, "Hints," No. VTI, op, oit., II, 193).
4 Of. V, 258; also chapter Two of "the present inquiry.
5 Gibbon observed sardonically: "iuubition is a weed of
quick and early vegetation in the vineyard of Christ" (VII, 248).
o V, 119. For a further indication of the operation of
ambjtion in ecclesiastioal hisaory, see Appendix 53.
7 Closely allied with pride was vanity, which Gibbon be¬
lieved to be the basis for tne desire for imiaortality and the real
motive for many of the martyrdoms. See II, 21, 110.
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1
to refuse the Gospel. It was pride which made it possible to turn
one's back uuon the pleasures of the world. It was, moreover, by-
virtue of its righteousness that the Church, in Gibbon's view, con¬
stituted a threat to society. For as he considered the claims to
spiritual authority which had been advanced on the strength of moral
rectitude, he observed that "to a Philosophic eye the vices of the
2
clergy are far less dangerous than their virtues."
A legitimate search.— How must Gibbon's effort to uncover
the real motives of human conduct be evaluated? Commonly, it has
been regarded as confirmation of the cynicism which pervaded the
whole of the History. Yet in his concern to determine the motives
behind human behaviour as being of crucial importance to any under¬
standing of the historic process, Gibbon was anticipating a twen¬
tieth century conception of the purpose of history. "For history,"
wrote Collingwood, "the object to be discovered is not the mere
event but the thought expressed in it. What did Brutus think which
3
made him decide to stab Caesar?" Collingwood even contended that
4
the historian was concerned with thought alone.
1 E.g., "Those persons who in the world had followed . . .
the dictates of benevolence and propriety, derived such a calm
satisfaction from the opinion of their own rectitude, as rendered
them much less susceptible of the .sudden emotions of shame, of grief,
and of terror, which have given birth to so many 'wonderful conver¬
sions" (II, 35).
2 V, 319. Was Gibbon inadvertently approaching the Christian
doctrine of original sin? See Appendix 54.
3 The Idea of History, p. 214. If this were not merely an
illustrative question, if Collingwood had been actually concerned to
inquire into the matter, he might have consulted Gibbon's "Digression
on the Character of Brutus" (Gibbon Papers, I, 264). See Appendix 55.
4 The Idea of History, p. 214. But it is questionable whether
Gibbon would have concurred with Collingwood'3 contention, since he
believed that man was more than a 'thinking' animal, and that desires,
feelings, passions played their part in history as well. For a
critique of Collingwood, see G. J. Renier, History, Its Purpose and
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Against tni3, it must be acknowledged that in simple *posi-
tivist' fashion, Giooon tended to classify human motives into
general categories rather than to inquire into the unique mental
1
atmosphere of the individual under consideration. Unquestionably,
he was not conspicuously equipped with that constructive and sympa¬
thetic imagination which Gollingwood considered so indispensable to
2
any oritical historian. Yet it may be claimed that in his attempt
to fathom the real thought motivating action, Gibbon was possessed
3
by a true historical feeling for the past.
Moralistic tendencies.— One furtner criticism of Gibbon
may be considered in this connection: the charge that despite his
disassociation with formal religious faith, he constantly acted as
a moralist, passing judgements upon the personalities of the past
by virtue of an uncritical application of the standards of eigh-
4
teenth century Enlightenment,
Gibbon was indeed a son of his own age, and could not be
acquainted with the contributions of the school of historical
relativism. Moreover, it might properly be disavowed that the pur¬
pose of history was, in Lord Actors sense, to drive home the lessons
Method (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1950), p. 44 ff.
1 A critic described the formulae of positivism thus: "The
treatment of an event not as unique but as an instance of a certain
type, and the explanation of it by discovering a cause applicable
not to it alone but to every event of the same general kind" (Col-
lingwood, op. olt., p. 148).
2 Tnis may possibly account for Collingwood*s contemptuous
attitude towards Gibbon; for he wrote disparagingly (but without
citing any further instances) of Gibbon's "characteristic neglect
to mention tne source of his information." Of. R. G. Collingwood,
mn Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940), p. 220.
See Chapter Three for the argument that this charge cannot be sub¬
stantiated in Gibbon's writings.
3 Eor a testimony to Giboon's achievement in this respect,
of, Meinecke, op. cit., p. 248,
4 The selection of adjectives to describe his characters
suggested this. People were "artful,"Credulous," "timorous,"
115
of an unchangeable morality; and Gibbon would most certainly have
1
disavowed it. Still the impulse of the historian to formulate
judgements on various aspects of the process he is surveying would
appear to be inevitable. As a critic of Acton*3 view of history
has argued;
Nothing could be more painful than to prevent the historian
from commenting on his story as he tells it. The historian
has a right to make judgements even though these might only
be a digression. We have him unfairly muzzled if we do not
grant him the pleasure of his * obiter dicta*,42
However tnis may oe, it Is evident that if The Decline and gall
were stripped of its moral judgements, as in one edition it was
stripped of its obscenities, much of its interest and pungency
3
would be sucrix'iced as well.
Distrust of Zeal
Still another factor in accounting for Gibbon* s attitude
towards ecclesiastical history can be seen in his appreciation of
the placid in life; for this invoiced in him a deep distrust of all
varieties of zeal and enthusiasm. Bury*s statement in this con¬
nection has become almost a classic:
The conviction that enthusiasm is inconsistent with intel¬
lectual balance was engrained in his mental constitution,
and confirmed by study and experience. We must consider
Gibson's zealous distrust of zeal as an essential and most
suggestive characteristic of the 'Decline and ifall*.^
a gexxeral attitude,— Zeal for Gibbon could be defined
according to the eighteenth century understanding of the term, a3
"intrepid," "haughty," "equitable."
1 Gibbon once examined the question whether historians
could be friends of virtue. See Appendix 55.
2 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History,
p. 104.
3 Thomas Bowdler's Edition of The Decline and Fall (Lon¬




"a belief or a conceit of being divinely inspired or commissioned."
On the strength of this conception, ne was opposed to zeal in
general rather than only to the particular expression of Christian
zeal. Never for example did he permit antipathies against those
who zealously stood on one side of a question to excite his syra-
patnies with those who stood on the other. There is indeed ample
support for tne supposition that this historian was opposed to zeal
2
irrespective of who had it.
Thus Gibbon's approach to the zeal of the triumphant Catho¬
lic party has already been cited. But that did not prevent the
historian from censuring the pagan "philosophers, who now assumed
3
tne unworthy office of directing the blind zeal of persecution."
It has even been argued that 30 sensitive was he on this subject,
he mistakenly supposed Cnristians at large to have been objects of
vindictive feelings and repressive measures that were actually
4
directed only against the priesthood. .-aid the fact that he was
critical on this oount of Julian, who has been called the ♦hero* of
The Decline and gall, confirms tne supposition that he was not in-
5
sensitive to the possibility of zeal among the Pagans.
1 The New Century Dictionary of the English Language (Lon¬
don: The Century Co., 1927), I. *
2 His most recent biographer contended, "In his distaste for
zeal and enthusiasm of every kind, he was acting irresponsibly"
(Joyce, Edward Gibbon, p. 146). But he did not relate why this must
be. May not a case be made for the contention that "historic en¬
thusiasms • , . are precarious things? It is so nearly certain
that our enthusiasm will not be shared by the next inquirer (Robert¬
son, G1bjon, p. 84). and there is reason to believe that the bio¬
grapher himself was not above being responsible for 'irresponsible*
utterance, as tne final chapter of this inquiry indicates.
3 II, 131.
4 This claim was advanced by the Editor of the Bohn Edition
of Tne Decline and Fall and was quoted by Robertson, Gibbon, p. 83.
5 Gibbon contended that in his zealous devotion to the
hopeless task of restoring ancient Paganism, a "religion .• , .
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Again, it was to be expected that the historian would not
withhold his fire from the Protestant Reformers, those "fearless
1
enthusiasts," who were "ambitious of succeeding the tyrants whom
2
they had dethroned." But it needs to be recalled that Gibbon ex-
3
hibited equal contempt for the zealous attackersof Christianity.
Of Voltaire, he exclaimed, "Would he have bestowed the same praise
4
on a Christian prince for retiring to a xaonastery?"
So concerned was Gibbon over the menace of uncontrolled zeal
(as exemplified in the excesses of the French Revolution) and over
the mood that could be incited in a mob through the arguments of
the freethinkers, that he recognized anew the importance of insti-
5
tutions which exercised a conserving influence in society.
Ecclesiastical controversies.— It is, therefore, against
the background of a fundamental aversion to enthusiasm and zeal of
any sort that one xaust appraise Gibbon*s attitude towards Christian
zeal in particular. Perhaps there was no single aspect of that
destitute of theological principles, of moral precepts, and of
ecclesiastical discipline," Julian was indefensible III, 472). For
a further discussion of zeal among the Pagans, see XI, 126.
1 VI, 132.
2 Ibid., p. 133* Concerning them, he commented caustically,
"The nature of the tiger remained the same, but he was gradually
deprived of his teeth and fangs."
3 "Nor could I approve the intolerant zeal of the philoso¬
phers and Encyclopaedists. They . . . preached the tenets of
atheism with the bigotry of dogmatists, and damned all believers
with ridicule and contempt" (Memoir B.. p. 204).
4 VII, 146, note. Gibbon added, "In his way, Voltaire was
a bigot, an intolerant bigot" (Ibid.. p. 146, note). See also V,
391, note, for a contrast between Gibbon's attitude and Voltaire's
animosity towards Mohamet.
5 Referring to Burke's refusal to follow the trend of the
times, Gibbon wrote: "I can almost excuse his reverence for Church
establishments. I have sometimes thought of writing a dialogue of
the dead, in which Lucian, Erasmus, and Voltaire should mutually
acknowledge the danger of exposing an old superstition to the con¬
tempt of a blind and fanatic multitude" (Memoir E.. p. 342, note).
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subject in which this "most suggestive characteristic" was more
clearly evidencea than in his consideration of ecclesiastical con¬
troversy. Here, he would contend, was an excellent example of
enthusiasm in action, an occurrence accompanied by the most absurd
and even comic consequences.
Minute differences in the controversies.— Gibcon launched
tne attack by arguing that the actual differences in most if not
all theological conflicts were extremely minute. Thus he claimed
tnut tne distinction between *homoousion* and 'homoiousion' was
j 1
"almost invisible to the nicest.theological eye," and that his
study of arianism had consumed many days of "reading, thinking,
2
and writing, in the pursuit of a phantom."
The significance of Chalcedon appeared to Gibbon to hinge
3
upon equally hair-splitting theological distinctions. The lines
were so finely drawn that tne critic was moved almost to admiration
By virtue of tne same line of reasoning, Gibbon contended that the
Church of Rome was placed in a ridiculous position due to the
1 II, 409, note.
2 nutobiograpay, p. 185. -For a different appraisal of the
xirian Controversy, Carlyle's verdict may not be without interest.
Carlyle coxxtended tnat while at first he couid attach no real sig-
nixMcance to the distinction between 1homoousion1 and *homoiousion'
he had at length revised his judgement and concluded that if the
nrians had won, "Christianity would have dwindled away into a
legend." Tne writer is indebted for this reference to H. R. Mac¬
intosh, Types of Modern Theology (London: Risbet & Co., 1937), p. 5
One can but observe that such what-would-have-happened-if asser¬
tions are incapable of historical verification. J?or a more recent
Christian justification of this controversy, see Neill, op. clt.,
p. 59 ff.
3 Likewise, the actual basis for the *filioque' debate
appeared to Gibbon to be meaningless. Jfor a fuller statement of
his view, and a confirmation by a contemporary Christian theologian
see ^ppexidix 56.
4 "The road to paradise", he wrote in rich imagery, "a
bridge as snarp as a razor was suspended over the abyss by the
master-hand of a theological artist" (V, 135).
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1
Imperceptible difference between Augustine and Calvin.
Extent of bitterness.— But under the impulse of enthusiasm,
the lack of significant difference between contending parties only-
served to increase the bitterness. Gibbon found that hatred between
religious bodies often had existed in inverse proportion to the
2
breadth of the gulf separating them. Thus heretics who had grasped
a portion of the Gospel were judged more dangerous enemies of truth
3
than the Pagans who had rejected it altogether; the "Christian"
Greeks regarded the "Christian" Latins as "the vilest and most
4
despicable portion of the human race," These unfortunate conse¬
quences of "intestine" quarrels prompted Gibbon to make one of his
rare direct indictments, as he wrote of those "animated only by
the spirit of religion,^and that spirit was productive only of
animosity and discord." But he was more in character when he com¬
mented sardonically: "These rigid sentiments, which had been un¬
known to the ancient world . . . Infused a seirit of bitterness
6
into a system of lo-ve and harmony."
1 Gibbon asserted, "Home canonized Augustine and reprobated
Calvin, while the real differentiation between them is invisible
to a theological microscope" (III, 437, note).
2 Gibbon wrote derisively of "the fury of the theological
insects who still crawled on the surface of the earth" (V, 147).
3 He observed that to the Christian "the reproach of 'Bar¬
barian' was irabittered by the more odious epithet of 'Heretic' (IV,
87). That this might aotually be justified is indicated by a con¬
sideration of the concept of the 'demonic', in which Anti-Christ has
always to include the 'Christ' element. It is therefore to be feared
more than unmitigated evil, since it may pass under the guise of
righteousness. See Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History, trans..
N, A. Rasetzki and Elsa L. Talmey (London: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1936), p. 77 ff.
4 VI, 491. Referring to the croud Greek, Gibbon asserted,
"He had rather behold, in Constantinople, the turban of Mahomet,




Consequences of the controversies,— In addition to the
two previous considerations that the differences were minute, and
that the bitterness was in inverse proportion to the extent of the
difference, Gibbon had several other observations on ecclesiastical
controversy. From such controversy once engaged upon, he argued
1
that it was extremely difficult to be extricated; he claimed that
the whole process of subscription and subservience to formal state-
2
ments of faith was absolutely meaningless; and he intimated tnat
in tne last analysis all partisan enthusiasm was temporary and
3
passing. Finally, Gibbon's own creao regarding the significance
of ecclesiastical controversy is indicated by his favourable quo¬
tation of the testimony of Procopius:
Religious controversy is the offspring of arrogance and
folly, .- . . true piety is most laudably expressed by si¬
lence, . . . man, ignorant of his own nature should not
presume to scrutinize the nature of his God; and ... it
is sufficient for us to Know that power and benevolence
are the perfect attributes of the Deity.^
Criticism.— How must Gibbon's treatment of the ecclesia¬
stical controversies be evaluateu? The first and obvious impres-
5
sion is that Giooon was not a theologian. By his own ironic
admission, it was tne tneologian's (and specifically not the his¬
torian's) task to interpret tne significance and character of re-
6
ligion "as sne descended from Heaven." Clearly, therefore, while
1 ".as soon," ne wrote, "as tney [tne theologians] beheld the
twilight of sense," they "measured back, slipped, and were again in¬
volved in pne gloom of an impenetrable orthodoxy" (V, 114).
2 "a black or a parrot might be taught to repeat the words
of the Chalcedonian or Monophysite creed" (V, 176).
3 For statements to this effect, see Appendix 56.
4 V, 142.
5 The 'value' that Gibbon plaoed upon theology as a separate
discipline was reflected in the following remark: He wrote of "the
same ignominious price Ja single ducat] , too high perhaps for a
shelf of theology . . ."VII, 206). *""
6 II, 2.
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Gibbon*s consideration of the effects ecclesiastical controversy
had upon the fall of home, how "the sense or rather the sound of
a syllable was sufficient to disturb the peace of an empire," —
while all this properly came within the sphere of his inquiry, the
theological significance and importance of the controversies did
1
not. It is thus necessary to concur, in this one area of the in¬
quiry at least, with Bury's judgement: "Neither the historian nor
the man of letters will any longer subscribe, without a thousand re-
2
serves, to the theological chapters of the 'Decline and Fall'."
But in fairness it ought to be added that Giboon's distaste
did not keep him from a careful and conscientious acquaintance with
the whole field of the controversies, and the extent of the investi¬
gation, by one to whom the whole subject was alien, testifies to
tne thoroughness of the historian and must compel the respect and
3
admiration of all but the most bigoted reader. One is tempted to
suggest that if he were to discount the clear arid unmistakable
slant of The Decline and Fall, Bury's "discreet inquirer" could
perhaps make a worse mistake than to "go there for his ecolesia-
4
stical history."
Further Indictment of Enthusiasm
Giboon's indictment of Ghristian enthusiasm was conducted
on a far wider canvass than the subject of ecclesiastical contro¬
versy, vast as it may oe, can indicate. Enthusiasm, ne considered
not alone the enemy of religion by dividing its adherents into
1 V, 139.
2 I (1896), xxxix.
3 This face, was recognized by a far from sympathetic critic.
See Meinecke, op. cit., p. 252.
4 I (1896), xxxix.
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bitterly opposing factions. It was not alone the foe of the
state by siphoning off energy that ought to be utilized in the
strengthening of the social structure. It led also inevitably to
these lamentable consequences:
Disillusionment.— In its blindness, zeal could not fail,
sooner or later, to run into the hard rock of reality. Thus he
cited the prayer of a pope that God would guide the hand of his
champion. Gibcon added ironically, ".after a similar prayer, . • .
1
the Moslems advanced ..." In the same manner, he wrote of the
readiness of tne Catholics to put the validity of their cause to
a trial by fire. Unfortunately, he observed drily, the expecta¬
tion that Catholic verity would be sustained by the flames was
disappointed.
a compromise of the truth.— The real effect of enthusiasm,
Giooon argued, was to make loyalty to the object of one*s enthu¬
siasm a more pressing consideration than strict truthfulness. In
support of tnis contention, he cited the tendency of Church Fathers
to gloss over unfortunate chapters in the history of the Church
3
and to explain them as something other than they actually were.
Even more serious than such rationalizations was the inclination,
under tne impulse of enthusiasm, to be unperturbed by the whole
4
question of truth. Enthusiasm, Gibbon contended, posited a more
1 VI, 44. The inference was that by the very nature of the
expectancy which zeal imposed, someone was certain to be disil¬
lusioned.
2"VI, 489. For further instances of disillusionment which
resulted from zeal, see VI, 150; and VII, 196. Cf. also Chapter
Two of this inquiry.
3 Giboon cited e.g., .augustine's attempt to defend the
Donatist persecution IIII, 427).
4 Thus he referred to "the pious fraud, which was embraced
with equal zeal at Home and at Geneva," (IV, 97) and described the
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ultimate end than the truth.
The unaeiminiag of individual morality.-- Gibbon contended
that zeal in religion led not only to the compromise and suppresion
of truth but also to a cancellation of considerations of fundamen¬
tal morality. To substantiate this, he cited the argument of a
bishop to the effect that a Christian ooligation "annihilates a
1
rash and sacriligious oath to the enemies of Christ." Likewise
he contended that in the creed of Justinian, the guilt of murder
2
could not be applied to the slaughter of unbelievers. In short,
zealous religion and real morality were frequently found to be
incompatible.
The upsurge of intolerance.— This was the chief item in
Giooon*s indictment of Christian zeal. Leal, ne argued, produced
bigotry; bigotry begat intolerance; intolerance was the arch-enemy
3
of enlightened humanity. The historian built his case carefully.
Intolerance first appeared among the Christians over the question
of how to treat those of their own number who persisted in obser¬
ving Jewish ceremonial law. quickly, he observed, the Gentiles
refused their more scrupulous brethren the same tolerance which
4
they had initially claimed for themselves.
Vatican as "an arsenal and manufacture, which . . . have produced
or concealed a various collection of false or genuine, of corrupt
or suspicious acts, as they tended to promote the interest of the
Koman Church" (V, 292).
1 VII, 130. .ana he noted another Christian injunction,
that it was becter to enter a brothel than to abstain from church
duties. Cf. V, 29b.
2 V, 143. Ih another passage he pointed to the Church^
willingness to "exonerate villains" provided that they sponsored
tne interest and defence of the Church (III, 232).
3 Was Giboon indebted to Bayle for this insight? See
appendix 57.
4 In support of this, Giobon cited the admission of Justin
Martyr. (II, li)
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Tnis, however, was but a beginning for the spirit of
bigotry, .almost at once it reached out to "the condemnation of
the wisest and most virtuous of the Pagans," and there was "de¬
livered over, without hesitation, to eternal torture the far
1
greater part of the human species." Tnis supposition, Giboon
maintained, could unmistakably be deduced from the famous testi-
2
mony of Tertullian. -and these sentiments, Giboon supposed, re¬
flected not merely the view of a single individual but were
3
indicative of the prevailing mentality of the Christian community.
The spirit expressed by Tertullian persisted through the
centuries. Nor was it simply a matter of consigning heretics and
unbelievers to eternal punishment. On the contrary, methods
designed to compel conformity in the present world were not only
countenanced within the Church but came to be regarded with in¬
creasing favour whenever such methods could be effectively employed.
Thus Giboon asserted that the first missionaries of the Gospel
claimed for tnemseives tne benefits of toleration; but as soon as
their religion became recognized and established, they systema-
4
tically denied the same privilege to others.
Of even more significance was the fact that while the in¬
tent remained the same, the effectiveness of persecution advanced
wltn succeeding ages. "Since the death of PrisciHian," he wrote,
"the rude attempts of persecution have been refined and methodized
1 II, 28.
2 This testimony is quoted in appendix 57.
3 against this, a critic urged that Tertullian was not
representative of early Christianity. Cf. Guizot's Edition of
The Decline and gall, I, 194, note, as if in anticipation of
such a rejoinder, Gibson sought carefully to establish the au¬




in tile iioiy office." Nor had there been any apparent awareness
that this entire development might be even faintly in contra¬
diction to the principles of Christ, so great was the capacity of
2
zeal to blind the mind and to dull its higher sensibilities. Nor
was tnere an end to the spirit of persecution even in more modern
3 4
times; it remained even in his own age of Enlightenment.
.an evaluation.— at first glance, Gibbon's treatment of the
whole question of ecclesiastical intolerance suggests partisanship.
Liice any effective polemicist, he seemed to have constructed his
case by citing instances wnich supported his view and by suppres¬
sing all which could prompt a contrary conclusion. Thus by dwel¬
ling upon particular chapters in Church history, he could create
an impression which might have an element of truth in it; but was
it true to the totality of the facts?
One might thus argue that Giboon failed to discern the
spirit of charity and i"orbearance which has been a constant ele¬
ment in bhe history of the Church, and it might be suggested that
had his survey ixicluded recognition of all the sainted lives which
nave been lived under the banner of the Cross, his final conclu¬
sion could not have remainea the same. He could not have been as
persuaded that Christian enthusiasm led inevitably to intolerance.
1 III, 163.
2 With masterful irony, Gibbon observed, "'May those who
divide Christ be divided with the sword,* were the charitable
wishes of tne Christian Synod" (V, 130).
3 Thus he oalled Calvin one "who loved liberty too well to
enuure that Christians should wear . . . other chains than those
imposed by himself" (Misc. WorKs, p. 221).
4 MI oould only rejoyce that if the voices of our priests
was clamorous and bitter, their hands were disarmed of the powers
of persecution" (Memoir E,, p. 316). again, "Whatever may be the
language of individuals, it [intolerance!] is still the public doc¬
trine of all the Christian churches"; (II, 28, note).
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But even when such a rebuttal has been fully considered,
the fact remains that Gibbon confronted Christian apologists with
a fundamental question: to what extent is the exercise of tolera¬
tion consistent with the underlying teaching of the Church? Is
there not a sense in wnich ' error* ought not to be tolerated? Vshy
may not the scriptural injunction, "compel them to come in," be ad¬
vanced in the mind of the Christian as justification for the use of
1
coercion to achieve and maintain the peace and unity of the Church?
The views of later historians.— These questions have
arrested the attention of historians of the Church ever since
Gibbon*s time. Thus it may not be without purpose to review some
of these contributions, to weigh their conclusions against one
i
another, and to ascertain to what extent they confirm or repudiate
the verdict which Gibbon reached.
ht once one is confronted by a seemingly broad divergence
of views. Lord Acton argued that far from being the instigator
of intolerance, the Church had frequently been the sole protector
of tne rights of conscience. This had resulted, Acton reasoned,
from the fact that the Church had consistently opposed the state's
persistent inclination to encroach upon the freedom and the dignity
2
of the individual.
On the other hand, ncton's successor at Cambridge, J". B.
Bury, insisted that tne Church had made no contribution to the over¬
throw of intolerance. He argued that the problem did not concern
the Christians at all; that while they claimed the rights of freedom
1 St. Luite 14:23.
2 John Edward Emerich Acton, History of Ereedom and Other
Essays (London: Macmillan & Co., 1907), p. 203. a quotation from
acton*s booJc, and an evaluation, are given in Appendix 58.
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for themselves, they would have been glad if a government would
1
suppress rival elements in the population.
Now it is evident that .acton and Bury were concerned with
two different kinds of freedom of conscience; the former with free¬
dom from political tyranny, and the latter with freedom from the
tendency of the Church to suppress views at variance with ortho¬
doxy.
The question which Acton did not answer may be stated thus:
granted that tne Church has served the cause of liberty by resis¬
ting political encroachments upon the individual, what safeguards
were there that the Church itself might not be victimized by "man*s
worldliness, cupidity, and ambition," and as a consequence supplant
2
the state as an instrument of tyranny? Must not this question be
involved in any consideration of the claim that the Church nas been
the ally of freedom of conscience?
But tnere was equally a question which Bury did not answer.
Granted that the Church has been tempted to claim toleration for
itself and not for its enemies, why was it that the tradition of
liberty and toleration entered into modern times under fundamental¬
ly Christian auspices and has been largely confined to that part of
the world informed by Christian presuppositions?
.a Christian historian has sought to explain these apparent
antinomies by assertingadistinction between Christianity and the
3
Church. Over against Bury (and Giboon), Herbert Butterfield has
1 J. B. Bury, ^ History of Freedom of Thought (2d ed.; Lon-
don: Oxford Press, 1932), p. 35. -For a fuller statement of Bury* s
position, see .appendix 58.
2 This question was posed by Herbert Butterfield, Chris¬
tianity in European History, p. 30. ~™
3 Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p. 152 ff.
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argued that Christianity operated for the cause of toleration to
far greater effect than rationalist critics have realized, to far
greater effect indeed than Christians themselves sometimes nave
1
desired it to do.
But over against acton, Butterfield has claimed that the
Church, both Catholic and Protestant, has rarely been on the side
2
of toleration. Protestants were no more immune than Catholics to
the temptation to capture the government and to coerce that part
of tne population which insisted on dissenting. But the critic
has insisted that tais was not the real impact of Christianity but
3
that impact corrupted by ecclesiasticism.
Nor has the effect of genuine Christianity upon the mundane
world been obliterated by the Church. This effect has been analysed
under three main considerations, all of which "spring from the very
nature of the Gospel itself": (a) the leavening effect of Christian
charity, (b) the assertion of the autonomy of the spiritual prin-
4
ciple, (o) bhe insistence on the spiritual character of personality.
The claim is that these factors have exercised their influence upon
the very texture of Western Civilization and insured it the free-
5
dom it enjoys.
a validation of Gibbon.— But tnis argument, cogent as
it may be in itself, has not met the point of Giboon*s central con¬
tention: that in the history of the Church, Christian enthusiasm
1 Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p. 152.
2 Butterfield, Christianity in European History, p. 34.
Cf. also Appendix 59*
3 Ibid., p. 35.
4 Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p. 151.
5 A critic has contended that real freedom depends upon two
fundamental considerations, co-operation and fellowship, and that
Christianity has provided the latter factor. Cf. Macmurray, op.
olt., p. 63; also, Appendix 58.
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has frequently produced an attitude contrary to Christian charity
and entirely irreconcilacle with "the insistence on the spiritual
character of personality." And while an intolerant attitude may
unquestionably be regarded as a corruption of the real spirit of
Christianity, there is serious question as to whether it must be
understood as a corruption of the fundamental ideology of the
1
Church. Far from supposing such intolerance to be an alien ele-
iaent introduced by man's "worldliness, cupidity, and ambition,"
one has reason to believe that an attitude of intolerance towards
•error' las been a fundamental ingredient of the •Church' type of
social organization.
Ernst Troeltsch stated tne case for the Church in his pro¬
foundly sociological analysis of the nature of the 'Church1 as dis¬
tinct from the 'sect* and the 'mystical' types of religious or-
2
ganization. He reasoned that from the Church's standpoint, it had
not only the right but the duty to compel unity not simply for its
own sake, but for the welfare of its constituents as well as the
ultimate interests of mankind. And upon occasion, it might even
be necessary to resort to external force in order to insure the
1 On the other hand, how defensible is the distinction
between Chriscianity and its historical embodiement, the Church?
as a contemporary has observed, "Christianity is unthinkable apart
from the Churcn," since "if Christianity is the revelation of the
depths of the personal and of love as the ultimate meaning of the
universe, it Can find expression only in a community." See J. H.
Oldham, Life is Commitment (London: SCM Press, 1953), p. 79«
2 Cf. Ernst Troeltsch, Tne Social Teachings of the Chris¬
tian Churoheq trans. Olive Wyon (London: George alien & Unwin,
1931) IX, 997. Troeltsch wrote, "The attitude of compulsion must
. . . finally express itself externally, because error . . . ought
not to be tolerated, and because it is not right that people who
have been born into the membership of the Church should be allowed
to fall a prey of temptation. Here it is permissible to force
people for their own good."
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attainment of this end..
ii conclusion.— Now a justification of intolerance may be
considered, legitimate or reprehensible depending upon one's personal
viewpoint. One would certainly approach the matter differently if
one were an ardent churchman or if one were a convinced rationalist.
But the recognition that intolerance is involved inevitably in the
distinctively 'Church* type of organisation may serve to clarify,
not only many chapters in Church history but occurrences in the
1
contemporary world a3 well. Obviously, the impulse to censure
previous ages for their bigotry must be examined against this back¬
ground: that the persecutors were doing not only what their own
age regarded as right, but also what, regardless of the changing
conceptions of appropriate means, the Church through the centuries
has regarded as aiming at a legitimate end.
Likewise, tae presexxt day Protestant tendency to castigate
Catnolics for tneir 'intolerance' may be seen as essentially the
reaction of the 'sect* to the 'Church* type of religious organiza¬
tion. Nor can it be an occasion of surprise to discover that "in
ecclesiastical history it is as rare a thing as in secular history
2
to meet with any abdication of mundane power." Could such an
abdication be anticipated when that mundane power might be employed
to advance "the peace and purity of the Church"?
This survey of more recent contributions to the subject
1 It might be argued that the current stress in continental
circles on the 'uniqueness' of Christ and the vehement rejection of
all tendencies toward syncretism, as well as the closed mentality
which cnaracterizes so many of this generation of theological stu¬
dents, may oe understood as an extension, in an intellectual or
psychological form, of the same fundamental spirit.
2 Buttei'field, Christianity in European History, p. 34.
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would onus confirm Giobon's fundamental contention. One may lament
tne tone which the historian adopted. One may call attention to
his utter inability, by means of constructive imagination, to enter
sympathetically into the Church1s viewpoint. One may wish that, if
only for purpases of historical understanding, Gibbon might have
approached the matter as a churchman would. One may point to the
historian's failure to appraise the leavening influence of Chris¬
tianity throughout the centuries or the incalculable effect of its
insistence upon the dignity of human personality. One may see him
hopelessly imprisoned within a narrow, eighteenth century preoc¬
cupation with its own brand of liberty and toleration.
Yet no amount of disparagement can blunt his basic insight:
that the Church has been on the side of toleration when toleration
served its interest and has suppressed 'error' wnen it was in a
position to do so. Real religious liberty, tne liberty to remain
in 'error' since no mortal system can be trusted in the last
analysis to define what is 'true', and since every resort to ex¬
ternal compulsion must be deemed a contradiction of the principles
of Christ —■ that liberty has arisen out of the clash of rival
1
religious systems rapher than as the bequest of any one of them.
The Idea of Individual Independence
There i3 yet another factor to be considered in this ap¬
praisal of Gibson's attitude towards ecclesiastical history. It
may best be identified as nis insistence upon the importance of
individual independence. Such independence, the historian regarded
1 In the thought of this section, the writer is indebted
to Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Tnter-p-ret^-hi nn of Hi .dt-.n-ny p, loo
ff.
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us ilia xaosfc prized possession; lie referred to it as "cue first of
1
earthly blessings," It meant for Gibbon the right of the individual
2
to be free of all external interference. It involved the ability
to include in, and exclude from, his life what he would. It im¬
plied the unrestricted opportunity to carry out his chosen purposes,
to do what he pleased.
an eighteenth century characteristic.-- This habit of mind,
it has been contended, was simply a reflection of the eighteenth
3
century faith in itself. It was a concomitant of the confidence
in reason, which assumed that all of life could be brought within
its domain. Man at last had oeen emancipated from the fetters
which had previously enmeshed his mind. The supposition is that
3uch an age instilled in its sons the assurance that within them¬
selves they possessed sufficient resources to make their way
through life, that they could be counted on to conduct themselves
properly, and that therefore they required neither assistance nor
interference from any outside quarter. At any rate, whatever its
origin, this consciousness was clearly in evidence in the historian
4
of the Roman Empire.
Admiration for Julian.— In support of txiis contention, a
number of considerations can be cited. There was, for example,
Gibbon's admiration for Julian, Txiis man, he felt, had the initia¬
tive ana tne independence to pursue a course that was against the
^-u^obiograpxxy, p. 1?6. Recognition of the importance of
this factor uo Giooon nas beerx mads by critics of the most diverse
schools. See appendix 39*
2 But this did not imply any desire for independence from
the society of friends. See appendix 39.
3 Gf. Meinecae, op. oiii., pp. 254, 255.
4 dee Misc. Woras, p. 307, for an assertion of his own
"independent happixiess." and upon tne coiapietion of The Decline
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trend of the tiiaes. Trained in Christianity, brought up to believe,
Julian yet asserted the right to formulate his own spiritual destiny.
Gibbon observed, "His independent spirit . . . refused to yield the
1
passive and unresisting obedience which was required."
Contempt of crowds.— In the light of this basic bent of
his character, Gibbon*s aversion to crowds and masses of people can
be explained. When, in The Decline and Fall, he wrote of "a large
~2
and tumultuous assembly," one senses that this was the last place
Giooon himself would care to be. Moreover, when a large group of
people degenerated into a mob, Gibbon's distaste assumed the pro-
3
portions of absolute abhorence.
attitude towards the state.— On the strength of this
emphasis on the importance of the individual, Gibbon's confusing
and seemingly contradictory attitude towards the state can be better
understood. It has been cited as somewhat of an anomaly that the
historian set such store upon individual independence and yet re¬
garded as tne most happy and most prosperous period in the history
4
of the world, the antonine era of absolute despotism. Gibbon
would claim that the contradiction was seeming rather than real.
and Fall, he wrote: "Hot a sh^et has been seen by any human eyes,
excepting those of the author and the printer: the faults and
merits are exclusively my own" {^utobiography. p. 205).
1 II, 458, 459. Struggling in another era, from a different
starting point, with radically different weapons, Julian appealed
to GibDon as the great prototype of himself.
2 II, 100. For a further instance of this aversion, see
.appendix 59.
3 This is seen in the reaction, reflected in his corres¬
pondence, to the excesses of the French Revolution. See Misc.
Works, p. 389 ff.
4 one critic claimed that this 'contradiction' was charac¬
teristic of the Enlightenment attitude even towards its own age
and was never resolved. See Meinecke, op. clt«, p. 250.
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His oonceotion of acceptable government was that which did not inter-
1
fere with the individual's pursuit of his own affairs. This he
conceived to be quite as possible under an enlightened absolutism
as under any other form of government.
But Gibbon was in some perplexity as to what was the best
2
government. It was "a matter of . . . delicacy," he wrote, "to
determine with whom the general will ought to be deposited. Shall
3
it reside in the breast of a prince?" That was ideal if the prince
was virtuous, but there was tne possibility that the prince might
4
be corrupted.
It would seem tnat he might have leaned towards another
form of government which would safeguard against the perils of
absolutism were it not for his recognition of another function of
government, Hot only was government required not to interfere with
the rights of the individual; it was also required to prevent other
elements in society from so interfering. This was, for Gibbon, the
decisive count against democracy. It was unable, he believed, to
prevent a breakdown of law and order. It was not, therefore, in
contradiction to his love of independence but rather on account of
5
it that Giobon came down on the side of enlightened absolutism.
In his judgement, only under established authority was real
1 In Maomurray's terms, Gibbon conceived of his freedom
as hinging upon a system of co-operation rather than upon a unity
of fellowship. Of. Macmurray, op, oit«t p. 102; also -appendix 59.
2 "Britain, perhaps, is the only powerful and wealthy state
wnich has ever possessed the inestimable secret of uniting the
benefits of order with the blessings of freedom" (Misc. Works, p.
S 34.
3 Ibid., p. 217.
4 IV, 177. Gf. also I, 86.
5 For a further indication of Gibbon's ideas on democracy




independence for the individual conceivable.
The menace of ecclesiasticism. —■ In view of the extent of
Giooon's devotion to this idea of personal independence, it becomes
not only understandable but inevitable that he should have ap¬
proached ecclesiastical history under the influence of this pre¬
disposition of his mind. Early in life, an experience had in¬
structed him that religion could encroach upon his independence.
The circumstances issuing out of his conversion to Catholicism,
the fact that "the gates of Magdalen College were forever shut"
2
against him, the realization that while nothing actually happened
to him other than an 'exile* to Lausanne (imposed by his own
father), still ne might have come "within the range of a state
unemancipated from eoclesiasticism" — all this conveyed to him
at an impressionable age tne idea that ecclesiasticism might be
3
incompatible with the independence of the individual.
apart from any threat of persecution, the Church impressed
Giboon as having a levelling effect, encroacning upon the real
uniqueness of the individual in far more subtle fashion, making
4
him think as everyone else thought. Gibbon felt this particular¬
ly to be a danger in the writing of eoclesiastical history; for
if he adopted the traditional assumptions of faith, the historian
1 If this was Gibbon's position, there was no such double
standard as the critic sought to account for: "Die absolute Norm
emfahl die Ereiheit, die practisohe Erfahrung einen wohltatigen
absolutismus, wo dann die Tugend des herrschers auch den Beifall
der absoluten Norm ernten konnte" (Meinecke, op. cit.. p. 251).
2 nutobiography. p. 49.
3 Ibid., p. xv.
4 Gibcon observed that revelation "in a more enlightened
age has satisfied or subdued the reason of a Grotius, a Pascal,
and a Locke" (II, 326). .
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might be exoected to come to the same conclusions as a hundred
1
otners. In this connection, Gibbon observed that the ecclesiastical
2
historians all seemed to have worn the uniform of the same regiment.
.an independent historian.— This historian was determined
to be different. lie would strike the balance. The ecclesiastical
historians had indicted all Paganism as a mass of corruption. They
had magnified the bitterness with which the first Christians were
attu.ok.eu, while betraying tneir own inability to evince any real
3
sympathy for the vast proportion of the human race. He, Gibbon,
was not one of them. He would portray the other side. He would
help to put the ledger of the centuries into more acourate and honest
order. Incidentally, as an ecolesiastical historian, he would thus
vindicate tne sense of individuality and independence which resided
within him.
a. presentiment of limits.— But was he as certain, as self
confident, on this lone and lofty perch as this discussion would
seem to suggest? Was ne indeed as uncritical of his own presup¬
positions as critics nave commonly assumed? Did he not at times
naroour doubts regarding the efficacy of the eighteenth century
attitude? Had he not at tne last come to question the capacity
of 'reason* to supply all the answers which life required?
1 Bee IV, 71, for an estimate of the effects of "credulity
and submission.
2 Cf. Misc. works, p. 754. Elsewhere he had written, "In¬
fallible authority allows not the faculties of the mind fairplay."
There are "various degrees of slavery .... The faith of the Pa¬
gan is light and easy, ... of the Christian binding and compre¬
hensive" (GiDbon, "Hints," No. X., op. cit., p. 196).
3 Actually, Gibbon argued, "The Christians, in the course
of tneir intestine dissensions, have inflicted far greater severi¬
ties on each other than they . . . experienced from the zeal of
infidels" (II, 147).
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One critic has surmised as much: "Once the doubt came to
him in looking bacx on nis life wors, in the midst of the pride of
reason, whetner ne had not in himself rooted out some flower of the
1
imagination, some pleasant errors with the weeds of prejudice."
The critic philosophized, "It was a quite gentle contact with cur¬
rents which were commencing to move contemporaries, an intimation




By way of retrospect, it may De observed that the argument
of tnis Chapter nas follov^ea certain easily traceable lines. It
has been contended tnat GiDDon's attitude towards ecclesiastical
history was not inspired by a specific animus or antagonism. This
contention was supporteu by citing his conception of history and
his purpose to maintain a standpoint of detachment, by indicating
that his early life did not produce bitter or hostile sentiments
on the subject of religion, and by recalling his readiness to
recognize the positive aspects of Christianity. It was seen also
that his irony, which has been considered the most objectionable
feature of nis History, sprang from nis detachment; that it was a
general weapon; and while it indicated the presence of a bias, it
did not imply a particular spite against the Church.
Giboon's attitude towards ecclesiastical nistory, it was
argued, is to be understood ratner in the light of a general feeling
for life which was in evidence over the total range of his experience
1 Meinecxe, op. cit.. p. 255. The translation is the
present writer's. For the critic's own words, see appendix 59.
2 Ibid.
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ana observation. Understandably, the historian applied tnis to
the materials of ecclesiastical history.
prominent in this wider outlooic was Giboon's attachment to
the anoient Empire, wnich has been rightly regarded as the one great
enthusiasm of his life. This was established by the circumstance
of a youthful interest in classical studies, confirmed by an early
visit to the site of the ancient capital, and expanded in the years
of maturity. It was further reflected in an attitude of indifference
and apparent obliviousness to the world of his own day, and by a
recognition that upon the greatness of his subject, his own claim
to fame lay. ^nd it was argued tnat his treatment of Christianity
must be traced against tne bacisground of his interest in all the
factors involved in Horned decay and fall rather than on the common
and erroneous supposition that he had singled out Christianity as
the chief cause of the catastrophe.
Equally a part of this general feeling for life, it was con¬
tended, was a coxifidence in reason, shared with his eighteenth cen¬
tury contemporaries. This confidence, combined vith a sensational¬
ist epistemology, betrayed nim into a dogmatic and unscientific re¬
jection of religious reality which failed to conform to his arbi¬
trary standards of measurement. But tne same predisposition promp¬
ted nim bo pioneer in tne attempt to trace the 'human' factors in¬
volved in the rise of Christianity, and by the irohic device of
uescrioing them as 'secondary' causes, ne was formally preserved
from a dogmatic and scientifically unsupporcable dismissal of the
Supernatural and its role in history, as usually has characterized
rationalist histories, even tnough it might be argueu that this was
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the real intent of his work. Equally in evidence in his treatment
of ecclesiastical history was his effort to uncover the underlying
motives of human behaviour.
It was seen also that distaste for enthusiasm was a perva¬
sive factor in the historian*s mentality, influencing his outlook
on many subjects. The application to Christianity appeared to be
natural and inevitable. Gib con asserteu that Christian enthusiasm
instigated profitless and pointless ecclesiastical controversy. (It
was pointed out that Gibbon was on questionable ground when, as an
historian, ne attempted to pass tne judgements of a theologian.)
Zeal and enthusiasm, he further contended, led to disillu¬
sionment, to a compromise of truth, to an undermining of morality,
and finally to an upsurge of intolerance. This latter charge was
examined in the light of the views of later historians, and a vindi¬
cation of Gibbon was indicated.
The final item in the wider outlook was identified as a
concern to defend the independence of tne individual from all en¬
croachments. This was illustrated in his approach to a number of
subjects including his seemingly contradictory attitude towards the
state. Tne historian's conviction that ecclesiasticism could be a
further source of such encroachment was another factor in producing
an able ana articulate critic.
1 By this device, in other words, the all-important possi¬
bility was kept open, the possibility tnat the Divine may have
acted in human history.
CHaPTHK V
CONCLUSION
Gibbon was reluctantly acclaimed by Newman as the greatest
of the ecclesiastical historians. That verdict has been challenged
in recent years, so much so, that even a friendly editor could sug¬
gest tnat in this area, Gibbon's work can no longer be regarded as
reliable. What final estimate does the present inquiry warrant?
In what sense was Giboon's treatment of ecclesiastical history de¬
fensible? Wherein do its most significant weaknesses and defi¬
ciencies lie? Can any permanent importance be attached to his work?
a Defensible Approach
It has been indicated tnat despite some lapses, Giboon at¬
tempted to provide a scientific approach to ecclesiastical history.
By its very nature, science must restrict itself to a description
and analysis of observable things. It must be content with the
kind of evidence wnich it is able to evaluate. This means that the
scientific historian is not to trace the presence or the activity
of the Supernatural in nistory. His is the more mundane task of
ascertaining the observaDle interconnections of events.
application to ecclesiastical history.— But is this ap¬
proach permissible in the treatment of eoclesiustioal history?
Today, Unristian historians contend that in the field of history




attitude. What aroused so much antagonism in Giboon's time is
no longer a live issue. By common consent, it is acknowledged that
the materials are available for a natural, human account of the
rise of Christianity. What G-iboon calieu 'secondary' causes are
clearly traceable; and sociological surveys of the development of
the early Church have, in fact, become a commonplace.
Thus in analysing the triumph of Christianity over the Em¬
pire, Gibbon was fundamentally right in refusing to be concerned
with the 'why' of the event and in concentrating on 'how' it hap¬
pened. as a critical historian, it was not for him to argue that
a satisfactory explanation of the triumph of the Gospel must finally
2
include the agency of the bupernatural, even though conceivably
3
this might be true. Had he been a believer and ascribeo. the oc¬
currence to the guiding hand of Providence, his work would have had
no significance as a critical study. His task, it must be recalled,
was to provide an empirical account of the elements which gave
Christianity its strength in the Roman world; and this is precisely
what he sought to do.
Criticism based upon a misconception.— It would appear
that the major attack upon Gibbon has resulted from the refusal of
1 See e.g., Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations,
p. 107; also, Appendix 60. *
2 He did assert this (II, 2), but the statement can only be
interpreted ironically.
3 a Christian writer has demanded, "Can the events of the
Exodus from Egypt or the events associated with the life and death
and resurrection of Jesus Christ be so accounted x'or by the modern
historian that he has no need of that hypothesis [that they happened
according to the will and through the power and guidance of a Divine
Being]} ?" Of. Aran Ricnardson, Christian Apologetics (London: LGM
Press, 1947), p. 91. This argument has suggested tnat a critical
historian can point neither to the need nor to the lack of need,
that this hypothesis does not properly come within his sphere at
all.
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critics to take account of the necessary limitation of a scientific
inquiry. The common oharge has oeen that in his treatment of ttie
Christian Churcn, Giboon failed to appraise tne 'spiritual1 factor.
1
He missed "tne divine fire at the center." Even a contemporary
writer has comparea Gibbon's ecclesiastical history to "presenting
Hamlet without the prince," or to "a description of a watch which
r ^
says nothing of the mainspring."
But this is to introduce an element which the scientific
historian is specifically pledged not to attempt to assess. No
critical study of Christianity can be expected to analyse the con¬
tribution of its 'prince'. Gibbon rightly disavowed any such
responsibility by referring to his study as an inquiry into the
'secondary' causes of its success. Ho thus allowed full latitude
for the possible operation of a First Cause, .and the fact that
this allowance was not above the suspicion of irony, and certainly
aid not reflect the historian's personal view, did not impair its
validity in limiting the scope of his study and in keeping it with¬
in the bounds of a scientific inquiry.
Propriety of non-Christian treatment.— Nor is Giboon to
be discounted as an ecclesiastical historian because he was riot a
Christian. Jfor certain, critics have argued that a writer cannot
3
be a good historian unless he identifies himself with his subjeot.
1 John Edward Emerich acton, Essays on Church and State
(London: Hollis & Carter, 1952), p. 431.
2 Michael Joyce, Edward Gibbon, pp. 151-152.
3 Cf. e.g., D. M. Baillie, Faith in God, p. 246; H. R.
Macintosh, Types of Modern Theology, p. 5; B. Croce, Theory and
History of Historiography, p. 134. For purposes of illustration,
the latter argued, "Do you wish to understand the true history of
a blade of grass? Try to become a blade of grass" (Ibid.. p. 135).
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and tnis is a quality which cannot be claimed for Gibbon's attitude
towards ecclesiastical history. Yet one feels that a contribution
also may be made by someone who stands apart from the subject as
Gibbon did. as a contemporary critic nas observed, either under¬
standing is abstract, or it is 'lived'.
In so far as it is lived, the student will tend to identify
himself so completely with the people whom he studies, that
he will lose the point of view from which it was worthwhile
and possible to study it. What we ordinarily mean by under¬
standing ... is an approximation . . . which stops short
at the point at wnich the student would oegin to lose some
essential of his own culture.1
Thus the fact that Gibbon did not embrace Christianity could not in
itself disqualify hixa as a student of its history.
■a conc-Lusion.-- What is important is that whether he is a
Christian or not, the technical historian xaust regard his study
not as ancillary to some further objective but as an end in itself.
This inquiry has suggested that while Gibbon never identified him¬
self with Christianity, neither was his treatment marred by specific
antagonism against any aspect of it which he was able to evaluate.
On the contrary, in carrying out his essential task as a critical
historian, he sought to make his scholarship as autonomous as
possible.
Should one assume that because he was not a Christian, this
historian could muxe no significant contribution to an understanding
of Cnristian history? Would it not be wiser to conclude with the
Christian apologist: "It is possible for scholars who have no
1 T. S. Eliot, Notes Towards the Definition of Culture
(London: fader and faber, I94&), ?. 41. The critic addea: The
man who, in order to understand the inner.world of a cannibal tribe,
nas parta&en of the practice ... has probably gone too far: he
can never quite be one of his own folk again" (Ibid.. p. 41).
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personal interest in the Christian faith ... to work alongside
1
believing Christian scholars in the task of scientific research"?
Weaknesses and Deficiencies
But tnere remain vital areas in which Gibson's work must
be augmented and corrected. In his subject as in others, scholar¬
ship is coxxtinuously advancing. Its coxxciusions are forever pro-
visioxxal. Thus it is scarcely surprising that not all of the
findings of the eighteenth century historian have been acceptable
to historians ixx our own time, a. brief indication of these several
areas is necessary for a final appraisal of Gibboxi's contribution
to ecclesiastical history.
Inadequacy of his analysis.— The most searching, specific
criticism of Giooon as an ecclesiastical historian is that he did
not carry far enough his analysis of the factors involved in Chris¬
tianity's triumph over the ancient world. It is known now that
txxis was an entirely complex phenomenon vd th endless ramifications
and coxxtributing coxxsiderations, so much so, that Gibbon's famous
five causes only coxxstituted a beginning of a complete explanation.
Later historians have cited as additional factors: the
spiritual vacuum in the Empire created by conquest, and the hunger
for new units of fellowship following the breakdown of the old
activities of home rule; the primary assimilation of the Church
group to the Jewish synagogue coupled with the diffusion of Judaism;
the kinship between Christian doctrine and Hellenistic syncretism;
the wide diffusion of the Mithraic religion and the close analogies
1 Richardson, op. cit., p. 59. Of interest is the fact
that this critic used Giooon as an illustration of his contention.
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between its doctrines and those of Christianity; the extent of
economic causation underlying ecclesiastical evolution; the com¬
plexity of the process of sociological decay in the Empire which
made it powerless to resist the encroachments of a new and vital
faith.
For certain, some of these ideas were hinted at by Gibbon,
as has been suggested in Chapter Four. Cut it would appear that
the critics were right in contending that he never understood their
full significance for the process he was attempting to explain.
absence of a sympathetic attitude.— a second major weak¬
ness was one absence in GibDon's ecclesiastical history of what
contemporary historians call 'sympathetic imagination'. Granted
the propriety of writing the history of the Church from a non-
Christian standpoint; yet one feels that for purposes of historical
understanding, Gicbon might have entered far more imaginatively
than he did into a viewpoint other than his own. But he could not.
Much of his treatment of Christianity suggests that he was defi¬
cient in this quality of sympathetic imagination.
as a consequence of this limitation, Giboon was unable to
understand the 'private' influence of the Gospel upon the lives of
tnose who professed it. nnd one may assume that this was a factor
wnich conceivably aad some visiDle influence upon society and there¬
fore might properly come within the sphere of the critical his¬
torian's evaluation. It is true that Gibbon appreciated the posi¬
tive contribution made by the Church to civilization through the
centuries far more than most critics have been prepared to acknow¬
ledge; yet one does not find in his History an insignt into the
intimate life of this institution, of "the spiritual work done by
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1
humble men over the face of the earth for fifteen hundred years."
Moreover, when an historian has not looked for something and con¬
sequently nas not founa it, it becomes a simple matter to infer
that it was not there at all. These inferences were often in evi¬
dence in Giboon's survey of Christian history. The critic was
thus sustained in his contention that "Giboon's contempt for re¬
ligious feeling and belief rendered him blind to the meaning of
2
many objects which he passed during his long journey."
Unawareness of assumptions.— This inquiry has indicated
finally that in the assumptions that mark his approach to ecclesia¬
stical history, Gibbon was particularly open to criticism. It is
known, of course, from F. H. Bradley's great essay, that it is
impossible for the historian to function apart from premises and
presuppositions wnich are incapable of validation by any amount
3
of historical research. Thus critical history has certain rules,
one of these being that for its purposes, phenomena have always
been governed by laws now in operation. By common consent, it
does not deal with wholly unique events like miracles. This is
an axiom which applies to critical history. It does not prove
that miracles cannot occur, nor does it eliminate the possibility
of a special revelation. Moreover, as in modern physics, axioms
which have proven workable for centuries are sometimes challenged
by new findings, and it is found upon occasion that they must be
replaoed. One cannot thereby dispense with axioms; but they can
1 Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History, p. 13b.
2 G. P. Gooch, "The Growth of Historical Science," The
Cambridge Modern History (1910), XII, 817.
3 Cf. P. H. Bradley, The Presuppositions of Critical
His Gory (1874); also appendix 61.
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be held constantly in tneir true character as principles and not
as established facts.
Gibbon's attitude was marked by basic assumptions, but it
is not clear that he was always conscious of their status as such.
It was, for example, an assumption that knowledge was only ascertain¬
able through reason and the senses. It was an assumption that the
criteria of his judgements could be derived from the 'facts' them¬
selves. It was an assumption that since he was not a Christian and
had not succumbed to the prejudices of his orthodox predecessors,
he was therefore able to provide an unbiased, 'impartial' account
of the rise of Christianity. It was finally an assumption that
when he had traced the history of this movement, he had achieved
its final and complete explanation.
By virtue of this unawareness, Gibbon tended to slip into
rationalistic dogmatism and to eliminate the Supernatural not only
from critical history, which was proper; but from any claim upon
the consciousness of man, which was improper, having no basis other
than that it happened to be Gibbon's own belief.
It is true that he did not deny the Supernatural directly,
as has been indicated, he specifically recognized the possible
fact of a First Cause and thus formally preserved his inquiry from
rationalistic arrogance. Yet the irony was so unmistakable, and
the attitude of contempt for what could not be measured by the
critical historian was so thinly concealed, that the reader has
been left in no uncertainty regarding Gibbon's real view.
Now as alien as it may be to the Christian, thi3 view was
not objectionable in itself. It would appear that one or another
viewpoint is inevitable since, as has been suggested, it is
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impossible to approach history apart from a principle of interpre¬
tation which history itself does not yield, ^nd there is no reason
why a rationalistic interpretation of history is not as permissible
as a Christian interpretation.
But what Gibbon did was to claim the authority of critical
history for nis philosophical appraisal of Christianity. He failed
to recognize that critical history itself was neutral, that it
substantiated no single philosophy, that rather it supplied
materials which could be subjected to varied philosophical inter¬
pretation, Gibbon mistakenly supposed that his findings led in¬
evitably to a rationalist's conclusions.
it conclusion.— That supposition is the principal weakness
of Gibson's treatment of ecclesiastical history. It hua been argued
that he could not be condemned for not being a Christian, .and one
ought not to condemn him for bringing his rationalistic ideas to
his interpretation of history. But it can and must be suggested
that he failed to entertain his assumptions critically; he did not
keep them open to revision on the evidence of new insights. One
must indeed note tnat the dogmatism which Giboon rejected in its
religious expression had inserted itself, in a disguised and un¬
conscious manner, into his own attitude towards the spiritual his¬
tory of the Church.
Lasting Significance
Does Gibbon's work then possess permanent importance?
Granted that great advances have been made in his subject; granted
that in some essential respects his approach must be corrected;
still, is there a sense in which The Decline and gall remains of
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perennial interest to tne student of history*? This study would
suggest an affirmative answer.
an insight into the eighteenth century.-- Gibbon1s History
has provided the most typical and perhaps the most mature expression
of the mentality of the period. Much can be learned about the
eighteenth century, its admirations as well as its assumptions,
when one reads nis account of the antonine era, and in Gibbon's
ecclesiastical history, there is an application of Deistic thinking
to the development of a particular religion, an application wnich
is itself of historical importance, as has been suggested, each
century supplies a point of view on history wnich, while it may
not be final, is somehow unique and never to be repeated by subse¬
quent ages. For this reason, if for no other, Gibbon ought always
to be read.
The importance of more than one approach.— Gibbon's treat¬
ment of ecclesiastical history should be of special interest to
those Christians who want a more complete understanding of the his¬
tory of the Church. For if it is true that the reality of any
earthly phenomenon is a many-sided affair, that like a mountain it
may be approached from several directions and viewed from more than
one perspective, then there is not only opportunity but obvious
need for non-Christian as well as Christian appraisals of Church
1
nistory. it is important that Christianity be approached from
witnin the framework of faith, so it is important that it be ap¬
proached from without.
1 a critic has used the fine analogy of Ben Nevis; cf. C.
a. Coulson, Christianity In an Age of Science (London: Oxford Uni¬
versity Press, 1953), p. 18 ff.
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The critic, therefore, was no more correct in claiming that
it was from Tillemont ratner tnan Giobon that one might derive an
understanding of "tue spirit of the Christian empire", tnan it
woula be to argue that it was from Giboon rather than Tillemont that
1
this understanding could be gained. The history of Christianity
is complex, as Tillemont may have introduced the reader to the
intimate life of the Church in a sense that could not be derived
from Giboon, so Gibbon's book has remained a view of a side of
ecclesiastical history which orthodox historians had traditionally
failed to comprehend.
Validation by later students of Church nistory.— But in
another sense, Gibbon's periaanent importance is due to the fact
that his successors in ecclesiastical history have comprenended the
validity of the approach which he, together with Voltaire and Hume,
employed; and these later writers have altered their own treatment
of Christian history in a manner which, while not mimicing the
Enlightenment historians, unmistakably took them into account.
Perhaps the most notable effect was the recognition of the
need for complete candour in ascertaining the facts. Among scholars
of the nineteenth century, there was growing awareness that as a
matter of historical research, the facts of ecclesiastical history
did not differ from the facts of civil history; in other words,
that Gibbon's sociological approach was the only possible scientific
approach to the history of Christianity.
Thus freed from the restraints of piety, Christian his¬
torians have arrived at conclusions which are astonishingly similar
1 Dawson, op. oit.. p. 12.
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to those of Gibbon. It is now freely acknowledged, for example,
that tne Church has frequently erred, that it has often been respon¬
sible for a policy of cruel persecution, that in no sense has it
been exempt from that * downward pull of life* which has introduced
factors of cupidity and ambition into all of human history.
apologists have argued that all the faults which properly
can be laid at the door of the Church have not been able to destroy
the spirit of Christ within it; that what is amazing is that Chris¬
tianity has survived in spite of all; that Church history can be re¬
garded as a "record of frustrated hopes which were powerless to re-
1
tard tne progress of the Faith." But this argument, valid as it
may be in itself, is actually an acknowledgement of the justice of
Giboon*s general indictment, indicating that it was based not so
much upon antagonism as upon fact.
Even more astonishing is the realization that some of the
dialectical theologians of our own time, after contemplating upon
the course of the last two thousand years, have concluded that the
world since Christ came is in no sense visibly different "in a way
2
that can be traced empirically by the historians." This surely
is a view which could be derived as an inference from The Decline
and Fall far more readily tnan from the apologetic writings of
Gibson*s generation.
Granted that it probably cannot be proven that the historical
scepticism of theologians liK© Barth ana Bultmann is directly trace¬
able to the historians of the Enlightenment; yet the fact remains
1 Frederick John Foaxes Jaexson, ,a History of Church History
(Cambridge: W, Heffer & Sons, 1939), p. 11.
2 D. M. Baillie, God was in Christ (London: Faber & Faber,
1948), p. 76.
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that history is woven of one piece; and. the alteration of historical
mentality which was accomplished by Voltaire and Gibbon, no matter
how discredited in detail or even in underlying philosophy, can
never be erased from the consciousness of subsequent generations.
a contribution to the understanding of faitn.— It is con¬
tended that inadvertently Gibbon contributed to an understanding of
the real basis of Christian faith. Through the centuries there had
been a continuous tendency to rely on history as a support for faith.
In Gibson's own time, Joseph Priestley argued that the Resurrection
and the miracles of the apostolic period were supported by sufficient
evidence, that all one need do was examine, by the known rules of
estimating the value of testimony, whether the evidence of Chris¬
tianity did not stand on as good ground as that of any other history
1
whatsoever. Gibbon argued that "the faith as well as the virtue
of a Christian must be formed and fortified by the inspiration of
2
Grace."
Gibbon was right. Prom an historian's standpoint, it is
now recognized that no historical religion can be established by
trying to take from technical history the authority it possesses.
Thus wnile Gibbon was mistaken in rejecting the possibility of
miracle because it fell outside the sphere of his inquiry, he was
correct in contending that supernatural events could not be vali¬
dated by the methods of scientific history.
an even stronger argument, from the Christian standpoint,
1 Cf. Joseph Priestley, an History of the Corruptions of
Christianity (2d ed.; Birmingham: J. Thompson, 1793), II, 459.
2 Memoir C., p. 250. por current views on this subject,
see appendix 52~,
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stems from the nature of faith itself. Ear clearly, supernatural
happenings which were verifiable by tne critical historian would
eliminate the need for faith, since acceptance of them could be
assured witnout it. By contrast, Christian faith is founded upon
events in history which are interpreteu through believers* eyes.
It rests upon occurrences which have a date and a place, and are
1
therefore 'historical'; but it recognizes that the supernatural
significance of these occurrences is reserved for the supernaturally
minded.
Christian faith, in short, is not assent to empirically
verifiable, historical •facts'. It is rather a venture of life on
the supposition that one's belief about these 'facts' is true.
Nor, according to traditional theology, will this venture be made
apart from a prior prompting of the Divine Spirit.
Gibbon would undoubtedly argue that this was a case of
making virtue out of necessity. He would contend that the forces
of faith wei*e required to retreat from the field of history and
had set up their flag where critical history could no longer attack
it. He would insist that this was not the way Christians through
the centuries had looked upon the 'historical' element in their
faith.
He would not be right, an insight into the real nature of
faith has been present from the foundation of the Church, long
1 The German terms, 'historisch' and *geschichtlich* are
more helpful than the single English word 'historical*; 'historisch'
referring to what can be established by the historian's criticism
of the past; and 'geschichtlich' desoricing those happenings in
history whose meaning alone is discernible through the eyes of faith.
This is R. Bultmann's interpretation of these terms. Cf. ISerygma
and Myth, trans. Reginald Euller (London: B.P.C.iC., 1953), p. xii.
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before the emergence of critical history. The earliest Gospel
asserted it. St. Paul claimed that no one could say Jesus is Lord
1
except by the Holy Spirit. To Christ, it would have been incon¬
ceivable that things of tne spirit could be apprehended apart from
the believing mind. Through the intervening years, the Church has
officially maintained this understanding apart from whatever current
attitudes towards history happened to be.
Yet it is also true that the Hew Testament conception of
faith had often been lost, and the illusion had grown that Chris¬
tianity as an historical religion should be historically verifiable;
that the Supernatural's role in history ought in some sense to be
evident for all to see.
Is it too muoh to suggest that a halt to this disastrous
tendency and a return to the real, spiritual character of the ven¬
ture of faith, was aided inadvertently by men like Giobon who, while
they tnemselves could not believe, saw more clearly than many be¬
lievers what could not be the basis of faith?
In conclusion.— There is a wise saying that God need not
grudge even his enemies their virtues. These words could be applied
to Edward Giboon, the ecclesiastical historian. By tracing the
history of the Church in all its essentially human character, he
performed a service which may linger long after men have forgotten
the source from which it came.
1 I Corinthians 12:3«
AFPEHDIX
iiDDITlOiiaL WOTES BY THE WkITJSH
1. The role of the historian in History,
J. B. Bury, who had. claimed that history is no more and
no less than a science, admitted in 1907 that "History is, in the
last resort, somebody's image of the past, and the image is con¬
ditioned by the miiid and experience of the person who forms it"
(Autobiography, p. xiv). This view has been echoed many times
since. Perhaps there has Deen no clearer statement than that by
Fritz Medicus in an article "On the Objectivity of Historical Xnow-
ledge," Philosophy and History, p. 154; "Wherever historical re¬
search is exerciseu, there it is done on the basis of the personal
history of the man who is striving after such knowledge."
2. General characteristics of the eighteenth century.
It has been claimed that in the history of human thought,
there has been no more ambiguous term than 'nature'* That asser¬
tion is easily illustrated in tne eighteenth century. At one point
there was a disposition po equate the laws of nature and the laws
of 'reason' and to argue that these laws would be acknowledged as
just and right by all men, just like axioms of ma taenia tics. But
this characterized tne early part of the period. Towards the close
of the century, the teuaency was to identify nature with man's in¬
stincts and emotions. It would appear however that Gibbon leaned
towards the earlier view. Sixailarly, it has been claimed that
historically, nature referred to things as they now are or have
become, wnereas philosophically, it meant things as they may become.
Of. Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background, p. 108. Both of
tnese meanings were present in the thought of Gibbon.
Critics have mistakenly assumed that the age had revolted
"not only against the power of institutionalized religion, but
against religion as such" (Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 76).
In his summary of the thought of Voltaire and Hume, whom he argued
were the typical expressions of the period's outlook, the critic
stated their view thus: "It [religion] was sheer error, due to
the unscrupulous and calculating hypocrisy of a class of beings
called priests, who . . . invented it to serve as an instrument of
domination over the masses of men" (Ibid., p. 77). But there is a
question how representative tnese writers were. The seventeenth
century had been a time of great transition whLch had challenged
men's faith in the Supernatural. Out of it had emerged a mood of
uncertainty and a disposition to challenge traditional assumptions;
this mood may nave been an embarrassment to religion, but that
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embarrassment need not be interpreted as open hostility. Of.
Butterfielu, Gnristianity in European iiistory. p. 36 ff.
3. Tne Enlightenment idea of history.
Groce contended that Voltaire was the typical expression of
Enlightenment historiography, and he summarized Voltaire*s approaon
thus: "It is not for history ... to tr«ce human splendour and
miseries, but only ... manners and arts, that is, . . . the posi¬
tive work." But was this "the principal object of all historic
labours of the period" (Theory and History of historiography, p.
245)? It is difficult to understand how 'this generalisation could
include Gibbon, the historian of "the crimes, follies, and misfor¬
tunes" of mankind (I, 84).
In the autobiography (p. 179)» Gibbon nad written, "History
is the most popular species of writing, since it can adapt itself
to the highest or lowest taste." But not everyone shared this view
as is indicated by this quotation by Boswelifrom Dr. Johnson: "Great
abilities are not requisite for an historian; for in historical
composition ail the greatest powers of tne human mind are quiescent.
He has facts ready to his hand; so tnere is no exercise of inven¬
tion • . ." ana John Bailiie, who cited this passage (The Belief
in Progress, p. lo5), arguea that "this was the notion of history
generally prevailing in the English empirical tradition of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries" (Ibid.). Bosweli further re¬
ported a bit of dialogue: "Johnson remarked: 'all the colouring,
aii the pniiosophy of history is conjecture.* BJSWJSUL; 'Then . .
. you would reduce all history to no better than alraanacic.' Mr.
Gibbon, . . . was present; but he did not step forth in defence of
that species of writing. He probably did not li&e to trust himself
with Johnson." But Bosweli was scarcely a trustworthy reporter, at
least on Giboon, whom he despised.
4. The Deistic approach to religion.
The Deists depended upon 'reason* as an infallible guide
in religion, but it was never specifically defined. What was it?
"The common assumption was that everyone Jsnew. In each human mind
tnere is to be found an ascertainable outfit of intellectual, moral
and religious convictions whose validity is a matter of universal
agreement" (Macintosh, Types of Modern TaeoloRy. p. 16).
The age was not consistent in the application of its scepti¬
cism, and this fact led to curious discrepancies, as a critic has
argued, "Tnere was notning which shaoicied the imagination in the
time-honoured legend of miraculous assistance vouchsafed to the
Hebrew Joshua. But it wa3 no more believed that the same power
would help the strategy of Marlborough" (Btephen, English Thought.
X, 178) • -and Ganon Haven observed (Science and Religion, p. 1/0),
"It is ... a clear indication of tne lethargy of the eighteenth
century that ... there had not been a clash over Genesis." The
critic argued that the age had the materials for such questioning
in tne studies of fossils made by Hay, but that it failed to grasp
the obvious implications.
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5. The Impact of external circumstances.
Gibbon's father was not sympathetically portrayed in the
Memoirs, tne Journal, or the Correspondence* One senses a great
gulf between the generations. The picture the son provided was of
a man uneasy and inconstant, usually good nutured, but given to
moments of harshness, moroseness, and unreasoning obstinacy. Gib¬
bon had no difficulty seeing his father's likeness in tne 'flatus'
of W. Laws' oerious Call. See Memoir -a.. p. 382.
Oxford registered an impression upon Giboon which, in its
negativeness, would be aifficult to equal and impossible to exceed.
"Of ail tne years of my life, tne fourteen months ... at Oxford
were most completely lost for every purpose of improvement" (Memoir
C., p. 225). lie observed tnat tnis was an ecclesiastical institu¬
tion; yet "witnout a single lecture . . . Christian or .Protestant,
I was left by the dim light of my catechism to grope my way to the
chapel" (autobiography, p. 45) • The main method of teaching was
by tutoring; yet in Giboon's case, "Or. well rememberea that he
nad a salary to receive and only forgot tnat he had a duty to per¬
form" (Ibid., p. 44). One critic has argued that part of the dif¬
ficulty was in Giboon himself, citing as 'proof' a statement by one
of Giboon's instructors (a John Byrom) to the effect that "Gibbon
is so slow" (Meredith Read, Historic Studies, II, 266). But ther e
is nothing either in Giooon's later achievement or in his early re¬
cord to substantiate this supposition; whereas tnere is much that
supports "the presumptuous belief that neither my temper nor my
talents were averse to the lessons of science" (Memoir C., p. 225).
The same critic contended (p. 348) that "for the sake of
Gibbon and the world at large, it was a great misfortune that he
did not marry Suzanne Curchod, arguing that "the purity and eleva¬
tion of ner characx-er" and "her deeply religious nature" would have
moulded him "in a spiritual direction." But one wonders what would
nave nappened to the distinctive euge of the History had he become
a devout Cnristian. xuaotaer critic (1). M. Low, Ldward Gibbon,
1737-1794), has suggested that the lady herself was not above re-
proaon, and that the promptness of ner marriage to another indi¬
cates tnat ner own heart was not too deeply iirvolved in tne affair.
Gibbon often indicated a derogatory attitude towards women,
whom he identified as the chief supporters of superstition; and
ironic tribute was paid to "the sex most prone to devotion" (V,
295)• At times, the jibe was direct and open; e.g., "... God
and tne ladies (I blush to unite such discordant names)" (II, 293)•
Perhaps it was this attitude wnich prompted Porson's famous comment:
"Nor does his humanity ever slumber, except when women are ravished
or the Christians persecuted" (Letters to Mr. archdeacon Travis,
p. xxviii).
While the main impact of his travels was undoubtedly posi¬
tive, some of the effects may not have been beneficial. Thus a
critic (quennell, Four Portraits, p. 103), charged that Gibbon's
early visit to Venice ana the distaste he acquired there for the
traces of Byzantium with which that city was encrusted, were responsi¬
ble for his failure to do justice to the eastern empire. The
failure adequately to treat the eastern empire is a fact; but this
explanation of the oause of it is hardly more than a conjecture.
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Tiie importance of tne military service to the future his¬
tories is supported, by the testimony of a modern critic (H. Tem-
periey, Kesearoh and Modern History, p. 5); in contrasting the
several bases "of soeptloism of Nero*s famous march to the Metaurus,
this writer observed tnat whereas Macauley based his position on
internal evidence, "Gibbon was able to point out that a march of
two hundred forty miles in six days or an average of about forty
miles per day was far beyond the capacity of any modern army. Gib¬
bon had tramped with the militia over the muddy roads in Kent and
Hampshire," The critic added, "Had Muoauley ever been a captain of
the Hampsnire grenadiers, he would have known of better arguments
than those he used."
6. The individuality of the historian.
It has been uptiy observed that "historians are born, not
manufactured." The same writer (G, M. Trevelyan, Gilo, Muse,
p. 195), assex*ted, "The young historian must depend • ". . on his
own initiative for which no organization of research and no kind¬
ness of older persons can ever provide a substitute."
Tuere is a possibility of over-estimatixig GiDbon's inde¬
pendence of his age. Thus /*. H. Thompson (Giooon. p. 9) has as¬
serted, "In the whole nistory of English literature, there is no
figure wnich is so entirely isolated from external influence, so
sufficient to itself as that of Gibbon." Hut in view of the his¬
torian^ reflection of so many of the altitudes and assumptions of
the age, it is difficult to see how this statement can be substan¬
tiated.
Giooon was entirely sceptical regarding the lasting effects
of preaching. He observed, "The preaoher will dismiss hi3 assembly
full of emotions, which a variety of other objects, the coldness
of our northern constitution, and no immediate opportunity of their
exerting tneir good resolution, will dissipate in a few moments"
(Journal, p. 127)«
The historian's approach to the study of languages iilu-
stx'atea the metnodioal bent of his mind. He reported that he would
translate some passage of Latin or French into the opposite lan¬
guage; then, after putting the original text out of his memory, he
would return his copy into the primitive idiom, comparing its de¬
fects "with the ease and grace of the original," and repeat the
practice until he had acquired mastery not only of the externals
but of the taeory and inner workings of Latin and French ooiapo3l-
tion (^utobio&rapny, p. ofe).
Tiie variety of Gibson's information was almost endless. ~n
examination of nis unpublished papers in the Manuscript Koom of the
British Museum indicates an interest in such unrelated subjects as
the belief in immortality among one primitive peoples of Mexico,
and the identity of the man in tne iron mask (whom he believed to
be the bustard of .unne of Austria and Cardinal Mazarin). mnd in
Miscellaneous works, there are comments upon "the height of the
Chimborazo, the temperature of molten iava, the batoning of eggs,
the habits of bees and fishes, the plants of Switzerland, the cli¬
mate of Siberia and Iceland" (citea by Black, The -art of History,
p. 156).
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"It has always been my practice," Gibbon wrote, "to oast
a long paragraph in a single mould., to try it by my ear, to deposit
it in my memory, but to suspend the action of the pen til I had
given the last polish to my work" (1artobiography, p. 185).
7. The meaning of * philosophy of history*.
To illustrate Troeltsch's distinction between two major
types of philosophy of history: the classical example of the meta¬
physical conception was 8t. Augustine; and a contemporary repre¬
sentative was Benadetto Croce with his theory of developmentalism.
Groce contended that the fundamental reality of history and of nature
and of the world is spirit (History of historiography, p. 312).
But ne also argued that tnere was no philosophy of history "in the
sense of a pre-determined plan or of an hegelian dialectic" (His¬
tory of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, p. 112). There was only
a pattern which followed "the central eternal truth of liberty."
n. contemporary exponent of the empirical approach is G. H. Renier;
of. his History, Its Purpose and Method. But Troeltsch's bi-partite
distinction has not been acceptable to "all; thus Gollingwood (op.
cit., p. 1) arguea that "a third use of the phrase is found in
several nineteenth century positivists for whom the philosophy of
history was the discovery of general laws governing the course of
events which it was history's business to record." But even inthe
limited, empirical sense, the phrase has still been attacked; the
contention was that it contained 'incongruity1 and 'superfluity'
since tne conception of history already involved philosophy, "nor
can one philosophize without referring to events which are his¬
torical" (Croce, History as the Story of Liberty, p. 140). For an
exposition of the general topic, cf. Raymond iron's article on "The
Philosophy of History" in the Chambers Encyclopaedia.
Professor Paul Tillich wrote: "In dealing with the philo¬
sophy of history, it is impossible to avoid the Christological
problem. History and Christology belong to one another as do
question and answer" (Religiose Verwirklichung, citeu by J. Baillie,
Our knowledge of God, p. 186). What is meantis that one cannot
approach history apart from a principle of interpretation; the his¬
torian must either accept or reject Christ as the center of his¬
tory; tnus Christ is or is not the historian's principle for judging
history, a fact which involves him inevitably in the Christological
question. This is undoubtedly true but useless for apologetic pur¬
poses. The same claim could be made for Marxism; either one accepts
or rejects a Marxist interpretation of history; thus does not the
relationship between history and Marxism become equally indissoluble?
Giboon would have had similar objections to the contention advanced
by D. M. Baillie in God was in Christ (p. 71): "History has no
ultimate meaning . . . unless some temporal point or points in it
can be found to possess an absolute significance in the 'prophetic'
or 'esohatological' sense . . ." Gibcon undoubtedly would have re¬
plied, 'then history has no ultimate meaning.'
8. Gibbon's methodology of history.
Christian scholars have agreed that to seek freedom from
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preconceptions Is a worthy aim for a critical historian, alan
Kicnardson (Christian apologetics, p. 104) argued, "The historian
neither starts nor ends with a philosophy of history, and he has no
interest in making facts fit into preconoeivea theories." and Her¬
bert riutterfieid (History and Human Halations. p. 101) concurred:
"The technical historian is"willing to jettison for the time being
his private views and personal evaluation. He performs an act of
self-emptying in order to seek tne Rind of truth waioh does not go
furtner than tne tangible evidence warrants . . • the Rind of truths
wnich the evidence forces us to believe whether we liRe it or not."
Giboon*s devotion to * truth* was refieoteu in many state¬
ments: "i.xuct and impartial, he [the historian] yields only to
that authority wnich is the rationale of facts"; (Misc. works. p.
043) l "n strict and inviolable adherence to truth is the foundation
of everytning virtuous and honourable in human nature" (Ibid.. p.
713); friend to truth, he aeeRs only for those Rinds of truth
that are appropriate to his subject, and with these he is content"
(Ibid.. p. 642).
The distinction Giboon made between history and chronicle
aid not lead aim to Macauley*s conclusion that "facts are the mere
dross of history. It is from the abstract truth that interpene¬
trates tnem and lies latent among them, that the mass derives its
value" (Macauley*s Works. p. 31» cited by Lord i%oton, Lectures on
Modern History, p. 321). fur Gibbon, tnere was no abstract truth
in history, but only concrete truths; he was merely acKnowleuging
that these iaoter were not of equal importance, and for tnis reason
alone, were not in themselves sufficient for tne writing of history.
On tne other nana, recognition of the distinction is sufficient to
suggest the over-simplification of Coleridge in contending: "Ideas
alone without facts would be mere philosophy; facts alone without
ideas of wuioh taese facts are symbols would be mere history" (Table
TalR. citea by acton, loid.. p. j2b). It might oe rewarding to
mukq a study of the use of the word *mere*, *mere* man, *mere*
reason, 'mere* history, to convey loadeu judgements wnich often are
not nearly as obvious as is iiaplieu. an adequate answer to Coler¬
idge is available in Croce* s comment: "Ordinary history is already
philosophical history. It contains philosopny inside itself in the
shape of predicates to its judgements" (History of Historiography.
P. 207). "
Ernst Troaltsoh struggled with the problem of the proper re¬
lationship between the materials of history and the principle of
their evaluation. He wrote: "'we are confronted by a logical cycle,
ne must interpret history by the degree to which it approximates
ethical values, and at the same time we must derive these ethical
values from history. The difficulty can be solved only by the
thinker*a own conviction and certainty that amid facts, he has
really recognised [one wonders how he can ever be sure] the tenden¬
cies that make for ethical ideals, and that he has truly disoerned
the dynamic movement and progressive tendency of the historic pro¬
cess" CHlstoriographyj'op. clt.. p. 722). x«.gainst this, it may be
argued tuat "the historical judgement i3 not related to value in
general but always to a concrete and specific form of value, vary¬
ing according to the general conception of the epoch {hid the particu¬
lar cultural oackgraund of the historian* (iU.ibuns.vy, -uroicle in
Philosophy aiiu Hi scary, p. j35) •
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The tendency of modern thought has been to regard the
materials of history and the principle of their evaluation not only
as associated but as insenarable. Croce (History as the Story of
Liberty, p. 22) wrote: "In those works of history in which the
standards of interpretation are fitted to the facts to be inter¬
preted, so that a single life pulsates, the facts and the theory
demonstrate each other." Moreover, technical historians continue
to insist upon the primary importance of the concrete materials of
history. One critic described them as "the yardstick that would
have given them [the historians bent on theorizing] the measure of
their loss" (Butterfield, The Study of Modern History, p. 10).
Gibbon's attitude of aloof superiority provoked share re¬
proaches from critics: Charles Oman (Memories of Victorian Oxford,
p. 160) contended, "Occasionally one meets with a book written from
the point of view of a superior person, who looks uoon the motions
of mankind with the sort of feeling with which we watch the appar¬
ently objectless activity of insects. Gibbon had this sort of mem-
tality." a. H. Thompson (Gibbon, p. 12) wrote, "His coldness of
disposition became a tranauiiity' superior to tne assaults of pas¬
sion." And Gollingwood (The New Leviathan, o. 357) called Gibbon
"hardheaded."
9. The historian on human nature.
It has been suggested that human nature was conceived of
'substantiallistically', as though it were something static, "an
unvarying substratum underlying the course of historical changes
and all human activities" (Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 82).
But can it be claimed that the real purpose of history, for the
eighteenth century, was not to record and learn facts, but to dis¬
cover "the general nature of man"? Cf. Willey, op. cit.. p. 83.
At any rate, in this generalization, it would be difficult to in¬
clude Gibbon's primary passion to 'ascertain the facts'.
Gibbon was appealing to the moral core in man when he argued
that "the man who will not expose his life in defence of children
has lost the first energies of nature" (VII, 181).
In an effort to provide a 'human' explanation for the mor¬
ality of the early Church fathers and the growth of ecclesiastical
government, the historian asserted that there were two natural human
* propensities', the love of pleasure and the love of action. Since
the former was repressed by rigid Christian moralisra, the latter, in¬
tensified by the stifling of the pleasure impulse, found an adeauate
outlet in the organization of the Church (II, 37). At times, his
interpretation of human motivation was entirely mechanistic: "The
mechanical operation of sounds, by quickening the circulation of
blood and spirits, will act on the human machine more forcibly than
the eloquence of reason and honour" (VII, 199). And beneath the
surface of humanity, he saw natural factors constantly in operation:
'In the vigour of health, his [the barbarian's] practice will contra¬
dict his belief, until the pressure of age or sickness, or calamity,
awakens his terrors, or compels him to satisfy the double debts of
piety and remorse" (VII, 224). There are also instances in which
he noted the tendency of human beings to emulate national character¬
istics. Thus in his discussion of the impact of Christianity upon
Paganism, he observed: "The natives of Syria and Egypt abandoned
their lives to lazy and contemplative
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devotion; Home again aspired to tne dominion of the world" (VI,
115).
Critics nave contended (e.g., Toynbee, Tne Study of History,
abr. p. 260) that Gibbon did not realize that the decline of tne
Empire was inherent in its rise; yet the historian had written:
"Injury will produce hatred, and hatred will find the opportunity
of revenge" (IV, 104). Again, "All conquest must be ineffectual
unless it could be universal, since the increasing circle must be
involved in a larger sphere of hostility" (V, 310). Emphasis upon
the moral element in history is equally evident; thus he cited the
remorse of Constans which "pursued him by land and sea, by day and
night" (V, 189). Of Montasser, he wrote: "In a reign of six months,
he found only the pangs of a guilty conscience" (VI, 50). Likewise,
the path of ambition was weighed and found wanting: "He ^ndronicus
the Younger gathered the fruits of ambition, but the taste was
transient and bitter." Again, Frederick advanced on a career of
triumph til he was unfortunately drowned in a petty torrent" (VI,
345). Hut from this awareness, Giboon did not proceed to^concep-
tion of history as a moral teacher, nor would ne have subscribed
to acton's contention that the achievement of history was to develop,
perfect, and arm tne conscience.
10. His idea of the unity of history.
That Gibbon succeeded in conveying the impression of his¬
tory's essential unity is suggested by the concessions of critics:
"The initial merit of Gibbon's book is its recognition of the con¬
tinuity of history" (Thompson, op. cit., p. 13). "Mannigfaltigkeit
und Einheit zugleich dieser Volkergemeinschaft wurden, wie von
Ranke, so auch schon von Gibbon freudig bemerkt" (Meinecxe, op. oit.«
p. 249). "It was his immortal achievement to show how the Roman
Empire lived on" (George Gooch, "Historiography," The Chambers
Encyclopaedia).
if retrogression was actually Gibbon's 'guiding idea', it
suggests a fundamental difficulty in classifying him. ifor the
eighteenth century has been heralded as the age of complacency, and
its belief in the constantly progressive operation of the good prin¬
ciple, is held to be expressive of that mood. Gf. J". Baillie, Tne
Belief in .Progress. p. 46, ff., for an exposition of the various
manifestations of this belief in the late eighteenth century. Yet
here was a supposedly 'typically eignteenth century historian sound¬
ing tne uiscordant note. The attempt to classify Giboon has led to
other strange conclusions. Eueter (Histor1pgraphie. p. 363) listed
him as belonging to "Die Schule Voltaires in England"; whereas
Giooon's contempt for Voltaire has already been indicated, ^nd
Algernon Cecil identified nim as one of Eix Oxford Thinkers; what
possible influence Oxford had upon Gibbon has esoaped the attention
of this writer. Gf. Chapter One and Appendix 3.
Home passages of the History clearly attest to the historian's
confidence in progress: e.g., "The monuments of art may be destroyed
at a single blow, but the immortal mind is renewed by the copies of
the pen" (VII, 122). "The fabric of science might be destroyed,
but the more useful and necessary arts would certainly survive"
Ia3
(Ibid., p. 209) • "The invention of the art [of printing] derides
tne havoc of time and barbarians" (Ibid,. p. 207)•
Similar in onaraoter were the expressions of nis optimism:
"Partial evexxts oannot essentially injure our general state of hap¬
piness • • , • The experience of four thousand years should enlarge
our hopes and diminish our apprehensions. We cannot determine to
what neights the human species may aspire in their advances to¬
wards perfection; cut it may safely be presumed that no people,
unless tae fact of nature be changed, will relapse into their
original barbarism" (IV, 17b, 160).
J", Baillie (op. cit,« p. 21) wrote: "Lucretius, Seneca,
ot. ^ugustine • • . ail toos what moderns would regard as a pessi¬
mistic view of the general course of our mortal life, yet each had
u.is own solace, finding something good to wnich his soul might
cleave."
Lois Whitney (Prlmitlvism mod the Idea of Progress) has
argued that eighteenth century English noveiists subscribed to the
idea of progress and to theories of human perfectivility and at tne
same time held to theories of the superiority of primitive man and
of man's natural goodness. The further contention was that this
confusion was xiot only evidenced in the novelists, e.g., Charlotte
Smith, cut was a part of the mentality of the period.
11. Qiboon and the conception of Providence.
as pervasive as Gibooxi's irony wu3, some of his statements
about God appear to nave been perfectly straignt-forward. Thus xie
observed: "Tne God of nature nas written hi3 existence in all his
worxs" (V, 3b2). "The unity of God is an idea most congenial to
nature and reason" (Ibicuj and in tne Kssai. he had cited "the cor¬
rect, simple, and universal feeling tnat there is a power superior
to mankind" (misc. works, p. 6o2).
The historian complained of the heedlessness "of tne pro-
pnet Jesus" to the call "to avenge the impious mockery of his name
ana religion1'' (VII, 15G). *oid he observed sardonically, "Their
divixxe patroness was deaf to tneir entreaties" (Ibid., p. 19b),
The only possible inference was that "from the vicissitudes of suc¬
cess, the monarchs [and religious devotees as well] mignt learn to
suspect that heaven was xieutral in their quarrel" (VX, P55).
Illustrative of adam Smith's contention about salutary
effects flowing from selfish causes was Gibbon's argument that
"among the causes that undermined the Gothic edifice, a conspicuous
place must be allotted to the crusades" (VI, 465); and yet the
crusades were responsible for the emancipation of the poor: "The
conflagration wnich destroyed the tail and barren trees of the for-
rest gave air to the vegetation of the smaller and nutritive plants
of the soil" (Ibid.) But could it not equally be argued that evil
can emerge out of good? Of. Butterfieid, Christianity and History,
p. 36 ff., for illustration of this supposition. One suspects that
only a Being with insight greater than man's, even greater tnan a
philosophic nistorian's, can finally assess the significance of any
event in nistory.
Is not a sense of providential deliverance suggested by tne
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following: "Greece might nave been overwhelmed, with her schools
emu libraries, before Europe had. emergen from the delude of our-
oarism; tue seeds of science migat nave been scattered by the winds
before the Italian soil was prepared for their cultivation" (VII,
122) ?
12. The historian and his predecessors.
The problem of the proper relationship between the historian
mid his predecessors has occupied contemporary students of history.
Coilingwood (The Idea of History, p. 238) has argued against the con¬
ception of history out of external authorities: "as he [the his¬
torian] becomes more and more master of his craft and hi3 subject,
tney [tne predecessors] beoome less and less his authorities, and
more and more his fellow students, to be treateu with respect or con¬
tempt according to taeir deserts." He furtner argued that there was
no suea tning as an "authority" in the traditional sense, that even
when an nistoriun accepted what his preueoesaors told him, he ac-
oaptea it "not on their authority out on nis own, not because they
say it, out oeoause it satisfies his criteria of historical truth."
miu one critic (Groce, History as the Story of Liberty, p. 61) has
claimed onat evidence doe3 not exist apart x'rom tils evaluation;
"History is b^aed on a syntnesis of two tilings vhich exist only in
that syntnesis, evidence ana criticism."
13• General features of Giooon1s treatment*
Tne nistorian often acknowledged his dependence upon his
predecessors: "Hor may the artist hope to equal or surpass til he
has learned to imitate the work of his predecessors" (VII, ld7). "I
have never denleu ... my obligation to modern glasses, more
especially to tne incomparable microscope of Tillemont" (Memoir K..
p. 303)* "I am not ashamed to confess myself the grateful disciple
of the impartial Mosheim" (Misc. Works, p. 748). «nd as he entered
into the discussion of theologioai history, he observed, "In the
contemplation of a remote object, I am not ashamed to borrow the
aid of tne strongest glasses" (V, 103, note).
That Gibbon had a sense of great difficulty in recovering
the essentials of early ecclesiastical history is indicated by the
following: "The obscure and imperfect origin of the western churches
has been so negligently recorded that if we would relate the manner
of tueir foundation, we must supply the silence of antiquity . . •
with legends . • ." (II, 67). again, "Without descending into a
minute scrutiny of tue expressions or the motives of those writers
who * • • record the progress of Christianity in the east, it may
oe observed tnat none of them have left us any grounds from which a
just estimate can oe formed" (Ibid.. p. o2).
14. The handling of Tiilemont una Mosheim.
One of the most common uses wnich Gibcon made of Tiliemont
was to support a contention by citing nis predecessor's references
to authoritative writings of antiquity. Thus he obsei'ved, "according
to the Donatists, whose assertion is confirmed by the tacit acknow-
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ledgment of Augustine, Africa was tne last of the provinces which
received the gospel" (II, 66, note). Tillemont had written, "Les
Donatistes pretendoient que L'Afrique avoit receu la foy, au la
derniere, ou au moins l'une des dernieres. S. ^ugustin le^confirme
plutoit que de le nier . . . Tertullien dit aussi que les Eglises
d'^frique estoient posterieures a celles de Grece fonaees par les
.apostres ou par des homines apostoliques. Et on tire la iaesme cho3e
de quelque endroits de S. nugustin. (On ne trouve rien de l'-afrique
dans l'histoire de I'Eglise que sur la fin du deuxieme siecle.)"
Cf. M. henain Tillemont, Memoires pour servir a ikHistoire Ecclesia-
stique des six Premiers Siecles, I, 525• Interesting also are the
Instances in which Gibbon not only reproduced tne substance of what
Tillemont wrote, hut also almost translated the very words and
phrases of nis predecessor. E.g., Gibbon wrote, "The bishops were
obliged to check and to censure the forward zeal of the Christians,
who voluntarily threw tnemselves into the hands of the magistrates.
Some of these were persons oppressed by poverty and debts who
blindly sought toterminate a miserable existence by a glorious death
Others were aliured by the hope that a short co nfinement would
expiate the sins of a whole life; and others, again, were actuated
by a less honourable motive of deriving a plentiful subsistence,
and perhaps a considerable profit, from the alias which the charity
of the faithful bestowed on the prisoners" (II, 145)• Tillemont
had written, "Mensurius s*y plaignoit encore de plusieurs autres
qui s'exposoient trop hardiment a la persecution, les uns pour ter¬
miner promtement une vie qui leur estoit a charge, parcequ' ils
estoient accablez de dettes envers le fisc . . . d'autres qui
s*imaginoient purger & effacer (par une prison de quelque temps)
les grands crimes dont ils se sentoient coupables, & d'autres enfin
qui estoient bien aises d'estre en prison pour y estre bien traitez
par la charite des autres Chretiens, & y ammasser de lfargent"
(Ibid., V, 28). Upon occasion, Gibbon supported a statement by
citing Tiliemont,s testimony, but noted the difficulty which the
subject under discussion caused the Catholic historian. E.g., in
connection witn his account of the kinds of early martyrs, Giooon
observed, "Tillemont is not pleased with so positive an exclusion
of any former martyrs of tne episcopal rank" (IIt 109, noue).
Tillemont's words were, "C'est a dire que cfest le premier Evesque
qui y ait repandu son sang pour J. C. Cependant il est bien
difficile de croire que dans une aussi grande province qu*estoit
l'afrique, & oil il y avoit tant d'Evesques, il n'y en eust encore
jamais eu un seul de martyrize" (Ibid., IV, 641). At times, it
needs be acknowledged, Gibbon's interpretation of Tillemont's atti¬
tude seemed to partake of the character of conjecture. Thus he
claimed, "The pious Tiliemont rejects with a si gh the useful Acts
of Artemus" (II, 324, note). But under the title, "Eautes dan les
Actes d'Arteme," Tillemont had simply observed, "Ce qui y est
raporte de l'histoire Romaine, est assez exact, quoiqu*il y ait
des fautes, & est principalement conforme aux extraits qui nous
restent de Hiilostorge. Pour ce qui regarde la personne d'Arteme,
il est difficile de croire que ou Metaphraste ou quelque autre,
n'ait pas ajoute beaucoup de choses a la verite . . . Baronius aussi
les aliegue souvent, & les veut faire passer pour sinceres 6c legi¬
times. Il est nean-moins oblige de reconnoistre qu'il y a des
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choses a corriger" (Ibid,, VII, 730, note). Occasionally, Gibbon
parted company with nis predecessor, completely, and cited dim as
representative of a mistaken view. E.g., "It is evident, notwith¬
standing the wishes of M. de Tillemont, that Tertullian composed
his treatise De Carona long before he was engaged in the errors of
the Montunists" (II, 20, note). Tillemont's words were, "au con-
traire Tertullien y est plus severe (en beaucoup de points) comme
sur celui de la guerre, (qu'il ne l'est mesme dans le livre de la
Gouronne, ecrit dans son schisme)"(Ibid., III, 211, note). Simi¬
larly, Gibbon contended, "That difference, and a mistake, either of
Eusebius or of his transcribers, have given occasion to suppose two
Domitillas, the wife and the niece of Clemens" (II, 97, note).
Actually, Tillemont had only recorded the testimony of an ancient
writer, "Dion marque sur l'an 93 la mort du Consul Clement, 1'exile
de Domitille sa femrae . . . . Un autre payen nomine Brutius marque
l'exile de Ste. Domitille (vierge) niece du mesme Consul . . ."
(Ibid., II, 118, note). On rhe strength of these instances, it may
be asserteu that while Gibbon freely departed from the interpreta¬
tions of Tillemont, and upon occasion even challenged the facts
which his predecessor reported, and while in certain instances,
Gibbon's own interpretation of the earlier writer may be subject to
question, there is no evidence that he ever failed to record fully
and faithfully either the letter or the spirit of what Tillemont
wrote.
q,uite commonly Giboon made a statement, and cited Mosheim
as the source of his information. Thus he observed, "It was natural
that the primitive tradition of a church whi. ch was founded only forty
days after the death of uhrist, and was governed almost as many years
under the immediate inspection of his apostle, should be received
as the standard of orthodoxy . . . the distant churches very fre¬
quently appealed to the authority of thi3 venerable parent" (II, 9).
Mosheim had written, "Hierosolymitanae quidem ecclesiae per tempus
allquod magna fuit dignitas et auctoritas quod ex Aotis Apostolorum
patet. Ahtiocheni controversial® suam tin leg!a Mosaioae praastantia
ecclesiae huius judicio subjiciebant, Actor XV. Idem alias fec-
isse ecclesias, vorisimillimum est. Paulus divinitus licet ad
obeundum Apostoli munus vocatus, id tamen in primis agebat, ut se,
suamque disciplinam Apostolis et coetui Hierosolymitano probaret et
commendaret. Gal. 1:18, II, 7, 8. 9. Cf. J. I». Mosheim, De Rebus
Christianorum ^jjqte Constantium Magnum Comentarii. p. 153* Sometimes,
Giboon related the same external facts as Mosheim, but proceeded to
advance his own theory of motivation. E.g., "The office of per¬
petual presidents in the councils of each province was conferred
on the bishops of the principal city, and these aspiring prelates,
who soon acquired the lofty titles of Metropolitans . . . secretly
prepared to usurp over their episoopal brethren the same authority
which the bishops had so lately assumed above • . . the presbyters"
(II, 48). Mosheim had written, "Necesse enirn quondam erat, ut
certa conciliorum sedes deligeretur, unique episcoporum foedere
junctoruin potestas conoederetur, corxventus indicandi et moderandi,
suffragia colligendi, acta custodiendi, honos hie primariae in
provincia urbi, eusque episcopo plerumque habebatur: ex quo pro-
gressu temporis dignitas et jus metropolltanorum, sic primariarum
urbium episcopoa nominabanc, oriebatur" (Ibid., p. 269). n.t other
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times, Gibbon supported an assertion by a reference to Mosheim, but
also criticized his predecessor's treatment of the subject. E.g.,
for the statement, "The doctrine of Christ's reign upon earth was at
first treated as a profound allegory, wa3 considered by degrees as
a doubtful and useless opinion, and was at length rejected . .
Gibbon cited the authority of Dupin and Mosheim, but added, "the lat¬
ter of these learned divines is not altogether candid on this occasion""
(II, 26, note). Mosheim had written, "Inter has opiniones Judaicas,
quibus philosophia detrimentum hac aetate attulit, celebrior est
ceteris ilia de Christo mllle annos in his terris cum Sanctis cor-
pori suo restitutis regnaturo, inter ipsa fere rerum Christianarum
initia in ecclesiam, ut puto, introducta. Earn ad ORIGENIS aetatem
qui volebant, inter doctores libere profitebantur, et populo instil-
labant, alii licet earadem vel negarent, vel in dublum vocarent. Verum
GfilGEHES earn, philosophise quippe suae repugnantem, acriter oppugna-
bat, et quae patroni eius te3tabantur maxima, saeri codicis oracula
ilia, quam invenerat, divinos libros internretandi arte aliorsum
flectebat" (Ibid., p. 720). Occasionally, Gibbon referred to his pre¬
decessor's views only for the purpose of discounting them. E.g., in
discussing the reaction to Middleton's Free Inquiry into the Miraou-
lous Powers. Gibbon observed, "From the indignation of Mosheim, we
may discover the sentiments of Lutheran divines" (II, 31, note).
Mosheim's comment was, "Atqui ante aliquot tamen annos inter Britan-
nos extitit vir alocuin ingenio excellent!, doctrinaque haud vulgari
praeditus, OONYERS MIDDLKTON, qui satis magno volumine emi so, uni-
versam gentem Christianam levitatis in hac re condemnavit, omniaque
falsa pronuntiare ausus est, quae tot veterum ore ac calamo de
extraordinariis Spiritus S, donis et primorum saeculorum, miraculis
memoriae prodita sunt .... Historiam celeberrimi huius libri
acerriraaeque, quam nenerit inter Britannos, disputationis uetant, qui¬
bus placet, ex Britannorum, Gallorum et Germanorum diurnls erudi-
torum nctis. ex Germanica item libri ipsius conversione ac refutatione
quae nuper lucem vidit" (Ibid.. p. 221). But in every instance, even
though a different use was made of the material and another emphasis
struck, this inquiry indicates Gibbon's complete fidelity in trans¬
cribing not only the letter but the spirit of what Mosheim wrote.
.admittedly, the foregoing passages are selected only from
Chapters Fifteen and Sixteen, together with the corresponding re¬
ferences in Tillemont and Mosheim. An exhaustive study would
exceed the limits of this inquiry. But it may be hoped that they
are reasonably representative.
15. Testimony by critics to Gibbon's accuracy.
The nineteenth century historian, Henry Milman, wrote: "The
present Editor has followed the track of Gibbon through many parts
of his work; he has read his authorities with constant references to
his pages, and must pronounce his deliberate judgement in terms of
the highest admiration of his general accuracy" (Milman, Preface,
p. vii). He added, "Gibbon i3 rarely chargeable with the suppres¬
sion of any material fact." This was the appraisal of a Protestant,
but the Roman Catholic writer, Christopher Dawson (who could not be
accused of excessive admiration for Gibbon), admitted: "Gibbon was
the most conscientious historian; his critics never caught him out
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in a alalia fai.se reference or second hand quotation" (Baward Gio-
con, p. i.0). again, the rationalist historian, «T. B. Bury, ob¬
served; "Gibbon's diligent accuracy in the use of nis materials
cannot ce over-praised" (I, ix). xuid tne literary critic, waiter
Bagenot, concurred; "The laborious research of German scholarship,
a steady criticism of eighty years, nave found few faults in detail.
The account has been worked right, the proper authorities consulted,
an accurate Judgement formed" (literary Btuales, I, 216). Likewise,
the anglican writer, a, 3, Farrur, 'asserted, "Those who in later
times have re-examined Gideon's statements admit that tney can find
hardly any errors of fact or Intentional mis-statement of circum¬
stance" (a Critical History of I'rse Thought, p. 277). iOid McCloy,
who wrote a book' on' the 'premise that justice had not been done to
Gibbon's critics, admitted that "their attempt to demonstrate Gibbon
inaccurate . . . [had] wearied their readers with minute criticism
• . ." (Gibbon's antagonism to Gnrlstianlty. p. 49).
16. rreference for the primary souroe.
In tne autobiography. Gib con nad written, "as it was xay
privilege to think wi tn my own reason, so it a my auty to see with
my own eyes" (Memoir E,, p. 30p). Again, "T'ne laoours of the moderns
n^ve served to guide, not to suspend, my inquiries" (Memoir h.. p.
412). against tnis, Jawsoxx (huw^ra Giuoon, p. 1U) coxxtenaed tnut
Gibuon went to tne origixxais "to verify the references of his pre¬
decessors" and "to correct tneir judgements" ratner tnan "to build
up anew from the foundation." This is the kind of assertion which
cannot oe proven or disproved, out in the face of tne aistoriurx's
frequently reit\eruteu concern to study the originals, una to use
nis predecessors only as a guide thereto, it does not merit the
status of more than an opinion.
Giboorx was critical of the failure of other historians to
cite tne source of their information. Thus he wrote, "The total
absence of quotations is the unpardonable blemish of his entertain¬
ing history" (ii, 331, note). Again, he observed, "But he [-to¬
copius might have informed us whether he had received this curious
anecaote from common report or from the mouth of the royal physi¬
cian" (IV, 217, note). Yet Giboon found that it was not always
feasible to provide specific authority for all of his own state¬
ments. In his discussion of theological history, he wrote; "If
i persist in supporting each fact or reflection by its proper ana
special evidence, every line would demand a string of testimonies,
,nxd every note woulu swell to a cxitical dissertation" (V, 103, note),
and in his coxxaideration of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, he noted
that "as tne general propositioxxs which I advance are the result of
many pui*ticuiar uxxa imperfect facts, I must either refer the reader
to tnoae modern autnors who have expressly treated the subject or
swell tnese xiotes to a disagreeable and disproportionate size" (II,
342, note).
17. Use of txxe secondary souroe.
Giubon's occasional prefex-erxce for txxe secondary source is
illustrated oy tne following; "It is much better to read this part
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of Augustan history in so learned and exact a compilation [Tille
rnont] tnan in the originals, which have neither method, accuracy,
eloquence, or chronology" (Gibcon's Journal, p. 163).
The historian was completely free with his acKnowledgements
of instances in which he was entirely dependent upon the secondary
source: "I do not pretend to make a personal acquaintance with
Chrysostom" (III, 181, note). "I have verified and examined this
passage, but I should never, without the aid of Tillemont . . .
have detected an historical anecdote in a strange medley of moral
and mystical exhortations" (III, 129, note). "I am indebted for
these passages, thougn not for my inferences to the learned Dr.
Laraner" (II, 63, note).
18. Gicoon's disposition towards scepticism.
nn attitude of caution and wariness was constantly in evi¬
dence. More than once (II, 1, 140, 493), he referred to "the sus¬
picious evidence of ecclesiastical nistory." and he cited "the
ecclesiastical historians from whom alone we derive a partial and
imperfect knowledge of tnis persecution" (Ibid., p. 12?). .Likewise,
he announced his intention "to distrust accounts of foreign and re¬
mote nations, and to suspend our belief of every tale that deviates
from the law of nature" (VII, 100, note). Against this latter in¬
tention, Collingwood's comment (The Idea of History, p. 239) may be
applied: "The historian's experience of the world in which he
lives can only help him to check . . . the statements of his au¬
thorities in so far as they are concerned not with history but with
nature .... The laws of nature have always been the same . . .
but the historical as distinct from the natural conditions of man's
life differ so much at different times that no argument from
analogy will hold. That the Greeks and Romans exposed their new¬
born children in order to control the numbers of their population
is no less true for being unlike anything . . .[today] ." Gibbon
did concur at least with the critic's illustration, as he wrote of
the "great numbers of infants who, according to the inhuman prac¬
tice of the times, had been exposed by their parents . . ." (II, 34).
But more often GibPon's scepticism took the form of agnosticism in
which he expressed uncertainty rather than outright rejection of the
account of a writer. Thus he wrote, "I must repeat though I cannot
credit, the evidence of Phranza . . ." (VII, 190). About another
writer, he remarxea, "His opinion can never be trusted unless our
assent is extorted by the internal evidence of facts" (V, 115, note).
iUid for tne character of Mohamet, he observed, "It is dangerous to
trust eitner Turxs or Christians" (VII, loo, note), a similar
attitude is reflected in his account of the sufferings of the early
martyrs: "out I cannot determine what I ought to transcribe until
I am satisfied how much I ought to Delieve" (II, 144). The best
basis for procedure was to keep constantly in mind the nature of a
predecessor's bias; thus Gibbon carefully noted the fact of it in
each of his predecessors: "Eusebius . . . indirectly confesses
that he has related whatever might redound to the glory, and that
he has suppressed all that could tend to the disgrace, of religion"
(II, 144). Of Tillemont's Life of Augustine, he wrote, "The dili¬
gence of that learneu Jansenist was excited by devout zeal for the
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founder of Ms sect" (III, 430). Of Mosheim, he observed, "This
historian Ms been carefully strained through an orthodox sieve"
(III, 135, note), and Ms general estimate is reflected in the com¬
ment on "tne precarious assistance of the ecclesiastical writers,
who, in tne neat of religious faction, are apt to despise the pro¬
fane virtues of sincerity and moderation" (III, 128). an interest-
in^ testimony to the basis for such scepticism nas been provided by
a contemporary Christian historian: "During two thousand years,
the ecclesiastical mind in general has tended to be particularly
unfortunate in its handling of historical data; for it has cherished
more legends tnan anybody else, and has attempted to maintain them
by force when all argument in their favour has lost its efficacy"
(ii. Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War, p. 18).
Gibbon not only identified the prejudice of his predecessors
but was ever watchful for instances of its operation. Thus he con¬
tended, "Most of the moderns except Dodweli have seized the occa¬
sion [created by the ambiguity of the early fathers regarding the
hostile intentions of the emperor aurelianj of gaining a few extra¬
ordinary martyrs" (II, 122, note), and he never failed to note
wnen the bias of a predecessor was embarrassed by the nature of the
documents with wxiich he was dealing. Thus with reference to certain
writings of Irenaeus and Tertullian, Gibbon observed, "LeClerc and
Mosheim labour in the interpretation of these passages, but the loose
and rhetorical style of the fathers often appears favourable to the
pretensions of Home" (II, 49, note). Again, "Petavius . . . has col¬
lected many similar passages on the virtues of the cross which in
the last age embarrassed our Protestant disputants" (Ibid., p. 320,
note).
19. Jbimits to the scepticism.
After full aoicnowleugement has been made of the extent of
Giboon's scepticism, it is still evident that in many instances
Gibbon proceeded to place great faith in the accounts of these same
preuecessors. E.g., "We can more safely rely on the learned Euse-
bius than on the vehement Tertullian or the credulous Epiphanius"
(II, 11, note). He referred to Tillemont as "that incomparable
guide whose bigotry is overbalanced by the merits of erudition,
and whose inimitable accuracy assumes almost the character of
genius" (V, 141, note), and he described Mosheim as "learned and
impartial" and termed the latter's De Rebus Ghristlanae, "a masterly
performance, which I shall often have occasion to quote" (II, 9,
note).
20. Mistaken impression of vacillation.
To reason from the fact that tnere were instances in which
Gibbon was 'uncritical' to the conclusion that he possessed no
critical apparatus is not justified. J. B. Bury had the status of
a critical historian by the most rigid nineteenth century standards;
yet "waen he wrote on the nineteenth century papacy, he made howlers
wnich would prevent an undergraduate from gaining the bottom class
in a university examination on the subject" (Butterfield, History
and Human Relations, p. 150). It would appear that the papacy was
a dangerous subject even for the most 'scientific' of historians.
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Thus Croce cited the * contradictions* of Range's History of the
Popes, claiming that "The Jesuit . . . will always prevail from the
point of view of vigourous criticism .... Hither the Papacy is
always and everywhere what it affirms to be, an institution of the
Hon of God made man, or it is a lie" (History of Historiography, pp.
300, 310). At least Gibbon would nave experienced 110 difficulty
with the latter supposition.
21. Methods of evaluating Authorities*.
Gibbon was quick to acknowleuge when a predecessor had made
uhe conscensus: e.g., "heClerc seems to have collected from Euse-
bius, Jerome, Epiphanius, and other writers, all the principal cir¬
cumstances that relate to the Nazarenes or Ebionites" (II, 11, note),
.again, "Mosheim, from many scattered passages of JLactantius and
Eusebius, has collected a very just and accurate notion of this
eaict of Diocletian against the Christians " (II, 130, note).
He clearly recognized that the repetition of an account by
many writers added nothing to its authority. E.g., "a rumour is
mentioned by Tacitus with very becoming distrust and hesitancy,
whilst it is greedily transcribed by Suetonius and solemnly con¬
firmed by Dion" (II, 90, note). For Giboon's description of the
successive improvements of a story about Pontius Pilate, see II,
lib, note; and for further instances of the tracing of 'fictions',
see II, 128, note; 120, note; 135, note. In the face of the number
of instances which can be cited, it is difficult to believe that
Bury actually supposed that the following comment applied to Gibbon
even though he included it in an analysis of advances since Giboon's
time: "The untrained historian fails to recognize that nothing is
added to the value of a statement of ftidukind by its repetition by
Thietmar . . . and that a record ... of Theophanes gains no furtna-
credibility from the fact that it likewise occurs in Cedrenus" (I,
xi).
Variations between authorities were conscientiously noted.
E.g., "The eloquent Laotantius seems impatient to proclaim to the
worlu the glorious example of the sovereign of Gaul who, in the first
moments of his reign, acknowledged . . . the majesty of the true . .
. God. The learned Eusebius has ascribed the faith of Constantino
to the miraculous sign which was displayed in the heavens ....
The historian Zosimus . . . asserts that the emperor had imbrued
his hands in tne blood of his eldest son before he publicly re-
nounceu the gods of Rome" (II, 306). For further instances of dis¬
crepancies between Lactantius and Eusebius, see II, 143, note; be¬
tween Hozomen and Socrates, see III, 408, note; for a comparison be¬
tween Mosheixa, EeClerc and Beausobre, see II, 15, note.
Some of Gibbon's excursions into textual criticism appear
now to have been so much 'beating of the air'. Thus he questioned
the validity of a passage concerning Jesus Christ which, he con¬
tended, was inserted into the text of Josephus between the time of
Origin and that of Eusebius, and which he described as an example
"of no vulgar forgery" (II, 92, note). But Bury has pointed out
that the interpolated passage does not appear in the best manu¬
script. In certain instances, tnere has been at least partial vindi¬
cation of Giboon's conclusion. Thus he noted, "In the present text
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of ^muuianus, we read '.asper quidern sed ad lenitatem propensior*
wnich forms a sentience of contradictory nonsense. With the aid of
an old manuscript Valesius has rectified tne first of these corrup¬
tions, and we perceive a ray of light in tne substitution of the
word 'vafer'" (II, 2ot>, note). Bury's comment was "The best MS das
'afen', wnence idessling has restored '.afer', which Gardhausen
accepts" (Ibid.). In still otder instances, Gibbon was more right
than ne knew. E.g., de dad cited the statement of Eusebius regard¬
ing the erection in Rome of a statue of Constantino holding a cross
(II, 318, nole). Bury observed, "Brieger thought that in tnis case
the passage in H.E. is an interpolation from that in the Vit. C.
But Schultze . . . has shown that Eusebius mentioned the statue in
question in his speech at Tyre in 314 a.D., from H.E. x.4, 16 (II,
appendis, $95)• Eor another instance of such subsequent confirmation,
cf. I, appendix 1, 484.
alterations introduced by translators were also noted. E.g.,
"The Latin translator [of Eusebius] has thought proper to reduce the
number of presbyters to forty-four" (II, 65, note). "His [Eusebius'J
Latin translator adds the important circumstance of the permission
aiven to tne inhabitants of retiring from thence" (II, 135> note).
Cf. also II, 128, note; and II, 26, note.
On tne operation of tne 'Historical sense', Collingwood
(The Idea of History, p. 244) wrote, "Whether he [the historian]
accepts or rejects or modifies or reinterprets what his so-called
authorities tell him, it is he that is responsible for the statement
wnich, after duly criticizing them, ne makes." xuid it has also Deen
argued that "the picture of the historian's subject, though it may
consist in part of statements drawn directly from his authorities,
consists also, and increasingly with every increase in his compe¬
tence as an historian, in statements reached inferentially from
these, according to his own criteria, his own rules of method"
(philosophy and History, p. 333)•
22. The verdict of critics on Giooon's 'critical' accomplishment.
Croce (History as the Story of Liberty, p. 70) wrote, "We
must not mistake erudition and the criticism of evidence for his-
toricism [oy which he meant scientific_history]. In order to under¬
stand tne true spirit of that century [the eighteenth] , it is es¬
sential to understand that unscientific nistory and erudition not
only lived peaceably side by side, but that tne erudites, when they
tried to think, did so according to the ideas of the time, that is,
unhistoricaliy."
In his survey of tne development of historiography, Colling¬
wood significantly placed Giooon in the section before his chapter
on "Tne Threshold of Scientific History" (The Idea of History, p.
87). He also expressed amazement that Bury, ty editing Tne Decline
and Eall. should seek to bring Gibbon up to d*t e "by means of foot¬
notes . . . without suspecting that the very ai soovery of these
facts resulted from an historical mentality so different from Gib¬
bon's own that the result was not unlike adding a saxophone obligato
to an Elizabethan madrigal" (Ibid.. p. 147).
Bury (Selected Essays, p. 3) wrote, "The proposition that
before the beginning of the last [tne nineteenth] century, the study
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of history was not scientific may be sustained in spite of a few
exceptions." Giodon was not cited among the exceptions. Bury added,
"a few stand on a higher level in so far as they were really alive
to tne need of bringing reason and critical doubt to bear on the
material, but the systematized method which distinguishes a science
was oeyond tne reach of all, except a few like Mabillon. Erudition
has now been supplemented by scientific method, and we owe the
change to Germany" (Ibid.. p. 5).
23. The impossibility of 'objectivity1.
Buoterl'ieid (Christianity and History, p. 9) has argued that
to the extent technical history is not content with the presentation
of mere abstract facts and seeks to introduce an interpretation of
the meaning of what has occurred, it is guided by that "which we
bring to our history and superimpose upon it .... We cannot say
that we obtained it as technical historians by inescapable inferences
from the purely historical evidence" (p. 23). Of. also Philosophy
and History, p. 332 ff. It is now being widely recognized that the
concepts of science itself necessarily partake of the character of
interpretations. These interpretations, while they assist to piece
together into a more meaningful pattern the scattered materials of
one's experience, cannot pretend to be more than constructs of the
human mind which may in time be replaced by other interpretations
capable of making even better sense of the total xaesh of life's
experience. Of. Christianity in an Age of Science, p. 16 ff. Gf.
also Philosophy and History, p. 158, for a statement of the his¬
torically determined cnaracter of all claims to 'timeless validity'.
24. a justifiable connotation of 'scientific'.
a critic nas observed, "These limitations [inflicted by the
age in which one livesj are often taken for deficiencies as though
a more powerful tninxer than Plato would nave lifted himself clean
out of the atmosphere of Greek politics, or as if Aristotle ought
to have anticipated the moral conceptions of Christianity. Bo far
from being a defect, they are a sign of merit . . . they are most
clearly seen in those works whose quality is the best. The reason
is that the authors are doing best tne only thing tnat can be done,
expanding the position reacned by the human mind in its historical
development down to their own time" (Coliingwood, op. cit.. p. 229).
And Butterfield (History and Human .Relations, p. 170) concurred,
"The best tning that any of us can do at a given moment only repre¬
sents the present state of knowledge in respect of the subject with
which we are dealing."
It has been argued that history has to be rewritten by a
single historian who "finds when he tries to reopen an old question
that the question itself has changed. The historian can see it [the
historic processj only from the point of view which at the present
moment he occupies within it" (Coliingwood, op. oit.t p. 248).
Crocs went even further to insist that "every thinking of history
is always adequate to the moment at wnich it appears, and always
inadequate to the moment that follows" (History of Historiography,
p. 201). One feels that this is an extreme statement employed for
purposes of illustration; literally, it would mean that every
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history was 'inadequate', including Croce's nistory of historio¬
graphy.
25. The implications of the 'subjective*.
a justification of the legitimacy of divergences between
historians has been well stated by a contemporary writer thus: *a
given event may be treated by one historian as of the greatest im¬
portance, and by another as quite incidental for the knowleuge of a
certain group of facts: each of the two historians is facing it
with the experience of his own personality, i.e., as an Italian or
an Englishman, as a nobleman or a commoner; he cannot understand it
except in relation to what gives concreteness to his life. The two
historians are different from each other . . . when they introduce
their personality in order to understand historical fact, they are
introducing something different; and that is why the pictures which
they achieve by means of their honest efforts after the truth of
history turn out differently. It may be the case that both his¬
torians are right, the one finding the fact in question relevant to
his picture of history, the other finding it indifferent to his . .
. . Neither of them can exhaust historical reality just because each
sees it from his own standpoint . . .** (.Philosophy and History, p.
14a).
The advance since Gibbon*s day has been an advance in the
understanding of the limits of an historical inquiry. It is true
tnat Giooon had some presentiment of this when he insisted on desig¬
nating his suudy, an inquiry into * secondary causes'. Yet it would
be difficult for nim or any other eighteenth century writer to
understand what tne contemporary critic meant in contending: "Cri¬
tical pnilosopny will forbid all talk of the givenness of meaning
in events or in history, and will emphasize that wherever there is
an attempt to determine the guiding force of historical evolution,
totally alogical assumptions are necessarily implied" (Philosophy
and History, p. 334). What was called for from Gibbon was not the
elimination of the subjective element but only the acknowledgement
of it.
26. The basis for an evaluation of an interpretation.
It has been argued that "because our view of the signifi¬
cance of historical facts varies according to the perspective from
which we look at them, it does not follow that all perspectives are
equally false. That perspective from which we see most clearly all
the facts, without having to explain any of them away, will be a
relatively true perspective" (alan Hichardson, Christian -apologetics,
p. 105). .and Keinhold Niebuhr (faith and History, p. 172) applied
the same criterion to evaluate tne truth of the Gospel: "It [the
Gospel} is validated when the truth of faith is correlated with all
truths wnich may be known by scientific and philosophical disci¬
plines, and proves itseif a resource for co-ordinating them into a
deeper and wider system of coherence." jui entirely different
criterion has been suggested by a modern writer who argued that
standpoints may be evaluated for their 'objectivity* by the extent
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to which they aspire to the hignest standards of 'humanity* which
a particular age has been able to acnieve. Wrote tnis critic; "It
may be said generally that an historical perspective will be more
free and open for the understanding of every height and depth of
m^n in proportion as it realizes contemporary humanity in itself
with more purity and strength" (Philosopny and History, p. 15o).
27. Gibbon's desire for detacnment.
One feels that the historian took particular pleasure in
viewing the quarrels of mortals from the remoteness of philosophic
detachment. Thus in characteristic vein, he wrote, "Omnipotence
itself cannot escape the murmur of its discordant votaries since
the same dispensation which was regarded as a deliverance in Europe
was deplored as a calamity in Asia" (VI, 369). and in presenting
the impact of Constantino upon subsequent ages, he observed, "By
the grateful zeal of the Christians, the deliverer of the Church
had been decorated with every attribute of a hero . . . while the
vanquished party has compared Constantino to trie most abhorred of
those tyrants who by their vice and weakness dishonoured the Im¬
perial purple" (II, 214). The same aloofness was reflected by the
following: "I cannot discover how Protestants can be affected if
Irenaeus in the second century or Palavicini in the seventeenth
were tempted ... to countenance the system of ecclesiastical do¬
minion . . . pursued in every age by the aspiring bishops of Rome"
Misc. works, p. 740).
Recognition of the fact of the detachment has been made by
critios of diverse schools. Thus Bury sougnt to explain Gibbon's
'antagonism' by claiming that it was "the fashion of the age"
rather than anything peculiar to the man himself, and by asserting
that if Gibbon were writing today, "he would assume an attitude of
detachment from all forms of sentiment about early Christianity."
Cf. I, (1896) p. xxxix. iind Algernon Cecil (Bix Oxford Thinkers,
p. 37) observed, "The purity, the enthusiasm, tne calm serenity of
the Primitive Church passed before his eyes. He treated them with
the same cold and critical indifference as he meted out to the
vices of Elagabalus."
28. absence of evidence of an emotional involvement.
That Gibbon was primarily an intellectual and not a man of
emotion is clearly established. But that fact does not justify the
contention that "the roots of the spiritual life did not exist for
him. It never withered because it never shot up. He had no pro¬
found associations to interest his heart." This was citea by
Robertson, Gibbon, p. 8. The historian's warm attachment to his
friends and nis devotion to his calling as an historian testified
to tne existence of a 'spiritual life' even though it did not fol¬
low tne pattern of traditional religion, and tne very fact that he
wrote tne History witnessed to the interior quality of the man. as
Cassirer wrote, "What grips us in any great historical achievement
is not the report of what has happened in the past, nor is it the
rendering of something merely factual; rather we feel in it . . .
something which cannot result from anything but a peculiar
j
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spiritually personal center of life'1 (Philasopny una History. p. lp.2).
29. Keco&nition of the merits of individual Christians.
The historian observed, "Whatever opinion we may entertain
of tne character or principles of Thomas Becket, we must acknowledge
that he suXTered death with a constancy not unworthy of the primitive
m rtyrs" (II, 110, note), /aid he expressed an equally positive
attitude towards William Law, whom one might suspect would provide
as snarp an antithesis to Gibbon's approach to religion as any person
possible could: "In our family, he [Law] left a reputation of a
worthy and pious man who believed all he professed and practised all
he enjoined" (Memoir *■>.. p. 388). Upon occasion, tne same apprecia¬
tive attitude was "indicated towards Christians, collectively: "The
Christians oould allege, with truth and confidence, that tney held
the principle of passive obedience, and that, in the 3paoe of three
centuries, their ounduct had always been conromable to their princi¬
ples. Tney might add that the throne of tne Emperors would be es-
tablisned on a fixed ... basis, if all ... learned to suffer and
obey" (II, 314)• It is nardly surprising tnat tne critic who com¬
plained that Gibbon dwelt on the degenerate periods of Christianity
and passed quiciciy over its brignter cnapters was foroeu to acoount
for tnese 'exceptional* instances by intimatii^ that "there are oc¬
casions wnen its [Cnrl3tianity*s] exalted numanity can compel even
him to fairness" (Milman, QPg oit., p. vi). .aid he adaed, "He [Gib-
don] reluctantly admits taeir SXSSi to admiration." Comment upon
such unonuritable and unprovable detractions scarcely seems warranted.
30. The constructive role of tne Cnuroh.
Gibbon observed that if the Church was "always the enemy of
reason," it was "often the parent of taste" (Memoir B.. p. 199)*
«nd he contended that "the growing authority of the Popes cemented
the union of the Cnristian republic; and gradually produced the
similar manners and common jurisprudence, wnioh have distinguished,
from the rest of manxind, the Independent, and even hostile, nations
of modern Europe" (IV, 87)*
nationalists have commonly contended that Christianity was
tne enemy of reason and tne sciences. Tnus in a chapter entitled
"Heason in x-rison," J. a. Bury (a. History of Ereedom of Thought, p.
40) argued, "There were • • . doctrines and implications in Cnris-
tlanlty wnicu, forming a solid rampart against the advance of know¬
ledge , biooxea the patns of science in the Middle ages, ana ob-
s&ruo&ed its progress til the latter part of the nineteenth century."
.pud J. M. Hobertson concurred, "The subsequent intellectual new-
Dirth of European semi-barbarism was effected not through but in
tne teetn of organized Christianity, by the fresh assimilation of
ancient pagan lore ana sciences, and later tnrough tne new diffusion
of ancient learning resulting from the downfall of Christian Con¬
stantinople" (QiPbon an Christianity, p. xvi). But this view nas
been resoundingly challenged in recent years, ifor the argument
that cnristianity was the chief contributing factor in tne rise of
modern science by liberating man "from the power of baser elemental
nature ana demons," of. Hicolus Berdyaev, The Meaning of History,
p. 113, tt. Cf. al3o Herbert Butterfieid, The Origins of Modern
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Science, p. 51» ff.
In one instance, Gibson*s readiness to admit evidence re¬
gardless of what conclusion it might prompt, gst him into difficulty.
Eor despite his deep conviction that miracles were untenable in any
scientific view of the historic process, he encountered what he
considered remarkably good evidence for the ♦miracle* of the tongue-
less confessions (IV, 98). It remained for Leslie Stephen (English
Thought, II, 267) to point out that people in modern times have
been known to speax without tongues.
It may not be without interest that in 1606, Historical
View of Christianity was published (London: 0adel& Davies)' which
contained select passages of scriptures, "with a commentary by the
late Edward Gibbon, Esquire." This commentary consisted of selections
from The Decline and Eall which, the Editor claimed, supported the
argument for Christianity*s historicity. In the Preface, the Editor
(who remained anonymous) commented, "It musp De gratifying to those
who ixxterest tnemselves in the character of our historian, to behold
him producixig the most unequivocal and unexceptionable evidence in
support of Revelation." while the reader may be amused at the
seeming brashness of such an attempt and note that the passages had
to be selected with ex&reme care, the faot remains that one can find
in the History ample material which submits to an interpretation not
uncongenial 'to Christianity.
31. The charge of unfairness levelled by critics.
"Giboon suppresses all which adds to the glory of the Chris¬
tian GXxurch and suggests or raises all which tends to weaken it"
(M. Guillon, Examen Critique des Doctrines du Gibbon). This rex"er-
erxce was citeu by kcCioy, op. olt., p. 280. Such a comment can be
discounted for its Catholic animus, but an objective critic like
J. B. iilacx (The art of History, p. 170) asserted, "His entire his¬
tory is saturated with this texaperamental and intellectual anti-
patny," and contended pnut Milman's was a very moderate indictment:
"Christianity alone receives no exabeliishment in Giboon. His imagina¬
tion is dead to its moral dignity.
32. The manner of presentation.
Many of Giboon's views oxx the martyrs and the persecutions
nave been substantiated by later Christian scholars. Thus writing
of the early period of ecclesiastical history, the Christian his¬
torian, Wiliiston Walker, confessed, "Yet the number of actual
martyrs in this period appears to have been relatively small com¬
pared with those of the third and fourth centuries. No general per¬
secution occurred before 250" (a History of tne Christian Churoh.
p. 49). But with reference to the third and fourth cexituries, the
same historian coxxtended that other than in brief periods when per¬
secution assumed "great ferocity," the Christians enjoyed "a con¬
siderable degree of toleration." See Ibid., p. 84 ff, p. 109 ff.
Of interest al3o is the comment of the Christian writer, Stephen
Neili (The Christian Society, p. 38): "The Church would not have
found it necessary to order that none should be accounted as martyrs
who had deliberately courted martyrdom, unless tnere had been a ten¬
dency for some unnecessarily to seek the martyr's crown; and such a
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running upon suffering is always evidence of a certain pathological
instaciiityCf. II, 112.
"Who can refute a sneer?" asxeu to, Puley. (The Prlnoi pies
of Mor^l and Political Pniiosopny, II, ix.) "You have endeavoured
to effectuate your purposes by indirect machinations," cried Travis.
(G. Travis, natters to Euward Globon, Esq.. p. J51.) "He ridicules
in sense want he asserts "in words," complained David Dalrymple. {^n
Inquiry into tne Secondary Causes, p. vi.) nnd in a letter to Gib¬
bon, rriastl'ey wrote," ""for what can reflect greater dishonour on a
man than to say one tiling ana to mean another?" (Misc. to oras. p. 311. J
The defender, H. Porsoa, adueu, "I see nothing wrong in Mr. Gideon's
attack on Gnristianity. we can only oiarne him for carrying on the
aotciCK in an insidious manner ana with ixaproper weapons" (heiters to
Mr. ih-endeaoon Travis, p. xxv).
33. Irony not applied only against Gxxriatians.
Examples of tne application of Giboon's irony to non-Ghxds-
tian religions are plentiful. Thus of tne Jews, he wrote, "They
embraced every opportunity of uver-reacxiing tne idolaters in trade"
(II, 79). .again, "When the posterity of Abraham had multiplied like
the sands of the sea, the Deity, from whose mouth they received a
system of law and ceremonies, declared himself ... the proper God
of Israel" (II, 5). See also IX, 3, note 3; ana page 4, note 11.
.vbout another faith, he noted, "Mohamet has not specified
tne male companions of female elect, lest ne should disturb the
felicity of their former husbands by the suspicion of an everlasting
marriage" (V, 434). Again, "If we remember the seven hunured wives
and txxree nunured oorxcubixies of Salomon, we sxiull applaud the moaesty
of the ,'iXaoian wao espoused xio more than sevexxteen or fifteen wives"
(V, 403).
3h. ^p^xioatioxx of ix-ony to Cxiristiaaity.
The classical quality of tae nistoxviun*s irony is Illustrated
by the following sentexices wxiich, from a literary standpoint, would
be aifficuxt to surpass: "The revolutions of seventeexi oenturies
xxas instructed us not to px'ess too closely the language of prophecy
and revelation; out as long as for "wise purposes tais error [txie be¬
lief in the imminent enu of tne worldJ was permitted to subsist in
tne Caurcix, It was productive of the most salutary effects" (II, 23).
"We cannot eatii*ely remove tne imputation of ignorance vshieh has been
so arrogantly oast upon the first proselytes," but we must "convert
tne occasion of scandal into a subject of edification," ana remexxxber
that "the lower we depress trie temporal condition of the first Ohris-
tians, the more reason we shall find to admire their merit and suc¬
cess" (II, 72). "There are some objections to the authority of Moses
and the Prophets which too readily present themselves to the sceptical
mind, though they can only be derived from our ignorance of x*emote
antiquity and our incapacity to form an adequate judgement of the
divine economy" (II, 12).
Occasionally the note of dexdsion was very evident: "Their
[the Crusaders'} genuine leaders were a goose and a goat, to whom
were ascriceu an infusion of the Holy Spirit" (VI, 285)• Ih a note,
he referred to an "orthodox protester," a hound who barxed furiously
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durii% ode signing of a treaty of union between the eastern and wes¬
tern Churches (VII, 117). Of Cyril of Alexandria, ho observed, "The
title of saint is a mark th^t his opinions and his party have finally
prevailed" (V, 114). The saiae derision was reflected in the reference
to "the Logos . . . Taught in the schools of Alexandria, 300 B.C.
. . . Revealed to the Apostle, St. John, 97 a.B." (II, 356, 358).
This jibe aroused Collingwood's ire: "Most people icnow . . . that
the notion of the logos was a commonplace familiar to every Platonist,
but that the Johannine doctrine according to vhich the logos was made
flesh was a new idea peculiar to Christianity" (Metaphysics, p. 220).
But Gibbon more commonly relied on the subtle thrust of
•innocent' suggestion: "It is remarkable that Bernard who records
so many miracles of his friend never takes any notice of his own"
(II, 32). Shall we ascribe this [freedom from controversy} to the
simplicity of their faith and courage or to our less intimate know¬
ledge of their history?" (Ibid,, p. 114). Chapter Twenty-eight was
entitled significantly, "Final Destruction of Paganism — Introduction
of the worship of Saints and Relics among the Christians." Hor did
Giboon ever tire of conveying a meaning by expressing the opposite
sentiment: "It may be hoped taut none except the heretics gave oc¬
casion to the complaint of Celsus that the Christians were perpetu¬
ally correcting and altering tneir gospels" (II, 71). "Hor snail I
believe that the most ardent in slaughter and rapine were the fore¬
most in the procession to the Holy Sepulchre" (VI, 334). "Hor can
we hastily believe txiat the servants of the Prince of Peace would
unsheath the sword of destruction unless their motives were pure"
(VI, 276).
The Christian reaction to this treatment of Church history
might have been predicted, but the response in Scotland differed
notably from the opposition in England. Letters of eulogy from out¬
standing Scots are contained in the Misc. Works; e.g., from Br. Robert¬
son (p. 273); from Br. George Campbell of Aberdeen (p. 277) who ex¬
pressed delight in finding in Chapters Fifteen and Sixteen "so great
a coincidence with my own sentiments"; and from a Mr. Wallace of
Edinburgh (p. 278), who called the History "incomparably the finest
production in English without any exception." Scotland's recogni¬
tion of the greatness of Gibbon was marred only by a poem of carica¬
ture written by George Colman (Eccentricities for Edinburgh). Sample
lixie: (p. 86) "She bowed as near the drooping lover drew. 'She'll
let me in,' he groaned; 'and should she frown, love's bliss is lost
— but oh — what rapture to sit down'." It would appear that far
more freedom of thought und a far greater conception of tolerance
prevailed during this period in Scotland than in England.
35• The reason for the use of irony.
Bury contended that "three years imprisonment without bail
was, for the second offense, the penalty imposed on any who, brought
up as a Christian, should deny the truth of Christianity . . . irony
was the historian's uefensive armour against these barbarous laws"
(AUtobiography. p. xv). Birkbeck Hill concurred, "If at times he
veiled his scepticism with the affectation of belief, part of the
blame must be bourne by the law of the land" (Gibbon's Memoirs, edited
by B. Hill, p. xv.) But Gibbon had specifically written, "I could
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only rejoice tnat if tne voices of our priests was clamorous and
titter, their iiands were disarmed of the powers of persecution"
(Memoir E., p. 316). and Jane Norton concurred: "He lived in a coun¬
try wnere a man may speak and write as he thinks" (The Bibliography
of the works of Edward Giobon, p. 84).
Thus in contrasting his circumst ances with those of Servetus,
Giboon wrote, "I must applaud the felicity of this country, and of
this age, which has disarmed if it could not mollify the fierceness
of ecclesiastical criticism" (Misc. Works, p. 724). and he had
also written, "Nor can X reflect without pleasure on the bounty of
Nature, which cast my oirth in a free and civilized country, in an
age of science and philosophy" (Memoir B.. p. 105).
3t>. The presence of bias.
The ecclesiastical historian, H. M. Gwatkin (Early Ghurch His¬
tory to xi.!!. 313. I, 186) argued that "against Christianity in
general tne cnarge of immoralities was never much more than a vulgar
slander. Yet tney nad a colour of truth, for some of the Gnostics
were immoral," and "were said to nave recognized each other by a
mark behind tne ear." Were it necessary to choose Detween such
credibility and a full-fieaged scepticism, preference must be allotted
to tne latter.
37. The one lasting enthusiasm of his life.
In the Autobiography (p. 32), Gibbon described the excitement
with which he first came across Echard's Roman History: "To me, the
reign of the successors of Constantine was absolutely new; and I was
immersed in the passage of the Goths over the Danube when the summons
of the dinner beil reluctantly dragged me from my intellectual
feast." "nt the distance of twenty five years, I can neither forget
nor express the strong emotion which agitated my mind when I first
approached ana entered tne eternal city" (,autobipgraphy, p. 158). Of
this experience, Butoerfield (The Whig Interpretation, p. 96) wrote
that "tiie true historical fervour is the love of the past for the
sake of tne past. It was the fervour that was awakened in Gibbon at
the sight of the ruins of ancient Rome." Nor was this experience of
a passing nature. iUiy reading of his writings must convey the sense
of a deep and direct impression which Rome had made first upon the
youth ana then upon the man.
Yet a critic has argued, "Die Sentimentalitat [which Gibbon
expressed over the fall of the Empire] war auch nur die Trauer iiber
den Untergang von nufklarungswerten " (Meinecxe, op. cit.. p. 254)•
.ana Callingwood (The Idea of History, p. xii) contended that "Giboon
looks at Roman history "merely from the viewpoint of an "eighteenth
century Englishman." But the critic acknowledged(p. 79) that unlike
other eighteenth century Englishmen, Gibbon saw history as embodying
retrogression from a golden age in the Roman era rather than as pro¬
gress towards some future goal. Similarly, H. J. Blackham (The Hu¬
man Tradition, p. 11) termed Toynbee's admiration for the Greeks and
the Romans "a beautifully eighteenth-century idea, . . . which makes
him contemporary with Gibbon." But according to the critic's own ad¬
mission (p. 11), this was not the attitude of Hume, and it was not
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Voltaire'3 view, admittedly Rousseau affirmed a tueory of regress
with his conception of tne virtuous primitive society which was
undermined by icings and priests, but Rousseau was not a classicist.
One wonaers about the basis, other than in Gibbon, for this 'beauti¬
fully eighteenth-century idea*.
Gibbon's first attempt at writing wa3 entitled "The age of
Besostris," in wnich he sought "to investigate the probable date of
the life and reign of the conqueror of asia" (^utooiograpay, p. 43).
his first published work, tue Essal Bur 1'etude da la litterature.
was a defence of classical studies as oelng of relevance to tne
modern world. Significantly, nis only other work published uefore
the history, Gritioal Ooservations on the hixtn Book of the asneid.
belonged to tne same classical period, -aid his unpublished works
contained a large number of monographs on subjects related to anti¬
quity.
Glowingly, he wrote, "It [the Empire] comprehended the fair¬
est part of tne eartn and the most civilized portion of mankind . .
• . The gentle but powerful influence of law and manners had gradu¬
ally cemented tne union of the provinces. Tneir peaceful inhabitants
enjoyeu and abused the advantages of wealth and luxury ... if a
mail were called to fix the period in which the human race was most
nappy ana mo3t prosperous, he would without hesitation name that
which elapsed from tne death of Domitian to the accession of Com-
modus" (I, i, 80). nnd of tne nntonine emperors, he observed, "They
enjoyed without a division the inimitable ooncord of virtue and
friendship, tne unsuspecting confidence of authority und obedience"
(among tne GlDUon Papers, VII, 293).
Critics' n~ve complained of the 'contradiction* between Giooon's
admiration for the order of the Empire and his recognition of the
evils of imperialism. Thus Meinecke (op. pit., p. 250) argued, ".aber
hat er inn, nat er die von ihra angenommene fatsaohe, dass hochstes
Menschengluck in diner schon dem Untergange gaweihten Kultur sich
entfaltet hat, wirklich gonz tief und rein tragison empfunden?" But
Gibbon would nave argued that absolutism was not inherently self-
destructive. Political despotism did not, in nis judgement, neces¬
sarily involve imperialism. Thus he could appreciate the advantages
of an enlightened despotism wniie repudiating tne inevitable evils of
imperialism, and tnat he recognized the danger is reflected by tne
observation tnat "the happiness of an hundred millions depended on
tne personal merit of one or two men • • . " (IV, 177).
38. Errors resulting from tne attitude of partiality.
The historian freely confessed his favourable disposition to¬
wards Rome. Thus he wrote, "-m often as I use the definition 'beyond
the nips' 'the Rhine', 'the Danube', I suppose myself at Rome" (X,
xviii. hut sometimes tne preference was not as defensible. E.g.,
ne hastened rapidly over nrnold of Brescia while dwelling on Rienzi,
"the constructive theories of the greater of the tribunes*' being "of
little significance compared with the pageant of revived antiquity
of wnich Rienzi was tne central figure" (Thompson, op. cit., p. lo).
likewise, his assumption tnat tne outin was the only tradition worthy
of note, and that nothing outside of it deserved tne name of civili¬
zation, led him to a disparagement of the eastern erapire, whose his¬
tory he referred to as "a tedious and uniform tale of weakness and
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misery" (V, 180). This verdict has been hit upon by critics (fol¬
lowing bury, I [1896] xvi) as one of the most unjustifiable judge¬
ments ever rendered by a "thoughtful" historian.
Gibbon argued that confusion might have resulted from two
possible meanings of the term 'Galilaean' in the testimony of Taci¬
tus. It might refer to the Christians or to a small group of Jewish
nationalists. "How natural it was for Tacitus in the time of Hadrian
to appropriate to the Christians the guilt and the suffering which
he might with far greater truth assign to a sect almost extinguished"
(II, 95)♦ Bury commented, "Gibbon's conjecture is not happy and
need not be seriously considered," and Guizot also annihilated
Gibbon's argument (Guizot's Edition. I, 2.15, note). But Gibbon
described his argument as "no more than a conjecture." Guizot
(Ibid.. p. 179, note) also argued against Gibbon over the universal
toleration which the latter had claimed for the era. The critic
cited the advice of Mecaenas to Augustus, "Honour yourself the gods
with care according to the wishes of our fathers, and. compel others
to honour them." Bury cited Gibbon's failure to indicate that it
was an age of religious revival; (I, 61, note) and Collingwood
(Metaphysics, p. 74) claimed that he missed the "internal strains"
and tensions of the times: "He begins by depicting the Antonine
period as a golden age, that is, an age containing no internal
strains whatever, and from this non-historical or anti-historical
tenor of its opening, the narrative never quite recovers."
39. The confirmation of critics.
^tfter pointing out that the emperors in this era threw off
the cloak of humility, and despotism became established in principle
as well as fact as the government of Rome, James Bryce (Holy Roman
Empire, p. 5) described the period thus: "Few troops were quartered
through the country . . . few fortresses .... The distant crash
of war from the Rhine or the Euphrates was scarcely heard or heeded
in the profound quiet .... no quarrels of race or religion dis¬
turbed that calm." And Arnold Toynbee concurred: "The picture of
the Graeco-Roman world during the second century after Christ wit¬
nessed a change for the better from the same world two hundred years
earlier. Before it had been wracked by revolution, seething with
tumult and violence. But in the second century after Christ, we
find peace . . ." (The World and the West, p. 91). And Herbert
Butterfield (Christianity in European History, p. 7) reached a simi¬
lar conclusion: "Shortly before the time of Christ there had opened
in the civilized world around the Mediterranean Sea a period of
peace which . . . was to last for two centuries — a phenomenon which
would be difficult to parallel."
40. Gibbon's obliviousness to his own era.
"I entered Parliament without patriotism find without ambition"
(Misc. Works, p. 314). Throughout the correspondence, the impression
is that political connections were important to Gibbon for what per¬
sonal emolument they might bring* And he wanted his political acti¬
vities not to interfere with his historical studies. Thus he con¬
fessed his happiness with the "unbroken vacation of the Board of
Trade" which "made it possible to enjoy weeks of repose in my
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library" (Misc. Works, p. 300). Gibbon's most positive statement
about Parliament concerned its contribution to his training as an
historian: "The eight sessions I sat in Parliament were a school
of civil prudence, the first and most essential virtue of an his¬
torian" (Autobiography. e. 179).
So astute a student of history might have foreseen the con¬
sequences of the policy of Lord North. Gibbon later did condemn
him: !tI repeat that in my opinion Lord North does not deserve par¬
don for the past, applause for the present, or confidence for the
future" (Autobiography, p. xii). Yet he recounted that he supported
"with many a sincere and silent vote the rights, though not perhaps
the interests, of the mother country" (Memoir E.. p. 310). Thus he
endorsed a policy which was certain to lose his country its most im¬
portant colonial possession. Almost to the end of the conflict, he
was without insight as to the outcome. See Misc. Works, p. 267, 271.
as R. B. Mowat (Gibbon, p. 177)observed, "The decline and fall of the
first British Empire in America had begun, but he only discerned the
decline and fall of the ancient Roman Empire." But Gibbon did make
a comparison between the two Empires; see Misc. Works, p. 313. And
at least one of his judgements concerning America proved correct; he
predicted that the loss of the American colonies would not ruin Eng¬
land's trade.
The significance of the French Revolution also escaped him.
Oblivious of the seething social forces which had finally broken
through to the surface, he referred to it as "an outbreak of popular
madness." "Could I have forseen the storm," he wrote to Sheffield
(Misc. Works, p. 156) he would have arranged his personal plans dif¬
ferently. As late as 1786, he invested in a new loan of the King of
France (Ibid.. p. 348). Even after the outbreak, he could offer no
explanation. "What a strange world we do live in," he wrote, "You
will allow me to be a tolerable historian. Yet after a fair view of
ancient and modern times. I can find none that bear any affinity to
the present" (Ibid.. p. 390).
This failure of insight has drawn the censure of critics: "He
had no more grasp of what either of them [the War of Independence
or the French RevolutionJ meant to the world of history than Mrs. Par¬
tington had of the strength of the Atlantic when she tried to sweep
its tide out with her broom" (Henry Morley, Carisbrook Library Edi¬
tion of Giboon's Autobiography, p. xv). "Er besass weder die viel-
seitigen Interessen seines schottischen Zeitgenossen noch dessen
historischen Blick. Wenn er grossere Anerkennung gefunden hat, so
darf daraus nicht geschlossen werden, dass er der bedeutendere His-
toriker gewesen ist" (Fueter, Historiographie. p. 369). And a friendly
critic lamented, "all those years of contemplation of the downward
course of ancient things left him not a whit more philosophically
alive to the main drift of his own age than the ordinary run of its
politicians . . ." (Robertson, Gibbon, p. 103). But it was pre¬
cisely the extent of the historians involvement in 'ancient things'
which made it difficult if not impossible for him to be a competent
critic of his own age.
41. Justification for the Inquiry into ecclesiastical history.
While the main line of justification was in tracing Chris¬
tianity's contribution to the Empire's fall, still the historian
might properly analyse the new situation which emerged as Rome
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declined. as Adolphus Ward ("Gib?>on" in The Cambridge History of
English Literature. X, 313) observed: "How it [the Empire] gradually
verge'} to decline and fall is only half the story. The other half
shows how its fall was followed by long centuries of life in the
eastern, and a revival, under new conditions, of its existence in the
western world. He [Gibbon! bids us consider not only what it was
that declined and fell, but also what grew into life."
Gibbon often stated the reason for his involvement in ecclesi¬
astical history. Thus he wrote, "So deeply did they effect the de¬
cline and fall of the empire, that the historian has too often been
compelled to attend the 3ynods" (VI, 115). "The flames of the Arian
controversy consumed the vitals of the empire" (II, 462). To ac¬
count for his extensive treatment of the Crusades, Gibbon charged
that "they undermined the Gothic edifioe" (VI, 462). And In intro¬
ducing his chapter on itonastioism, Gibbon wrote, "The indissoluble
connexion of civil and ecclesiastical affairs has compelled and en¬
couraged me to relate the pr sgress, the persecutions, the establish¬
ment, the divisions, the final triumph, and the gradual corruption
of Christianity" (IV, 62).
Sensitive to the charge of an exoessive interest, he claimed
that he was not concerned "v/ith the dark abyss of predestination and
grace" (V, 176). And he commented sardonically, "The reign of the
four successors are distinguished by a rare though fortunate vacancy
in ecclesiastical history" (V, 149). Again, "The historian of the
empire may overlook those disputes which were confined to the ob¬
scurity of schools and synods" (IV, 104).
42. The surmise of critics.
J. M. Robertson (Gibbon. p. 78)wrote, "The main fallacy of
Gibbon was in calling Christianity the cause of the decay of the
Empire." This critic also recognized that Gibbon was groping for the
*real* causes, (op. 97, 100); but that he mainly subscribed to the
common vie\v is indicated by the following criticism of Morlson: "If
he had argued that Gibbon erred in calling Christianity the cause of
the decay of the Empire, he would have been right" (p. 84). A. H,
Thompson (Gibbon, p. 8)argued, "In Christianity he saw the power
which had sapped the greatest of human institutions and he brought
all his command of irony upon the cause of this catastrophe" Alger¬
non Cecil (Six Oxford Thinkers, o. 234) wrote with reference to "the
greatest tragedy or wmcn nistory has to tell": "For so unnatural
an event there must [for Gibbon] n ve been an unnatural reason. That
reason he found In Christianity'." The more recent study by Shelby
McCloy echoed the general verdict; he cited "Gibbon*s main conten¬
tion that the rise and progress of Christianity was the primal cause
of Rome * s decay and fall" (McCloy, op. qit.. o. 50). F. H. Ridley
argued that "to attribute the collapse "Tor the Empire] to the triumph
of Christianity as Gibbon did, is absurd" (Julian the Apostate, p. 56).
Arnold Toynbee (The Study of History, abr., p. 260) claimed that in
Gibbon, "The Hellenic Society, embodied in a Roman Empire which was
at its zenith in the Age of the Antonines, is represented as having
been overthrown by a simultaneous assault from two alien enemies
attaching on two different fronts: The North European barbarians
. . . and the Christian Church." But the best known indictment was
made by tne friendly editor, J. B. Bury, who interpreted the state¬
ment, "I have described the triumph of barbarism and religion,*' as
meaning that for Gibbon, "the historical development of human societies
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since the second century after Christ was a retrogression for which
Christianity was mainly to blame" (I, vii).
J. B. Black (The Art of History, p. 1?0) dissented from the
common view arguing that "the disparagement of Christianity is a dif¬
ferent thing from singling it out as the chief cause." And F.
Meinecke (op. cit. . p. 25?) concurred: "Bs ist nicht richtig, dass
er in erster Linie dem Christentum die Schuld am Verfall des Reiches
zuschreibe, denn das 'langsame und geheime Gift* sah er schon lange
vorher in seinen Kingeweiden wirken." Meinecke in a note (Ibid..
p. 252) reported that Trude Benz, in Die Anfchronologie in der
Geschichtschreibung des 18 Jahrhunderts (i'932). .joined in this con¬
clusion, but the present writer has not seen the latter reference.
Bury appeared to echo the view of the cause of the decline
which has been attributed to uibbon, when he wrote, "In the strength
of ancient ideas lay the strength of the Roman empire; Christianity
was the solvent of these ideas, and dissolved also the political
unity of Europe" (A History of the Later Roman Emoira. 1889, p. 1).
But Bury's view changed. As Harold Temperly, in an Introduction to
Selected Essays of J. B. Bury, pointed out, "In the earliest study,
he adopted conventional explanations ... in his latest [1923] he
adopted the 'contingency1 theory throughout," which asserted that the
fall of nome could be attributed to a "conflux of coincidences."
Such shifting is perhaps illustrative of Bury's famous remark that
an historian did not do his duty unless he changed his mind every
two years,
43. Inquiry into actual causes.
Critics have often ignored or overlooked the fact that this
inquiry was made by Gibbon. Thus Algernon Cecil (Six Oxford Thinkers,
p. 32) after subscribing to the traditional view that Gibbon re¬
garded Christianity as the cause of the Empire's collapse, nroceeded
to rehearse some of the 'real* causes of that occurrence, which
actually added little to Gibbon*3 own analysis, but which, the critic
claimed, ^constitutes the real reply to the innuendo of The Decline
und J'all." iUid Coleridge complained that "to call it a history of
the decline and fall, was there ever a greater misnomer? I do not
remember a single philosophical attempt made throughout the work
to fathom the ultimate cause of the decline and fall of the empire."
This reference to Table Talk was cited by Robertson, Gibbon, p. 40.
The only possible defence for Coleridge's comment is by virtue of a
narrow, nineteenth century connotation of the term 'philosophical*.
The concern to uncover causes produced at least one instance
of clear contradiction; for in one instance Gibbon argued that the
chief "immediate" cause was the abandonment of curiases and helmets
by the army in the reign of Gratian; but in a later chapter he con¬
tended that the chief immediate cause was the great settlement of the
Goths in the east beginning in the reign of Valens. (This contra¬
diction was cited by Robertson, Gibbon, p. 97.)
44. Inadequacy of the inquiry.
J. Macmurray has argued (Conditions of -Freedom, p. 64) that
force can never establish security and must always finally defeat its
own nurpose since it inevitably nroduces fear and insecurity. But it
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is worth noting that in his annotated cony of the History. Gibbon
wrote, "Should I not have deduced the decline of the empire from
the civil wars which ensued after the fall of Nero, or even from
the tyranny which succeeded the reign of Augustus. Alas, I should,
but of what excuse is this tardy knowledge. Where error is irrepar¬
able, repentance is useless" (I, 1896, xxxv). In still another in¬
stance, it would appear that Gibbon anticipated his critic; for Toyn-
bee (The Study of History, p. 261) wrote, "When the whole story is
taken into account, the rapid decline of the Emoire after the Anto-
nine Age is seen to be not at all. surprising." But Gibbon himself
had written, 'Instead of inquiring why the Roman empire was destroyed,
we should rather be surprised that it had subsisted so long" (IV, 174).
45. A scientific study.
A critic argued that in explaining the success of Christianity,
there was in addition to the operation of the Supernatural and "the
very lowest of moral principles" a third factor, "the highest kind of
moral principle." Sara Hennell (Early Christian Anticipation of an
Approaching End of the World, p. 67) wrote: "The supposition on the
part of Gibbon that it was possible to effect a due consideration of
the history of Christianity while this prime element was either left
in the background or entirely ignored is the deficiency . . . of . . .
his philosophy," But Gibbon's position was clearly closer to ortho¬
doxy, which teaches that there is no "highest kind of moral principle"
apart from the operation of the Supernatural; and this latter, Gibbon,
as a scientific historian, had specifically pledged himself not to
attempt to evaluate.
46. Views of critics on Gibbon's approach.
Adolphus Ward ("Gibbon," op. cit.. p. 317) contended, "Nor
did he ask his readers to shut their eyes to the cardinal fact . . .
that 'in the Christian dispensation as in the material world, it is
as the first great cause that the Deity is most understandably pre¬
sent'." And MacDonald ("Irony in History," op. clt.. p. 546) con¬
curred: "He nowhere intimates that these secondary causes are suf¬
ficient (but the contrary) to account for the progress of Christianity
and ... he unmistakably asserts that these causes were used or
over-ruled by Divine Providence to execute the purpose of promoting
the reception of this pure and humble religion." The real intent of
Gibbon's irony appears so evident that this misreading of his meaning
must be attributed to the desire to provide an interpretation which
deviated from the traditional one.
47. The famous five causes.
Morison (Gibbon, p. 24) argued that these were 'effects*
rather than 'causes* and were explicable only as the result of "deep
antecedent forces." How these 'deep antecedent forces' might be
analysed by the scientific historian, the critic did not indicate;
nor had the awareness that effects may also be causes, apparently oc¬
curred to him. Most modern Christian scholars would coneede that
they may rightfully be considered 'causes'. Cf. Walker, op. cit..
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p. 493. among Gibbon's early antagonists, the debate hinged uoon
the question of the sufficiency of such factors in explaining the
success of Christianity.
48. The zeal of the Christians.
Critics have contended that the positing of a Jewish origin
was inadequate to exnlain the real eraergence of this oassion which
led people to embark upon "one long trial of self denial'1 (Morison,
Gj bbon, p. 123) . J. H. Newman (An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of
Assent, p. 458) argued that it was not from the Jews but from "the
thought of Christ" that Christian zeal stemmed. The inference was
that Christian zeal is inexplicable apart from a supernatural explana¬
tion. but as has been argued, how must one account for the zeal
which inspired Mohammedanism? Might it not with eaual validity point
to the inevitability of a supernatural explanation?
49. The belief in immortality.
In an argument with Sheffield on the question of immortality,
Gibbon indicated astonishment "at the horror some conceive at the
idea of annihilation," since "how can that be dreadful of which one
cannot be sensible . . . Eternal existence might be a blessing but
still I should not think of it when annihilated" (Among the Gibbon
Papers, IX, 49).
Critics have not been satisfied with Gibbon's handling of the
belief in immortality. 'Thus Morison (Gibbon, n. 124) demanded,
"Whence arose . . . the sudden blaze of conviction with which the
Christians embraced it?" But is it within the scone of the scienti¬
fic historian to attempt to answer this question? Another writer
complained, "He implies throughout his representation that the Jews
received the belief solely as a means of heightening their own present
worldly advantages" and that "the same effect goes on increasingly in
the hands of the Christians*' (Hennell, op. cit.. p. 78). It would
be difficult to establish a sole motivation for any belief; yet
Gibbon might properly point out that the conviction of immortality
was not without its practical, present-worldly value. Henry Milman,
who had once criticized Gibbon for finding natural causes for the
rise of Christianity, later wrote, ^There can be no doubt both that
many of the early Christians almost hourly expected the final des¬
truction of the world, and that this opinion awed many timid believers
into the profession of Christianity, and kept them in trembling sub¬
jection to its authority** (History of Christianity, I, 455).
50. The miracles.
Occasionally Gibbon did advance what may be regarded as a
naturalistic interpretation of the miracles. Thus he wrote, *A
seasonable storm of rain, hail, and lightening, which refreshed the
Aomans and dismayed the barbarians was improved into a miracle, which
might be variously ascribed to Egyptian magic, to Jupiter and Mercury,
or to the God of the Christians' (Among the Gibbon Papers, VII, 293).
■ttgain, Every event or appearance, or accident, which seems to
deviate from the ordinary course of nature has been rashly ascribed
to the immediate action of the Deity' (II, 322), It may be argued
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that normally Gibbon regarded a naturalistic interpretation to be
identical with a denial of miracle which could be understood on no
other basis than the operation of the Supernatural. But Gibbon
would have been on firmer ground merely to advance the naturalistic
explanation and oerrait the reader to formulate his own final conclu¬
sion.
The historian cited the instance of Irenaeus, a bishop of
Gaul though an Asiatic, who, though needing the gift of sneaking in
foreign tongues supposedly bestowed upon others, was compelled to
struggle as best he could with a barbarian dialect (II, 30). Thus
there is no basis for the critic's supposition that Gibbon's impulse
to expose the falsity of eost-aoostolic miracles suggests that he
assumed that there were true miracles. Macdonald ("Irony in History,"
op. cit,. p. 555) contended, "In the contrast which he runs between
the true and the false, he does not merely concede, but claims, that
there must have been true miracles."
51. The good • orks of the Christians.
Gibbon argued that the concern for the reputation of their
society might have been a motive for martyrdom among the Christians.
"Could we suppose that the bishop of Carthage employed the Christian
faith only as an instrument of ambition, still it was incumbent on
him to support the character ho had assumed" (II, 110). Yet these
martyrdoms were not without effect, for "the morality which led to
a mortification of the flesh" and a strict denial of the normal
pleasures was "so extraordinary and so sublime as must inevitably
com mand the veneration of the people" (Ibid.. p. 110). This sentence
smacks of irony; yet one does not sense "irony in the historian's
treatment of the good works of the Christians. It is doubtful
whether the critic's inference is sound: "In suggesting that the
progress of Cnristianity was aided by the virtues of its first con¬
verts, we feel that Gibbon wrote with tongue in hi3 cheek" (Edward
Clodd, Edward Gibbon, p. 52). This would appear to be a projection
of the supposition of an all-consuming animosity for which there is
no foundation.
52. Ecclesiastical organization.
Synods had obvious advantages over the independent congrega¬
tions. Especially as the numbers of th-^ Christians multiplied, clear
benefit could be derived from a close union of their interests and
designs. "It was natural," Gibbon observed sardonically, "to believe
that a liberal effusion of the Holy Spirit would be poured on the
united assembly of the delegates of the Christian people" (II, 46).
Rome's rise could be explained due to its position as "the
greatest, the most superior, and among the western churches, the most
ancient of all Christian establishments" (II, 48). This ciroumstance,
and the faot that Rome could claim two apostolic founders, Peter and
Paul, supported the ascendency of the Roman primate.
James Bryce (The Holy Roman Empire, p. 9) ascribed a motive
for txie development of ecclesiastical government other than the
passion for power: "Its (Christianity's} inexperience was perplexed
by a sphere of action vast and varied. The natural course seemed to
be to follow the precedent of the state and sacrifice individual
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freedom to uniformity and precision. Thus a hierarchy shaped
itself." But the contemporary Christian historian, Herbert Butter-
field, concurred with Gibbon. In illustrating the contention that
power is self-peruetuating and leads inevitably to corruption, Butter-
field argued, "We can see enough in history to justify the assertion
that ... in the . . . ♦Church' (having in mind those visible
ecclesiastical organizations that play their oart in mundane history)
the same principle holds good, for even there, men will go on simply
expanding their oower once they see that they are in a position to
do it with impunity" (Christianity, Diplomacy, and War, p. 56).
53. Motives of the Christians.
Greed motivated Christians, according to Gibbon. E.G., "The
want of riches could comrel them [the bishopsj to deserve the public
esteem" (III, 375). "A weighty incumbrance of gold is said to have
impeded the Cardinal's flight" (VII, 154). "The bishopric is now
worth 20,000 ducats, and is therefore much-less likely to produce
the author of a new heresy" (III, 161). Gibbon occasionally did
stress the economic aspect of ecclesiastical evolution. Thus he
wrote, "A general tax . . . was imposed on the laity, and even the
clergy of the Latin Church, for the service of the holy war. The
practice was too lucrative to expire with the occasion; and this
tribute became the foundation of all the tithes and tenths on
ecclesiastical benefices which have been granted by the Roman Pon¬
tiffs to Catholic sovereigns or reserved for the immediate use of
the Apostolic See" (VI, 369).
Ambition, Gibbon argued, was the reason for the immense
interest in the government of the Church. It was "the ambition of
raising themselves and their friends to the honours and offices"
which "was disguised by the laudable intention of devoting to the
public benefit the power and consideration whi ch for that purpose
only it became their duty to solicit" (II, 42).
54. Materials for a doctrine of original sin.
In his emphasis on the darker, self centered side of human
nature, was not Gibbon inadvertently approaching the Christian doc¬
trine of original sin? "A Christian is bound by his very creed to
suspect evil. He sees evil where others do not. His instinot is
divinely strengthened. His eye is supernaturally keen. He owns
the doctrine of original sin, and that doctrine nuts him neces¬
sarily on guard against appearances and prepares him for recognizing
anywhere that which he knows to be everywhere" (Mozely Letters, p.
333, cited by Acton, Lectures on Modern History, o. 26). Gibbon's
inquiry into the motivation of human beings has produced materials
which might support this hypothesis. Butterfield's assertion
(Christianity and History, p. 35) that if history points to any one
truth, it is that all men are sinners, would hardly be seconded by
Gibbon 'without a thousand reserves*. Yet a nlain reading of his
judgement upon the 'follies and foibles' of human nature might lead
to such an anomalous conclusion.
55. The thought underlying the event.
Referring to Brutus* "God-like stroke," Gibbon argued that
"since our esteem is bestowed by the intention rather than the
action, we ought to be well assured that the intention was pure from
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any interested . . . motive . . . not the hasty suggestion of resent¬
ment or vanity, but the calm result of consistent . . . virtue."
Gibbon examined various aspects of Brutus' career on the assumption
that "it is the uniform tenor of his life . , . which must . . .
acquit or condemn" him. His conclusion: Brutus' action in other
contexts produced no confidence in the ourity of,his moral inten¬
tions (-among the Gibbon Papers, IX, 264). Whether convincing or
not, it did suggest Gibbon1s attempt to capture "the thought under¬
lying the event."
Gibbon would not have seconded Acton's conception of history
as "a schoolmaster to bring men to Christ" (Acton, Lectures on
Modern History, p. xvii), but he did allow that an historian might
be a friend to virtue, with these exceptions: allow great latitude
in the means; incline more to personal than to social virtue;
moderns, if religious, pervert their natural ideas. Cf. Gibbon's
"Hints," No. xiii, op. pit.. IX, 187.
56. Minute difference in ecclesiastical controversies.
"On the substance of the [filioque] doctrine," Gibbon argued,
"the controversy was equal and endless; reason is confounded by the
procession of the Deity: the Gospel, which lay on the altar, was
silent; the various texts of the Fathers might be corrupted by
fraud . . . neither side could be convinced by the arguments of their
opponents . * . the bishops and monks had been taught from their in¬
fancy to repeat the form of mysterious words; their national and
personal honour depended on a repetition of the same sounds" (VII,
115). The Christian theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, has conceded
that "this fact [that all forms of holiness and all signs of redemp¬
tion must be related to God's nature] hardly justifies the long
'filioque' controversy ... in which theologians sought abortively,
either to prove or to disprove that the Holy Spirit proceeded from
only the Father or from both the Father and the Son" (Faith and
History, 0. 191) . " " ~
"
The impact of enthusiasm, Gibbon argued, was temporary and
passing. "The human character, however it may be exalted or de¬
pressed by a temporary enthusiasm will return, by degrees to its
proper and natural level" (II, 41). "The fine problems of the In¬
carnation were forgotten in the more popular and visible quarrels
of the worship of images" (V, 152). "The religious fervour was
the illusion of the moment . . . the sense of interest is strong
and lasting" (V, 283).
57. Intolerance among the Christians.
In his Glfford Lectures, entitled "Religio Historic!,"
"Religion in a Westernizing World" (delivered at the University of
Edinburgh, New College, in October-November, 1953), Arnold Toynbee
noted the treatment of this tonic by the seventeenth century writer
Bayle. Bayle had asserted that the Christians refused to extend to
heretics and infidels the privileges they claimed for themselves.
Since Gibbon was well acquainted with Bayle's writing — see II,
313, note, for his reference to the Dictlonnaire Critique de Chauf-
feple — there is reason to suppose that he was influenced by the
earlier writer. One does not find any specific instance of acknow¬
ledgement unless Gibbon's comment that "the celebrated Bayle . . .
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has refuted, with superfluous diligence . . . the arguments by
which the bishop of Hippo .justified . . . the persecution of the
Donatists," be so interpreted. (Of. Ill, 427, note)
Tertullian had written, ''How shall I admire, how laugh, how
rejoice, how exult, when I behold so many nroud raonarchs, and fancied
gods, groaning in the lowest abyss of darkness, so many magistrates
who persecuted the name of the Lord, liquefying in fiercer fires
than they ever kindled against the Christians ... so many philoso¬
phers . . ." (II, 29).
58. The view of later historians.
Acton (History of freedom, p. 203) argued, "The Church cannot
tolerate any species of government where this right [to freedom of
conscience] is not recognized. The Church has succeeded in producing
the kind of liberty she exacts for her children only in those states
which she has herself created, or transformed. Real freedom has been
known in no state which has not passed through her medieval action.
The Church could never abandon the principle of liberty by which she
conquered Pagan Rome." That Acton individually was a staunoh defen¬
der of liberty cannot be questioned. But his concern for freedom
from political encroachments might have naturally led to a compar¬
able concern for the right of conscience to be free from ecclesia¬
stical interference. Is it unfair to susnect that ActonTs lifelong
allegiance to the Roman Cliuroh made this consideration far less
crucial than it might otherwise have appeared?
J. B. Bury (A History of Freedom of Thought, p. 35) argued
that however much Christians may have claimed the right of toleration
when they were a minority, "when a Christian state was established,
they would completely forget the principle which they had evoked.
The martyrs died for conscience not for liberty. Today, the greatest
of the churches demands freedom of conscience in the modern state
which she doesn't control, but refuses to admit that when she has
the power, it would be incumbent on her to concede it. It was a duty
to impose on men the only true doctrine."
John Macmurray (Conditions of Freedom, p. 63) illustrated
his contention that real freedom hinges upon two fundamental con¬
siderations, cooperation and fellowship, by suggesting the Roman
system provided the factor of cooperation, "based wholly upon law
and administration," without concerning itself about unities of fel¬
lowship, "except in so far as they threaten to disrupt the system of
cooperation which it maintains," Christianity, Macmurray maintained,
introduced the other essential element, "the binding force of a sense
of fellowship which is direct and personal."
59. The idea of individual independence,
"Liberty was in fact the ultimate standard," wrote Bury.
"Perhaps there was no deeper feeling in his breast than jealousy of
personal freedom and independence" (Autobiography. p. xvi). And
Guizot paid tribute to "that liberality of mind which suffei's not
itself to be bound by institutions or bv times" (Guizot's Edition,
p. xv). And Meinecke (oo. cit«. p. 254) added, "Der Typus des
vornehmen englischen Geschmacksmenschen schlug in ihm wieder durch.
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Shaftesbury hatte einst diesen Typus zu befeelen und zu vertiefen
vermooht. Bei Giboon fuhrte er zu einera geniebenden Intellectual-
ismus von hochster Kraft und unbedingter Selbstsicherhoit."
But bis independence was not independence from friends. "Yet
I feel, " he wrote, "and I shall continue to feel, that domestic soli¬
tude suits me ill" (Misc. Works, p. 136).
In explaining his reluctance to attend a masnuerade which re¬
quired for its success a large subscription, Gibbon wrote, I sub¬
scribed but am very indifferent, about it. A few friends and a great
many books entertain me, but I think fifteen hundred people the worst
company in the world." This was cited by G. 0. Trevelyan, The Ameri¬
can Revolution. Ill, 191.
Gibbon's conception of independence xirithin absolutism may
sound strange to modern ears; yet that a system of enforced coopera¬
tion is not without attraction ha3 been admitted by no less a defender
of freedom than John Macmurray: "The military dictatorship of the
world, with scientific instruments of terrorization sufficient to
make resistance futile would be a solution to the colitical task.
It is not difficult to Imagine conditions arise in the near future
which would make it preferable for the mass of mankind to an inter¬
national anarchy. Under Augustus, the Roman empire did just this
for the civilization of its time, and the peace it imposed and . . .
the cooperation it achieved were hailed as a boon in its own day
and are still held up for admiration in ours" (Conditions of Freedom,
p. 102), ™
Gibbon reasoned that if final authority rested with the ag¬
gregate of the people, there wa3 no assuranoe that the rights of the
individual would be respected. "I will never persuade the people to
shake off the yoke of absolutism that they may proceed from murmur
to sedition, and from sedition to anarchy" (Misc. Works, p. 225).
"The most perfect equality of freedom requires the directing hand of
a superior magistrate" (II, 44). Thus he concluded that democracy
held out the "apple of false freedom," anarchy; and observed that
"the blackest demon in hell is the demon of democracy" (Misc. Works.
P. 392). Macmurray (op, oit.. p. 34) wrote, "Democracy as we know
it is not of itself a guarantee of freedom, far less is it to be
identified with freedom." He acknowledged also that absolutism
occasionally has provided the freedom and stability in society, "so
essential to the independence of the individual."
Meinecke wrote, "Einmal kam ihm da bei der Riickschau auf sein
Lebenswerk inmitten des Vernunftstolzes wohl der Zweifel an, ob er
nicht doch einige Bluraen der Phantasie, einige anmutige Irrtumer,
mit dem Unkraut des Vorurteils in sich ausgerottet habe . • . . Es
war eine ganz leise Beriihrung mit Stromungen, die seine Zeitgenos-
sen bereits zu bewegen anfingen, ein ganz leises Zeichen, dass die
Aufklarung ihre Grenzen zu ahnen begann" (dp. cit.. p. 255).
60. Conclusion - in defence of Gibbon.
The argument thus would contest two statements made at the
Gibbon Centennial in 1894; for M. Erant Duff declared, "Undoubtedly
his attitude to Christianity is the feature of his great work which
has done most to diminish his influence, and all educated men, to
whatever school they belong, now admit with his masterly biographer
that it is a most serious blemish" (Proceedings of the Gibbon Com¬
memoration. p. 15). .And Frederic Harrison ad'ed, "No one now thinks
of defending Gibbon's treatment of the rise of Christianity, of the
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foundation of the medieval church, of the work of the Catholic
apostles, saints, and statesman. Far from being just to the creed
he despised, he was more than unju3t to the purest and noblest of
mankind" (Ibid., o. 22). Also questionable was the contention of the
rationalistic writer, Sara Hennell (Early Christian Anticipation,
p. 76): "We owe to him a large contribution towards the delineation
of the outer surface of Christianity . . . but towards the true his¬
tory of Christianity, he has contributed nothing." To write thus
of a 'true* history is entirely arbitrary and carries no more weight
than that of one person's opinion.
The nature of the scientific approach to history has been
well stated by the Christian historian, Herbert Butterfield, who
wrote: "It was discovered that by restricting oneself to the realm
of secondary causes, one could pursue certain kinds of more mundane
enquiry to better purpose. This is . . . one of the secrets of the
transition to the scientific method of modern times" (History and
Human Relations, p. 137)• And with respect to science in general,
the same critic (p. 102) contended, "A natural scientist is pledged
to work in the way Gibbon purported to do; that is to say, he con¬
fines his explanations to the causes that are 'under God', and he
would be committing an act of sabotage if he brought God into his
scientific argument."
The rationalist, Edward Clodd (Edward Gibbon, p. 39) was,
therefore, mistaken in contending that "by the concession which Gib¬
bon made to the orthodox in his lip service as to the divine origin
of Christianity, he was heavily handicapped. He had to fall back on
his ingenuity in suggesting secondary causes." This study has sug¬
gested that the device was of real significance in the defence of
Gibbon's History as a restricted and a scientific inquiry, impart
from it, his treatment would have been exposed indefensibly to the
charge of rationalistic dogmatism.
61. Conclusion - weaknesses and deficiencies.
The ever-present danger of a scientific study is the supposi¬
tion that its explanation is all-sufficient. Against this, Butter-
field (op. cit., p. 138) effectively argued that "it was a modern
piece of wilfulness which made men think that technical history and
natural science were qualified to settle ultimate philosophical
questions," forgetting "the very factor which gave the scientific
method the advantage in efficacy and intensity . . . the restriction
of the scope of physical enquiry itself."
Critical history is based upon the assumption of certain fun¬
damental regularity in the life of the past. A3 Leslie Stephen
(English Thought. I, 190) argued, "Rational criticism is possible
only on the constant assumption that the phenomena have always been
governed by laws now in operation. Admit a systematic interference,
or even an occasional interference, and we are at once at sea with¬
out a compass . . . the fir3t test of credibility of an ancient docu¬
ment which in the absence of collateral testimony, can be tried
only by its inherent probability, vanishes ..." Against this,
Macintosh's argument will not stand: "Historical research as these
writers conceive it may without offence be characterized as a par¬
ticular kind of game, one rule being that wholly unique events, or
miracles, do not happen; and if you are going to play the game, you
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raust iceep the rules. You must never discover anything that is super¬
natural" (Types of Modern Theology. p. 203). But the fact remains
that these are the rules of the game. What would appear to be re¬
quired is not a setting aside of the 'rules', but rather a recogni¬
tion of their status as such. The absence of such recognition has
been the traditional failure of rationalist approaches to history.
And the error has been amply exposed. As F. H. Bradley (The Presup¬
positions of Critical History, p. 15) put it, "There is no such thing
as history without a prejudication . . . the real distinction is be¬
tween the writer who has his prejudications without knowing what they
are, and the writer who consciously orders and creates from the known
foundation of that which is for him the truth." Thus the conclusion
of this incuiry seems warranted: critical history may be autonomous
within its field, but it needs to recognize the limits of the field.
"The claim, that all scientific activity must vindicate its legiti¬
macy at the bar of 'ratio' nobody will contest. If, however, blind
to other forces that may happen to be operative, it poses as monarch
in the realm of science, it is guilty of overstepping its judicial
competence" (Philosophy and History, p. 328).
62. Conclusion - lasting significance.
G. M. frevelyan (Clio, a Muse, p. 191) has observed that "the
works of great historians of former times should not be relegated to
the dust heap because in certain points they have been supplemented
or corrected by works of smaller intellectual powers." And Bury
(Selected Essays, p. 18) added, "They abide as milestones of human
progress . . . they belong to the documents which mirror the form
and features of their age, and may be regarded as part of the most
valuabla material at the disposal of posterity."
If Carlyle's passionate treatment of Cromwell haired to
correct a distorted view of dispassionate historians (as Yrevelyan,
op. clt., p. 180, has suggested), may not Gibbon's 'dispassionate'
approach to ecclesiastical history have helped to correct a distorted
view of the subject xvhich might be traced to the passionate, partisan
allegiance of earlier ecclesiastical historians?
The recognition that Christian faith cannot be based uoon
historical facts which come within the domain of the critical his¬
torian would appear to be well established. Yet modern writers have
expressed ideas which suggest continued confusion on this question.
Thus H. M. Gwatkin (Early Church History, p. 10) wrote, "By far the
strongest blow yet struck at Christianity is Leasing*s dictum — that
events of time cannot prove eternal truths." But the fact remains
that they cannot, and the contention of Oscar Cullman (Christ and
Time, p. 32) does not help to clarify the confusion: "All points
of this redemptive line are related to one historical fact . . . This
fact is the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ." At least this
type of statement could contribute to the impression that Christians
considered the Resurrection a demonstrable 'historical fact* apart
from faith, which in itself is a disservice. The empirically veri¬
fiable 'historical fact* was that some people believed there had been
u Resurrection. Fortunately, representative Christian thinkers have
been entirely clear on this subject: Thus Reinhold Niebuhr has
written, ' Thi3 pinnacle of faith ... has no support from miraculous
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facts in history; neither can it he deduced from a careful observa¬
tion of the general facts of human nature and history" (Faith and
History, p. 169)* And the apologist, Alan Riohardson, has argued,
"Revelation in history is not identical with historical facts; there
must be some orior enlightening of the eyes of the mind before either
the facts or their meaning can be seen in their true perspective"
(Christian Apologetics, p. 107).
Even more significant has been the recognition that critical
rationalism has played its cart in the recovery of this insight. Thus
the Christian historian Butterfield (History and Human Relations,
p. 143) has confessed, "Modern science has been beneficial for Chris¬
tianity in that it has made religion cease to be plausible except as
an essentially spiritual thing." And the Christian writer, Basil
Wllley, has concurred: "Christianity can now be more clearly seen
for what it really is than ever before . . , • We • . . owe ... it
to the critical rigours and destructive rationalism . . . which have
removed all but the essential foundations of religion" (Christianity.
Past and Present. p. 131).
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